For decades, international observers framed arms transfers to the Israeli military almost exclusively around Western suppliers. That focus changed when Amnesty International released a new investigation on July 30, 2026, documenting a steady supply of military hardware sent from India to Israel. The findings show that Indian exporters maintained these shipments long after global institutions issued explicit warnings about war crimes and genocide in Gaza.
The trade volume reflects a deep integration between the defence industries of both countries. Investigators analysed shipping manifests and customs records, identifying 2,596 distinct shipments of arms components, ammunition, and military vehicle parts sent to Israeli contractors between October 2023 and November 2025. The recorded cargo includes over 564,000 parts for explosive ordnance, such as drone warheads and artillery shell casings. It also includes 390,000 small arms components designed for military-grade weapons.
This trade is not an accidental outcome of globalised supply chains. It is the result of long-term economic and security policy. India’s defence cooperation with Israel expanded significantly during the 1999 Kargil War, when Israel delivered mortar ammunition and precision supplies. Over the following decades, this relationship shifted from basic purchasing to joint manufacturing. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” initiative, New Delhi encouraged foreign defence companies to build factories inside the country. Israeli defence firms established joint ventures with Indian partners to manufacture machine gun parts and specialised drone components. While this strategy expanded India’s domestic manufacturing base, it also tied Indian factories directly to arms used in military operations across Gaza.
Field research in Palestinian cities shows where these components end up. Investigators have recovered debris from specialised munitions in areas like Khan Younis. This wreckage includes warheads designed for the Skystriker loitering munition, a suicide drone made by Israeli contractor Elbit Systems. Key parts for these warheads were manufactured in India by Alpha Elsec. A similar pattern exists in heavy artillery supply lines. High-explosive 155mm artillery shells, designed to strike targets at ranges of up to 24 kilometres, have repeatedly hit urban neighbourhoods and medical facilities in Gaza. These shells were supplied to Israeli defence contractors by Munitions India Limited.
The involvement of Munitions India Limited creates direct legal risks for the Indian government. The company is not a private contractor; it is a state-owned enterprise owned and operated by the Indian government. Under international law, a government that transfers weapons knowing they may be used to commit grave human rights violations risks complicity in those crimes. Because the exporter is state-owned, the Indian government cannot claim distance from the private market. At the same time, corporate executives authorising these shipments face legal risks, including potential civil liability and criminal responsibility under international standards.
The physical evidence of military components stamped 'Made in India' arriving at Israeli defence facilities demonstrates that New Delhi is no longer merely a passive diplomatic actor in the Middle East.
Weak regulations in India make these transfers easier. India is not a member of the Arms Trade Treaty, having abstained during the United Nations vote in 2013. Its national export controls do not require mandatory human rights checks. Because of this, military components move across borders under general customs codes for dual-use hardware with little public disclosure or oversight regarding their final use. Furthermore, these transfers continued after the International Court of Justice ordered states to prevent acts of genocide in Gaza.
Before publishing the report, Amnesty International wrote to the Indian government and nine manufacturing companies, later named in the report, detailing these shipping records. None of them provided a response. Meanwhile, local health authorities in Gaza report that the death toll has passed 73,000 Palestinians. Amnesty Secretary General Agnès Callamard publicly called on India to suspend all military export permits to Israel, stating that permitting these shipments breaks the obligation to prevent international crimes.
Beyond the immediate legal vulnerability, India’s supply role highlights a deeper strategic shift in Global South politics. Historically, New Delhi maintained a diplomatic posture grounded in solidarity with anti-colonial movements, including explicit support for Palestinian self-determination. Over the past decade, however, transactional defence economics have increasingly overridden those historic diplomatic principles. By positioning itself as a low-cost, high-volume production hub for international arms firms, India has integrated its state-owned industrial base into global supply lines that operate outside Western regulatory frameworks.
This integration creates a clear contradiction in India’s broader foreign policy branding. New Delhi regularly seeks to position itself as the representative leader of the Global South; a bridge between developing nations and global governance institutions. Yet when state-owned enterprises export artillery shell casings and drone warheads that sustain urban bombardment in Gaza, that diplomatic claim loses structural credibility. The physical evidence of military components stamped “Made in India” arriving at Israeli defence facilities demonstrates that New Delhi is no longer merely a passive diplomatic actor in the Middle East. It has become an active manufacturing participant in the conflict’s material supply chain.
As international legal scrutiny around arms transfers expands beyond Western capitals, New Delhi faces an unavoidable policy choice. It can continue to prioritise industrial joint ventures and defence trade revenues, or it can update its national export controls to match its international legal obligations under the Geneva Conventions. Attempting to maintain a position of diplomatic neutrality while permitting state enterprises to supply military hardware to an active conflict zone is an unsustainable strategy.