On Wednesday, during the National Assembly proceedings, former NA Speaker and a Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz MNA, Ayaz Sadiq, referred to the circumstances in which India’s downed and captured pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, was presumably returned.
Before I get to Sadiq’s statement, let me point out that he was nowhere in the decision-making loop. He was present in a meeting called to brief a group of parliamentarians representing all the parties in NA regarding Pakistan’s decision to return the downed pilot. Since I was not in that meeting, even though I have spoken to sources who know what transpired there, I will not comment on Sadiq’s statement in the videoclip that has gone viral and predictably picked up and hyped by the Indian media. What I will say, however, is that the decision was taken, after Pakistan showed the resolve to strike back, to signal to the world that (a) it does not want to escalate, but (b) it will retaliate if India chose to escalate.
I have written about this before, but let me recap some fundamental points:
a: After the Pulwama attack, based on statements from India, the BJP’s electioneering slogans and intelligence reports, Pakistan had warned relevant world capitals that India was planning to aggress against Pakistan. They were also told that while Pakistan did not want a conflict, in the event that India resorted to hostile action, Pakistan would not have any option but to go for quid pro quo-plus. Those warnings, unfortunately, weren’t heeded.
b: This changed when India attacked a seminary on the morning of February 26. Washington tried to convince Pakistan to not retaliate since no damage had been caused by the Indian aerial attack. Western capitals had chosen to side with India. Pakistan refused to stay quiet.
c: The Indian Air Force expected retaliation and flew combat air patrol through the evening and intervening night of February 26/27. On the Pakistani side, Pakistan Air Force was given the task to draw up the plan for a counter-strike and execute it. Initially, PAF had decided to strike four targets for a kill but were asked to only go for a show of resolve in order for the operational plan to remain dovetailed with the overall strategy of resolve but restraint. This was also important, at the early stage of conflict, to put the onus of escalation on India.
d: The PAF strike package executed Op Swift Retort on the morning of February 27. One MiG 21 was a certain kill with the pilot captured while a Su30MKI sustained damage and probably went down somewhere in Occupied Kashmir. Earlier, as per the final plan, the PAF fighter jets struck close to the selected targets but did not go for a kill. The action also showed India that Pakistan would not be deterred.
e: That evening, the R&AW chief spoke with then-DG-ISI and reportedly said that India would retaliate with a missile strike on nine targets. He was told that such an action would invite a Pakistani missile counterstrike. These facts have already been reported and are in the public domain. India was also in communication with the United States and the latter, through former US National Security Advisor, John Bolton, was trying to defuse the situation.
f: Pakistan had prepared for an Indian missile attack. As Prime Minister Imran Khan also said in the NA (and later reports corroborated his statement), India had prepared to launch an attack between 2100 and 2200 hours on February 27.
g: A combination of factors got into play: Pakistan’s resolve to strike back and fire three missiles for every one Indian missile strike against targets in Pakistan; Washington’s hectic diplomacy at that point (it had earlier thought that India would draw blood and Pakistan would be hard pressed to respond); the involvement of other state actors, including China and the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan’s decision to debrief the captured pilot and return him.
[NB: Since memories are short, let me remind the readers that Pakistan had also returned one of the captured Indian pilots, Flight-Lieutenant Nachiketa Rao, during the Kargil conflict while the other pilot, Squadron-Leader Ajay Ahuja got killed after bailing out.]
h: India’s February 27 threat to resort to missile strikes clearly showed that after the PAF action on the morning of February 27, the Indian Air Force could not deliver a counter-punch which, theoretically, necessitated a destabilising action. Pakistan communicated its response to such an action, forcing India to calculate the cost of escalation. Corollary: the PAF had carried the day.
i: India’s threat and Pakistan’s response showed the perilous and flawed premise on which India’s limited, swift war concept is based. Exchange of missiles between a nuclear dyad is a big No. There’s no way that the threatened can figure out whether the threatener is using conventional warheads on its missiles. In the heat and din of a conflict, the threatened can neither afford to fail-deadly (retaliate to a conventional strike by a nuclear one) or fail-impotent (get decimated by a nuclear strike). Corollary: the chances of failing-deadly increase manifold.
This is a bird’s-eye view of the chain of events. The real issue, which necessitated this recap, is the absolutely irresponsible statement made by Sadiq, first on the floor of the House and then reinforcing the original stupidity by putting out a clarification (through a videoclip).
Sadiq has been the speaker of the House. He is generally considered to be an equable person. Those who have been in public office, or at any point were entrusted with positions in the strategic decision-making chain, bear a very heavy cross: it’s called responsibility. Politics rotates; today’s opposition is tomorrow’s government and vice versa. In government, many positions and offices are privy to very sensitive information. People in such positions are considered adults and the information they come across and the decisions they make are a trust. That trust belongs to the state; neither to any political party nor to the partisan-political side of a government. Politicking belongs in a different domain.
I don’t know whether Sadiq strayed across the line inadvertently or was made to cross that line, but frankly that does not matter. If the first, he has no reason in the future to be entrusted with public office; if the second, then the PMLN seems to have decided that if it can’t be in the Penthouse, it will dynamite the entire condo.
What is even more surprising is the fact that the PMLN leadership, to the best of my knowledge (I hope I am wrong), has issued no statement condemning, unequivocally, Sadiq’s egregious blabbering.
The military round in February 2019 was won squarely by PAF. Everyone, from those on the ground to the pilots in the air, fought for Pakistan, the state. They were neither fighting for the PTI nor the PMLN and certainly not for blathering, partisan cretins.
In his clarification, Sadiq spoke about how the Indian media has twisted his words. What did he expect when he crossed the line from partisan politics to affairs of the state. Is he telling us that he had no idea that the Indian media would pick up his reckless words, that he is the personification of Hanlon’s razor? Worse, that he didn’t know the damage he would cause both to the deterrence trajectory and strategic signalling.
And if we do accept Hanlon’s razor in his case, what’s the lesson here? Strategy Street is not for jaywalking.
The writer is a former News Editor of The Friday Times and reluctantly tweets @ejazhaider
Before I get to Sadiq’s statement, let me point out that he was nowhere in the decision-making loop. He was present in a meeting called to brief a group of parliamentarians representing all the parties in NA regarding Pakistan’s decision to return the downed pilot. Since I was not in that meeting, even though I have spoken to sources who know what transpired there, I will not comment on Sadiq’s statement in the videoclip that has gone viral and predictably picked up and hyped by the Indian media. What I will say, however, is that the decision was taken, after Pakistan showed the resolve to strike back, to signal to the world that (a) it does not want to escalate, but (b) it will retaliate if India chose to escalate.
I have written about this before, but let me recap some fundamental points:
a: After the Pulwama attack, based on statements from India, the BJP’s electioneering slogans and intelligence reports, Pakistan had warned relevant world capitals that India was planning to aggress against Pakistan. They were also told that while Pakistan did not want a conflict, in the event that India resorted to hostile action, Pakistan would not have any option but to go for quid pro quo-plus. Those warnings, unfortunately, weren’t heeded.
b: This changed when India attacked a seminary on the morning of February 26. Washington tried to convince Pakistan to not retaliate since no damage had been caused by the Indian aerial attack. Western capitals had chosen to side with India. Pakistan refused to stay quiet.
c: The Indian Air Force expected retaliation and flew combat air patrol through the evening and intervening night of February 26/27. On the Pakistani side, Pakistan Air Force was given the task to draw up the plan for a counter-strike and execute it. Initially, PAF had decided to strike four targets for a kill but were asked to only go for a show of resolve in order for the operational plan to remain dovetailed with the overall strategy of resolve but restraint. This was also important, at the early stage of conflict, to put the onus of escalation on India.
d: The PAF strike package executed Op Swift Retort on the morning of February 27. One MiG 21 was a certain kill with the pilot captured while a Su30MKI sustained damage and probably went down somewhere in Occupied Kashmir. Earlier, as per the final plan, the PAF fighter jets struck close to the selected targets but did not go for a kill. The action also showed India that Pakistan would not be deterred.
In his clarification, Sadiq spoke about how the Indian media has twisted his words. What did he expect when he crossed the line from partisan politics to affairs of the state
e: That evening, the R&AW chief spoke with then-DG-ISI and reportedly said that India would retaliate with a missile strike on nine targets. He was told that such an action would invite a Pakistani missile counterstrike. These facts have already been reported and are in the public domain. India was also in communication with the United States and the latter, through former US National Security Advisor, John Bolton, was trying to defuse the situation.
f: Pakistan had prepared for an Indian missile attack. As Prime Minister Imran Khan also said in the NA (and later reports corroborated his statement), India had prepared to launch an attack between 2100 and 2200 hours on February 27.
g: A combination of factors got into play: Pakistan’s resolve to strike back and fire three missiles for every one Indian missile strike against targets in Pakistan; Washington’s hectic diplomacy at that point (it had earlier thought that India would draw blood and Pakistan would be hard pressed to respond); the involvement of other state actors, including China and the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan’s decision to debrief the captured pilot and return him.
[NB: Since memories are short, let me remind the readers that Pakistan had also returned one of the captured Indian pilots, Flight-Lieutenant Nachiketa Rao, during the Kargil conflict while the other pilot, Squadron-Leader Ajay Ahuja got killed after bailing out.]
h: India’s February 27 threat to resort to missile strikes clearly showed that after the PAF action on the morning of February 27, the Indian Air Force could not deliver a counter-punch which, theoretically, necessitated a destabilising action. Pakistan communicated its response to such an action, forcing India to calculate the cost of escalation. Corollary: the PAF had carried the day.
i: India’s threat and Pakistan’s response showed the perilous and flawed premise on which India’s limited, swift war concept is based. Exchange of missiles between a nuclear dyad is a big No. There’s no way that the threatened can figure out whether the threatener is using conventional warheads on its missiles. In the heat and din of a conflict, the threatened can neither afford to fail-deadly (retaliate to a conventional strike by a nuclear one) or fail-impotent (get decimated by a nuclear strike). Corollary: the chances of failing-deadly increase manifold.
This is a bird’s-eye view of the chain of events. The real issue, which necessitated this recap, is the absolutely irresponsible statement made by Sadiq, first on the floor of the House and then reinforcing the original stupidity by putting out a clarification (through a videoclip).
Sadiq has been the speaker of the House. He is generally considered to be an equable person. Those who have been in public office, or at any point were entrusted with positions in the strategic decision-making chain, bear a very heavy cross: it’s called responsibility. Politics rotates; today’s opposition is tomorrow’s government and vice versa. In government, many positions and offices are privy to very sensitive information. People in such positions are considered adults and the information they come across and the decisions they make are a trust. That trust belongs to the state; neither to any political party nor to the partisan-political side of a government. Politicking belongs in a different domain.
I don’t know whether Sadiq strayed across the line inadvertently or was made to cross that line, but frankly that does not matter. If the first, he has no reason in the future to be entrusted with public office; if the second, then the PMLN seems to have decided that if it can’t be in the Penthouse, it will dynamite the entire condo.
What is even more surprising is the fact that the PMLN leadership, to the best of my knowledge (I hope I am wrong), has issued no statement condemning, unequivocally, Sadiq’s egregious blabbering.
The military round in February 2019 was won squarely by PAF. Everyone, from those on the ground to the pilots in the air, fought for Pakistan, the state. They were neither fighting for the PTI nor the PMLN and certainly not for blathering, partisan cretins.
In his clarification, Sadiq spoke about how the Indian media has twisted his words. What did he expect when he crossed the line from partisan politics to affairs of the state. Is he telling us that he had no idea that the Indian media would pick up his reckless words, that he is the personification of Hanlon’s razor? Worse, that he didn’t know the damage he would cause both to the deterrence trajectory and strategic signalling.
And if we do accept Hanlon’s razor in his case, what’s the lesson here? Strategy Street is not for jaywalking.
The writer is a former News Editor of The Friday Times and reluctantly tweets @ejazhaider