I wrote almost a year ago in another Pakistani journal about what I like to call “The Bangladesh Paradox.” The paradox is that, in traditional development theory, Bangladesh should have become, over the past 25 years, a modernized democracy, knocking on the door of entry into the middle income category of developing countries. Its economy has grown for most of the last two decades around 5-6 % per year, and its social development indices have improved rapidly and now are generally better than most other South Asian countries except Sri Lanka. Instead, over those same two decades, Bangladesh has regressed along the democracy/authoritarian axis no matter which of the two major parties was in power. (Backward in my lexicon means toward authoritarianism, although current Bangladeshi political leaders might define it the other way round.)
This regression toward authoritarian governance has accelerated since January this year when a one-party election brought a one-party government to power. This government seems to be following the script laid out in the authoritarian playbook by closing the political space for any kind of opposition to be viable in the future. Closing political space usually entails increasing abuse of human rights, and guess what—extra-judicial deaths, disappearances, and harassment of opposition figures are on the rise in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh is, in fact, a contradiction to the widely held modernization theory of political and economic development, although not the only such contradiction by any means. China is, perhaps a more prominent example. This theory has held for much of the last 50-60 years that political development inevitably follows economic and social development; countries will modernize socially and politically as they grow economically—the faster the economic growth, the faster the political and social modernization. Democracy is, under this theory, the ultimate result of constant economic growth and social development. Underpinning this theory is the notion that economic growth and social development bring forth a middle class that will become larger and more assertive about its interests, and will push to protect those interests through democratization.
Perhaps some Pakistanis wish their country had the same problems as Bangladesh
The “Why Nations Fail” school of political development twists this theory somewhat by arguing that the middle class and other vested interests have gained power because they are connected with the growth of the economy, and they gain entry into the political and economic institutions to keep them from rocking the boat. Their motivation for insisting on entry is, of course, to get a larger piece of the pie. But their ability to assert their interests in these institutions leads to a spreading of the wealth and consensual politics, ultimately to modernization and, maybe, democracy. As institutions become more inclusive of vested interests in the country, and thus are strengthened, consensual politics and democracy can take root. In Bangladesh, however, these institutions were never inclusive. But with different leadership over the two decades, they could have become so. Alas, they are now being pillaged and reduced by the governing party.
Why have I begun this article with very oversimplified versions of two different, if related, theories of political development? Because I was struck last week by another paradox involving Bangladesh. President Obama was in Myanmar lecturing the Burmese on their failure to keep up the pace they began with a few years ago in their democratization process as well as an increase in human rights abuses (mostly involving minorities like the Rohingas). At the same time, sub-cabinet level US officials in Washington were conducting a “partnership dialogue” with a visiting delegation from Myanmar’s next-door neighbor Bangladesh. Nowhere in the joint statement that was issued from that dialogue is there any reference to US concerns (and I know the US has them) about the regressions from democratic governance and rising human rights violations in Bangladesh.
A woman shows a Mizzima newspaper with a photograph of US President Barack Obama and Myanmar pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi
I wonder if the government officials in Myanmar are as puzzled by this as I am. Did we raise democracy and human rights issues with the Bangladeshi delegation sotto voce (in the corridors or in lower level unrecorded meetings)? And if so, does the fact that the President raised these issues publicly from the podium in Myanmar while we whispered them to Bangladeshis in Washington mean anything in our relations with or interests in the two nations? Or is it just an ordinary glitch in communication and coordination in the US government? Why is the slippage in the democratization process (but evidently not a backward slide) in Myanmar, a country which has just entered into that process after decades of authoritarian rule, more important than a serious backward slide in Bangladesh, which has supposedly been working on democracy for 25 years? Is Bangladesh lost to democracy anyway, so there is no reason to bother and ruffle feathers when it is a lost cause? And if so what happened to the notion that the wider spread democracy is, the better our national security interests are served?
Well, for Pakistan these conundrums must seem even more distant politically than Bangladesh and Myanmar are geographically. Perhaps some Pakistanis wish their country had the same problems as Bangladesh. After all, democratic vital signs are very weak in Pakistan. By vital signs I meant the fundamental bases of real democracy—a literate polity, inclusive institutions that check and balance the tendency of political parties to go too far, a healthy public, and more. Almost all the social development indicators of Pakistan lag even behind some of the poorest countries of the world. The formal economy stagnates, partially because neither major party can find the will or the courage to undertake structural reforms that would be the foundation of an economic revival. The informal economy at least keeps many Bangladeshis alive, but robs the government of needed revenue.
It has always seemed to me that the fundamental questions about Pakistan’s national security revolve around these issues. A society weakened by a largely illiterate population, a fragile and highly skewed economy, an inability to pay its own way in the world and a reliance on moral hazard (someone else picking up the tab), and a very divided polity which includes thousands (maybe millions) of militant extremists that regard the state as illegitimate, if not apostate, is in serious trouble. Is it a lost cause? Hardly. But the climb back up the slope to a viable state and nation is getting more difficult every day. Where is the transformational leader and party with the strength and knowhow to turn things around and begin that climb?
The author is a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC and a former US diplomat who was Ambassador to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Chief of Mission in Liberia
