In the age of artificial intelligence, when technological advancement is progressing faster than social and political institutions can adapt, a question posed a century ago demands reconsideration: Is the global economy moving along the paths economists once imagined, or has it taken a fundamentally different turn?
In 1930, John Maynard Keynes wrote an essay, Economic Possibilities for Our Children, wherein he famously predicted the achievement of an economic crescendo within a hundred years; a time when life would be defined beyond economic hustles and the pursuit of virtues.
Keynes was not ignorant of disruptions. He observed rapid economic progress and accurately noted the disparity between economic advancement and inherited human expectations. He used the term “technological unemployment”, a condition where the discovery of means to economise on labour precedes the search for new applications for labour.
What he could not fully foresee was the permanence of this transition. This maladjustment remains a pervasive problem within contemporary economics. The issue persists as the world transitions into a fully optimised era of artificial intelligence, reducing the chances of finding new forms of labour.
Artificial intelligence not only automates physical labour; it increasingly replaces cognitive tasks such as analysis, coordination, and even judgment. For developing countries like Pakistan, unemployment, unequal distribution of resources, weak industrial bases, and demographic pressure are not roads to prosperity but risks of long-term exclusion.
Keynes understood that economics is never only about output. In human history, he argued, the struggle for subsistence remained the central point of life. Evolution, starting from primitive forms, has been a process of acquiring the necessities of survival. Therefore, our evolution is based on our impulses and deepest instincts to solve the economic problem.
In current times, when economic growth fails to translate into meaningful changes in livelihoods, societies experience not liberation but anxiety. While wealth accumulates at the top, insecurity widens at the bottom. Growth without inclusion raises tension and pessimism towards institutions.
The defining question of our time is no longer whether technological advancement can solve the problem of economic growth. The real question is whether societies can build social and political institutions capable of translating technological power into shared prosperity
However, proceeding with the assumption of continuous growth, Keynes contended that if the rate of technological progress were maintained, humanity would achieve an eightfold improvement in its condition within a century. This would solve the lifelong economic problem. Consequently, the struggle for subsistence would no longer be the permanent problem of the human race.
The economic crescendo might cause nervous breakdowns because of the accumulation of wealth and capital, potentially developing a collective sense of a lack of meaning in life. This is primarily because human history reflects a struggle to overcome scarcity, and in this struggle, both individuals and societies find meaning that keeps the social fabric intact.
Our moral values were shaped by centuries of scarcity and an obsession with wealth and accumulation. Once again comes the point where the gap between technological advancement and inherited expectations will require decades to adjust, even after the pinnacle is achieved.
If one employs an absolute interpretation of Keynes’ predictions and evaluates them on a scientific scale of success, the results might not be encouraging. Does this imply that Keynes failed to account for the externalities of social and political structures? The answer suggests otherwise. His anticipation of future success was conditioned upon the ability to control population growth, avoid war and civil dissension, entrust science, and manage the rate of accumulation through the gap between production and consumption.
Almost a century later, the world continues to grapple with issues that were once considered mere conditions. Developing countries still face rapid population growth without any real power to control the surge. The threat of war appears more imminent than ever, accompanied by numerous waves of civil unrest, no longer restricted to developing countries. The tariff war between the United States and China, the two principal forces in the global economy, and escalating tensions between them over the years, also challenge Keynes’ predictions.
The rate of accumulation is a major concern following the rise of artificial intelligence. There are monopolies of knowledge and access. Only a few companies control most data centres, resulting in the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few.
The economic crescendo that Keynes once dreamt of remains a dream of the future. Keynes did not fail to predict the future; he not only accurately anticipated the highest point of economic achievement but also warned of the challenges along the path. In fact, the factors he identified as threats to human prosperity and the achievement of ultimate success are prevailing in the world today.
If Keynes were alive today, he would likely emphasise the need for robust competition policies, open standards, and active state intervention to invest in the public good. This would entail reducing inequality and ensuring wealth circulates more freely, helping sustain economic prosperity until material concerns cease to dominate human life.
The defining question of our time is no longer whether technological advancement can solve the problem of economic growth. The real question is whether societies can build social and political institutions capable of translating technological power into shared prosperity.