Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (or AK Party) regained its absolute majority in the parliament after the November 1 do-over elections. The snap polls brought the outcome that they had desired in the June 7 general elections: while the Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) passed the 10% threshold with a very slim margin to keep the hopes alive for the Kurdish peace process, the AK Party received 49.5% of the votes to form a single-party government.
The Turkish electorate punished the HDP and its armed wing PKK for resorting to violence after years of peace, but kept the party afloat to allow it to distance itself from violence and the PKK.
This is good news for the peace process in Turkey. Several observers have been proven correct in their assessment that once politics takes hold, it invalidates violence. We can, hopefully, now expect a lively debate among Turkey’s leftist-liberal intellectuals (both among the Kurds and the Turks) about how the PKK actually harms the Kurdish political movement. There are already (rather harsh) exchanges between the HDP and the PKK leadership on the election debacle. The PKK sent a stern message to the HDP, warning them that ‘without the PKK they could not get more than 5% votes in the elections’. If this friction worsens, we will have to wait and see how, and with what instruments, the two sides will seek to outmaneuver each other.
In the meantime, the renewed AK Party government will be under pressure to develop a new constitution for Turkey. It is very likely that it will only be able to replace its outdated 1980 constitution with the cooperation of the HDP. Therefore, when the warring parties eventually return to the negotiating table and the process gets moving, Turkey will have a new constitution as well. We should not expect that to happen instantly though.
The election results are not surprising. Although there was an ungrounded glee after the June 7 elections about the impending downfall of the ruling party, those who were out in the field had known what would happen – the AK Party made many mistakes during the election campaign, and still received 41% votes. Erdogan had made an unpopular bid for a presidential system in the country, and the AK Party had partially lost touch with the masses before the June elections. My own post-election interviews on the field clearly showed that the AK Party could easily bounce back with some basic changes. Those who did not vote for the AK Party five months ago did so not because the AK Party had failed to run the economy, but because they thought that the string of AK Party governments since 2002 made the country rich but the rewards were not being shared with the people in a fair manner. Regardless of how far-fetched this may sound to the ears of fierce critics of the government, people had thought that the Turkish Central Bank grew exponentially under the AK Party governments but the people did not benefit from that. Besides, the June 7 elections had clearly shown that even when the AK Party loses, it has a majority, and no government can be formed without it.
What will matter most in the short to medium term is whether the AK Party will be able to establish the right harmony between two elected power figures – Prime Minister Davuto?lu and President Erdogan.
A presidential system does not seem to be on the priority list of the Turkish electorate at the moment. That means whether Erdogan insists on this issue or not will be crucial. Davutoglu will most likely carve out a space for himself, and rightly so. In whatever capacity he operates, he is poised to lift the AK Party’s ‘class’ by demanding a higher level of intellectual capacity around himself.
Finally, the leftist and liberal observers in and outside Turkey may feel lost once again. This is chiefly because they fail to understand that a momentous elite replacement has been taking place in Turkey. Turkey’s ‘Muslim democrats’ now permanently occupy seats and places in business, academia, media, civil society, and the public sector. They are more educated and globalized than ever and comfortable with their increasing lot, as it comes with all its moral challenges, complexities, discussions, and contradictions.
If sociology tells us anything, we will not wake up one day and see this broad network of conservative people disappear from all these realms. They are here to stay for good, with or without the AK Party.
Ömer Aslan is a PhD candidate at the Political Science Department at Bilkent University and a researcher for the Turkish National Police Academy in Ankara. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, and do not reflect the official opinion of the Turkish National Police Academy
The Turkish electorate punished the HDP and its armed wing PKK for resorting to violence after years of peace, but kept the party afloat to allow it to distance itself from violence and the PKK.
This is good news for the peace process in Turkey. Several observers have been proven correct in their assessment that once politics takes hold, it invalidates violence. We can, hopefully, now expect a lively debate among Turkey’s leftist-liberal intellectuals (both among the Kurds and the Turks) about how the PKK actually harms the Kurdish political movement. There are already (rather harsh) exchanges between the HDP and the PKK leadership on the election debacle. The PKK sent a stern message to the HDP, warning them that ‘without the PKK they could not get more than 5% votes in the elections’. If this friction worsens, we will have to wait and see how, and with what instruments, the two sides will seek to outmaneuver each other.
In the meantime, the renewed AK Party government will be under pressure to develop a new constitution for Turkey. It is very likely that it will only be able to replace its outdated 1980 constitution with the cooperation of the HDP. Therefore, when the warring parties eventually return to the negotiating table and the process gets moving, Turkey will have a new constitution as well. We should not expect that to happen instantly though.
We will not wake up one day and see this broad network of conservative Muslims disappear
The election results are not surprising. Although there was an ungrounded glee after the June 7 elections about the impending downfall of the ruling party, those who were out in the field had known what would happen – the AK Party made many mistakes during the election campaign, and still received 41% votes. Erdogan had made an unpopular bid for a presidential system in the country, and the AK Party had partially lost touch with the masses before the June elections. My own post-election interviews on the field clearly showed that the AK Party could easily bounce back with some basic changes. Those who did not vote for the AK Party five months ago did so not because the AK Party had failed to run the economy, but because they thought that the string of AK Party governments since 2002 made the country rich but the rewards were not being shared with the people in a fair manner. Regardless of how far-fetched this may sound to the ears of fierce critics of the government, people had thought that the Turkish Central Bank grew exponentially under the AK Party governments but the people did not benefit from that. Besides, the June 7 elections had clearly shown that even when the AK Party loses, it has a majority, and no government can be formed without it.
What will matter most in the short to medium term is whether the AK Party will be able to establish the right harmony between two elected power figures – Prime Minister Davuto?lu and President Erdogan.
A presidential system does not seem to be on the priority list of the Turkish electorate at the moment. That means whether Erdogan insists on this issue or not will be crucial. Davutoglu will most likely carve out a space for himself, and rightly so. In whatever capacity he operates, he is poised to lift the AK Party’s ‘class’ by demanding a higher level of intellectual capacity around himself.
Finally, the leftist and liberal observers in and outside Turkey may feel lost once again. This is chiefly because they fail to understand that a momentous elite replacement has been taking place in Turkey. Turkey’s ‘Muslim democrats’ now permanently occupy seats and places in business, academia, media, civil society, and the public sector. They are more educated and globalized than ever and comfortable with their increasing lot, as it comes with all its moral challenges, complexities, discussions, and contradictions.
If sociology tells us anything, we will not wake up one day and see this broad network of conservative people disappear from all these realms. They are here to stay for good, with or without the AK Party.
Ömer Aslan is a PhD candidate at the Political Science Department at Bilkent University and a researcher for the Turkish National Police Academy in Ankara. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own, and do not reflect the official opinion of the Turkish National Police Academy