The Nuclear Tightrope: India-Pakistan Relations, Deterrence, and the Perpetual Risk of Escalation

In this timely episode of Unraveled with Marvi Sirmed, economist and columnist Dr. Aqdas Afzal joins us to unravel the deeply flawed logic behind South Asia’s most dangerous standoff. Just weeks after India’s largest conventional strike inside Pakistan in decades, and Pakistan’s swift military retaliation, both nations appear locked in a game of nuclear brinkmanship—with neither side willing to blink. Indian Prime Minister Modi’s “Doctrine of Deterrence” claims India will no longer be blackmailed by Pakistan’s nuclear threat. Meanwhile, senior Pakistani politicians like Hanif Abbasi and Omar Ayub have publicly hinted at the possibility of using nuclear weapons. The world is now watching two nuclear-armed states daring each other to cross the line. But is this rational behavior—or dangerous illusion? Dr. Afzal argues that the classic game theory assumptions—especially the idea that all players are rational—don’t apply to the India-Pakistan conflict. Instead, flawed mental models, nationalist myths, and the “Madman Theory” are pushing both countries closer to disaster. From Clausewitz to constructivism, from deterrence to delusion, this episode challenges everything you thought you knew about South Asia’s security calculus. Topics covered: Why the “game of chicken” doesn’t work in nuclear South Asia Modi’s nuclear bluff and Pakistan’s deterrence doctrine Madman Theory: Appearing irrational as strategy The danger of flawed mental models and bounded rationality Why peace requires a people-centric, constructivist approach—not just military realism Whether you’re in Delhi, Lahore, Washington, or London, this is a conversation that demands your attention.