There has been much speculation in the Pakistani media about Pakistan-Saudi relations since Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi obliquely criticised Riyadh’s foot-dragging on the Kashmir issue in the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation).
The FM’s statement stirred the pot because Pakistan has traditionally toed Riyadh’s line on many foreign policy issues. Saudi Arabia has also helped shore up Pakistan’s fledgling finances through an oil credit facility and remittances from the Gulf account for nearly half of total remittances to Pakistan. According to State Bank of Pakistan figures, remittances from Saudi Arabia and UAE have shown an increase of 74.5 per cent and 26 per cent respectively in July this year compared to the same period last year; this despite the pandemic, shrinking coffers in host countries and an oil-price slump.
Additionally, during his February 2019 visit to Islamabad, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman had announced a USD 6.2 billion emergency economic relief package for Pakistan, including USD3 billion in loan and USD3.2 billion in oil credit on an annual basis for the next three years. Pakistan, at the time, was looking to shore up its foreign exchange reserves and avert a balance-of-payments crisis.
It is generally accepted that these are important levers and help Riyadh exercise considerable influence over Pakistan’s foreign policy choices, especially in the Middle East and with respect to other states in the Muslim bloc.
Last year, Pakistan pulled out of the Kuala Lumpur Summit convened by former Malaysian prime minister, Mahatir Mohamed, after Riyadh took the position that the summit was a move to divide the Muslim bloc and create an alternate OIC.
Given the traditional trajectory of Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia, the levers Riyadh has, and the fragile state of Pakistan’s economy, the debate has either criticised Qureshi’s statement or wondered how and why he might have said what he did. There has also been speculation about whether he played off his own bat or expressed institutional thinking. If the first, would the Saudis ask for his scalp; if the latter, what exactly is Pakistan’s calculation.
Two important factors have been forgotten in this debate: first, what leverage does Pakistan have with Riyadh? Put another way, why would Riyadh facilitate Pakistan? Surely, there are no free lunches in this world for anyone, the ummah rhetoric notwithstanding. Second, what are the Saudi concerns with reference to the Muslim bloc and why.
These two questions are vital to understanding the choppy waters Pakistan has to negotiate. While it is easy to criticise the current government on social media, that is no substitute for serious policy thinking. Let’s try a bird’s-eye view of the lay of the land to appreciate what Pakistan has to contend with going forward.
While the world has come to know Saudi Arabia as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since it came into being in 1932, two of its defining features have got buried in the silt of history: it is an artificial entity put together by the House of Saud and kept from unraveling through multiple strategies underpinned by oil wealth, selective coercion and smart internal compacts. In other words, Saudi Arabia, as constituted, is about the House of Saud. This subsumption of state in the dynasty may not be as total as the Romanovs in pre-Revolution Russia but it is much the same.
In fact, a number of western allies of Riyadh have pointed to the fact that eighty odd years of Al Saud rule in combination with other factors could mean political chaos in a post-Saud KSA.
Second, Riyadh is increasingly trapped by choices that undermine its long-cherished goal to lead the Muslim world. Instead of acting as a unifying force, Riyadh under the young MbS has embarked upon a trajectory that now threatens to tear the Muslim bloc asunder.
The situation is exacerbated by Iran, which has its own power-projection project in the Middle East and the Levant. Further, ever since the civil war in Syria and President Erdogan’s internal consolidation of power and external regional policies, the Middle East’s fault-lines have deepened.
At one time Israel was a unifying force for the Muslim world, especially the Arab states. It is now a fracturing force.
To get an idea of how KSA looks at Turkey and Iran, let me quote from an August 16 op-ed by Dr Ali Awedh Asseri in Arab News. Dr Asseri is a senior former Saudi diplomat and was Riyadh’s ambassador to Islamabad from 2001 to 2009:
“It is quite unfortunate for Turkey that it is led by a megalomaniac neo-Ottoman whose insatiable quest for domestic control and regional hegemony knows no bounds. For almost two decades, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has invoked old wounds to upset domestic peace and regional geopolitics. His personal spree for dividing the Islamic world has gained momentum more recently.” (italics added)
At another place, Dr Asseri writes: “Last December, Pakistan had acted wisely by boycotting one such gathering in Kuala Lumpur, which was an attempt orchestrated primarily by Turkey and Iran to challenge the leadership of the OIC.” (italics added)
Now read this in conjunction with what Roger Boyes wrote for The Times UK on August 18: “The man who is given most public credit for negotiating a groundbreaking deal between Israel and the UAE is the head of Mossad, Yossi Cohen. He has been talking secretly with fellow spooks in the Gulf states for years, pointing out that they shared a common enemy: Iran. But there was one encounter about 20 months ago when he let slip another agenda. ‘Iranian power is fragile,’ he reportedly told spymasters from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, ‘but the real threat is from Turkey.’” (italics added)
On August 13, Israel and the UAE signed an agreement mediated by President Donald Trump. Under the peace deal, Israel and the UAE will establish full diplomatic relations. As part of the deal, Israel agreed to suspend plans for the annexation of Jordan Valley. (italics added)
Nothing sudden about this development. The basics of this deal had been forming for more than a decade. The details are too many for this space, but let it be said that since the Trump presidency and Jared Kushner’s backchannel efforts with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Israel managed this feat in the run-up to the US presidential elections.
Let there be no doubt that while Riyadh might not immediately go for overt formalisation of relations with Israel, it is even closer to Tel Aviv than Abu Dhabi. It will now seek to bring Abu Mazen around. That might just be the time for it to go overt. It will also greatly help Israel to totally single out Hamas.
What is happening in Libya and which external actors are supporting Khalifa Haftar on the one side and the UN-recognised Government of National Accord on the other is an even lesser-known story in Pakistan. Suffice to say that there too, as in Syria, Turkey is on one side (GNA) while Egypt, UAE, Saudi, France, Russia are on the other (Haftar). Trouble is also brewing in eastern Mediterranean between Turkey and Greece over oil exploration and the definition of the exclusive economic zones under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
This is by no means an exhaustive account of the contradictory and conflicting interests of states within the Muslim bloc and the lines that have been drawn with blood. But two points need to be made: Pakistan has tried so far to stay out of aligning with one or the other bloc. It has tried, increasingly desperately, to navigate past these hazards. It will continue to do so for as long as it can.
The second point is about how long Pakistan can continue along its non-aligned path. The way things are shaping up, it is only a matter of time before the OIC, the Arab League and even the GCC will collapse. Such a rupture will be most unfortunate, but it is almost inevitable. At that point, Pakistan may no longer have the option of staying neutral.
It is important to note that most of these developments are exogenous to Pakistan, a fact that is often lost on partisan analysts. That said, Pakistan needs to begin formulating a policy based on worst-case scenarios. Pakistan’s foreign policy course has to be charted coolly, keeping in mind Pakistan’s best interests. This point should be obvious, but is apparently not, given the rhetoric and shibboleths Pakistanis are raised on. There is no ummah; there are interests. Pakistan cannot make and implement any policy in a vacuum.
Corollary: avoid knee-jerk statements and commitment traps; avoid statements in television interviews, especially those conducted by fawning anchors. Interstate relations is serious business. Take, for instance, the problem of Pakistanis working in the Gulf. If Pakistan wants policy space, it needs to have a policy for adjusting them elsewhere or improving their skillset in case things come to a head in the region.
This is just one example. The point is that policy approaches require covering one’s flanks and securing that axis. Question: can we do that?
The writer is a former News Editor of The Friday Times. He reluctantly tweets @ejazhaider
The FM’s statement stirred the pot because Pakistan has traditionally toed Riyadh’s line on many foreign policy issues. Saudi Arabia has also helped shore up Pakistan’s fledgling finances through an oil credit facility and remittances from the Gulf account for nearly half of total remittances to Pakistan. According to State Bank of Pakistan figures, remittances from Saudi Arabia and UAE have shown an increase of 74.5 per cent and 26 per cent respectively in July this year compared to the same period last year; this despite the pandemic, shrinking coffers in host countries and an oil-price slump.
Additionally, during his February 2019 visit to Islamabad, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman had announced a USD 6.2 billion emergency economic relief package for Pakistan, including USD3 billion in loan and USD3.2 billion in oil credit on an annual basis for the next three years. Pakistan, at the time, was looking to shore up its foreign exchange reserves and avert a balance-of-payments crisis.
It is generally accepted that these are important levers and help Riyadh exercise considerable influence over Pakistan’s foreign policy choices, especially in the Middle East and with respect to other states in the Muslim bloc.
Last year, Pakistan pulled out of the Kuala Lumpur Summit convened by former Malaysian prime minister, Mahatir Mohamed, after Riyadh took the position that the summit was a move to divide the Muslim bloc and create an alternate OIC.
Given the traditional trajectory of Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia, the levers Riyadh has, and the fragile state of Pakistan’s economy, the debate has either criticised Qureshi’s statement or wondered how and why he might have said what he did. There has also been speculation about whether he played off his own bat or expressed institutional thinking. If the first, would the Saudis ask for his scalp; if the latter, what exactly is Pakistan’s calculation.
Two important factors have been forgotten in this debate: first, what leverage does Pakistan have with Riyadh? Put another way, why would Riyadh facilitate Pakistan? Surely, there are no free lunches in this world for anyone, the ummah rhetoric notwithstanding. Second, what are the Saudi concerns with reference to the Muslim bloc and why.
These two questions are vital to understanding the choppy waters Pakistan has to negotiate. While it is easy to criticise the current government on social media, that is no substitute for serious policy thinking. Let’s try a bird’s-eye view of the lay of the land to appreciate what Pakistan has to contend with going forward.
While the world has come to know Saudi Arabia as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since it came into being in 1932, two of its defining features have got buried in the silt of history: it is an artificial entity put together by the House of Saud and kept from unraveling through multiple strategies underpinned by oil wealth, selective coercion and smart internal compacts. In other words, Saudi Arabia, as constituted, is about the House of Saud. This subsumption of state in the dynasty may not be as total as the Romanovs in pre-Revolution Russia but it is much the same.
In fact, a number of western allies of Riyadh have pointed to the fact that eighty odd years of Al Saud rule in combination with other factors could mean political chaos in a post-Saud KSA.
Second, Riyadh is increasingly trapped by choices that undermine its long-cherished goal to lead the Muslim world. Instead of acting as a unifying force, Riyadh under the young MbS has embarked upon a trajectory that now threatens to tear the Muslim bloc asunder.
The situation is exacerbated by Iran, which has its own power-projection project in the Middle East and the Levant. Further, ever since the civil war in Syria and President Erdogan’s internal consolidation of power and external regional policies, the Middle East’s fault-lines have deepened.
At one time Israel was a unifying force for the Muslim world, especially the Arab states. It is now a fracturing force.
To get an idea of how KSA looks at Turkey and Iran, let me quote from an August 16 op-ed by Dr Ali Awedh Asseri in Arab News. Dr Asseri is a senior former Saudi diplomat and was Riyadh’s ambassador to Islamabad from 2001 to 2009:
“It is quite unfortunate for Turkey that it is led by a megalomaniac neo-Ottoman whose insatiable quest for domestic control and regional hegemony knows no bounds. For almost two decades, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has invoked old wounds to upset domestic peace and regional geopolitics. His personal spree for dividing the Islamic world has gained momentum more recently.” (italics added)
At another place, Dr Asseri writes: “Last December, Pakistan had acted wisely by boycotting one such gathering in Kuala Lumpur, which was an attempt orchestrated primarily by Turkey and Iran to challenge the leadership of the OIC.” (italics added)
Now read this in conjunction with what Roger Boyes wrote for The Times UK on August 18: “The man who is given most public credit for negotiating a groundbreaking deal between Israel and the UAE is the head of Mossad, Yossi Cohen. He has been talking secretly with fellow spooks in the Gulf states for years, pointing out that they shared a common enemy: Iran. But there was one encounter about 20 months ago when he let slip another agenda. ‘Iranian power is fragile,’ he reportedly told spymasters from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, ‘but the real threat is from Turkey.’” (italics added)
On August 13, Israel and the UAE signed an agreement mediated by President Donald Trump. Under the peace deal, Israel and the UAE will establish full diplomatic relations. As part of the deal, Israel agreed to suspend plans for the annexation of Jordan Valley. (italics added)
Nothing sudden about this development. The basics of this deal had been forming for more than a decade. The details are too many for this space, but let it be said that since the Trump presidency and Jared Kushner’s backchannel efforts with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Israel managed this feat in the run-up to the US presidential elections.
Let there be no doubt that while Riyadh might not immediately go for overt formalisation of relations with Israel, it is even closer to Tel Aviv than Abu Dhabi. It will now seek to bring Abu Mazen around. That might just be the time for it to go overt. It will also greatly help Israel to totally single out Hamas.
What is happening in Libya and which external actors are supporting Khalifa Haftar on the one side and the UN-recognised Government of National Accord on the other is an even lesser-known story in Pakistan. Suffice to say that there too, as in Syria, Turkey is on one side (GNA) while Egypt, UAE, Saudi, France, Russia are on the other (Haftar). Trouble is also brewing in eastern Mediterranean between Turkey and Greece over oil exploration and the definition of the exclusive economic zones under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
This is by no means an exhaustive account of the contradictory and conflicting interests of states within the Muslim bloc and the lines that have been drawn with blood. But two points need to be made: Pakistan has tried so far to stay out of aligning with one or the other bloc. It has tried, increasingly desperately, to navigate past these hazards. It will continue to do so for as long as it can.
The second point is about how long Pakistan can continue along its non-aligned path. The way things are shaping up, it is only a matter of time before the OIC, the Arab League and even the GCC will collapse. Such a rupture will be most unfortunate, but it is almost inevitable. At that point, Pakistan may no longer have the option of staying neutral.
It is important to note that most of these developments are exogenous to Pakistan, a fact that is often lost on partisan analysts. That said, Pakistan needs to begin formulating a policy based on worst-case scenarios. Pakistan’s foreign policy course has to be charted coolly, keeping in mind Pakistan’s best interests. This point should be obvious, but is apparently not, given the rhetoric and shibboleths Pakistanis are raised on. There is no ummah; there are interests. Pakistan cannot make and implement any policy in a vacuum.
Corollary: avoid knee-jerk statements and commitment traps; avoid statements in television interviews, especially those conducted by fawning anchors. Interstate relations is serious business. Take, for instance, the problem of Pakistanis working in the Gulf. If Pakistan wants policy space, it needs to have a policy for adjusting them elsewhere or improving their skillset in case things come to a head in the region.
This is just one example. The point is that policy approaches require covering one’s flanks and securing that axis. Question: can we do that?
The writer is a former News Editor of The Friday Times. He reluctantly tweets @ejazhaider