The PPP and the MQM formed an alliance in Sindh after the 2013 elections. At least at the provincial level, the coalition had been a victim of active sabotage by certain spoilers within the two parties. It was former president Asif Ali Zardari who started the “politics of reconciliation” under which he accommodated MQM during the last tenure.
“We had accommodated MQM despite having a majority in the Sindh Assembly and that shows our commitment to a working relationship with the MQM,” says PPP’s Sharjeel Memon. “It’s the MQM which has issues.”
The bone of contention between the two paeties is the PPP’s posturing over the years over distribution of resources and the establishment of local governments in Sindh. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, PPP’s co-chariman, had been very critical of the MQM recently, and that is seen as the reason behind the recent flare-up, but the differences between the two parties are inherent in the ethnic fault lines and the urban-rural divide in Sindh. That is why when the MQM announced leaving the alliance with the PPP, they also announced to begin a struggle for what they call a Mohajir province.
The crisis in Sindh is very complex. In 1948, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was the governor general, had to dismiss Sindh chief minister Ayub Khuro’s government after he protested against making Karachi the federal capital and separating Karachi from Sindh. In 1956, more than 56 councilors for the first time demanded in the City Council that Karachi be made a separate province. “The issue here is deep, where the Sindhi PPP who had absolutely no interest in Karachi but whose leadership now lives in Karachi wants to expand against MQM’s wishes,” says Faizan Tahir, an assistant professor in sociology.
Historically, the Mohajirs have kept themselves politically, socially and culturally separate, to a large extent, from the native Sindhis—. The powerful feudals of the PPP had never made common cause with the common man’s Jiye Sindh factions, which had traditionally opposed the settlement of ‘non-Sindhis’. There have been different aspects to the MQM’s approach to the PPP, considering the bitter experiences between Sindhis and Mohajirs after the language riots in 1972. It was, to a certain extent, motivated by the strategic considerations of the party leadership, which realised that it had to join a coalition to gain power and rightly anticipated a victory for the PPP in the national elections of 1988. Altaf Hussain lobbied within the party for a closer relationship with the local Sindhis and had condemned any aggressive posturing towards the Sindhis, whom Altaf Hussain thanked in one of his addresses as “those who gave us their lands”.
[quote]MQM has made playful advances at Sindhi rural culture [/quote]
Famous Sindhi sociologist and historian Feroz Ahmed wrote a long article, which was published in four installments in the weekly Viewpoint of Lahore (August 18 & 25, and September 1 & 8, 1988), where, after discussing critically the historical, psychological, cultural and political aspects of such a claim, he made rather positive assessments: “By basing its approach on Mohajir rights, the MQM has avoided playing up Islam, a significant departure from the Mohajir political tradition. In a sense, the MQM could be considered secular and a natural ally of the Sindhis...The MQM has been instrumental in cutting the Mohajir’s umbilical cord from the Punjabi ruling establishment.”
At a popular level, the MQM has been flirtatious, making playful and semi-serious advances at a Sindhi rural culture that was portrayed as exotic and authentic rather than dangerous or backward. This element had an element of provocation, challenging the high cultural, Islamic, modernist values of the Mohajir cause. The MQM felt a sense of liberation, togetherness, power, and joy while interacting with various Sindhi political personalities, who had previously been against the Mohajirs. After the ethnic rioting in Sindh in the 1980s, the gap between the MQM and the PPP widened and the situation became so bad at one point that the two parties considered each other their sole enemy.
Eventually, the MQM contested the elections with the PPP and formed a coalition. Benazir Bhutto came down to Nine Zero and Altaf Hussain visited 70 Clifton. Altaf Hussain’s increasing interactions with GM Syed and Benazir Bhutto, and his frequent visits to the interior Sindh, transformed his MQM, at least in appearance, into a more ‘pro-Sindhi’ party and for the first time attempted to meld the Mohajirs with Sindhis with tags like ‘New Sindhi’. Altaf Hussain, in time, started wearing traditional Sindhi caps and ethnic ajrak in his speeches to convey to both the Sindhis and the Mohajirs that he represents not just the Mohajirs but the oppressed Sindhis and lower classes too. Despite the conflict of interests, the MQM joined the PPP’s coalition government following the general elections of 1988 on the pursuance of PPP and with the historic, ‘Karachi Charter’ signed by Benazir Bhutto, who overwhelmingly supported the Sindhis, and Altaf Hussain, who pretty much represented every Mohajir in Sindh and Pakistan.
Eventually, the PPP-MQM alliance of convenience crumbled, thanks to the absence of concrete political programmes, profound distrust on both sides, class differences and disagreements over political strategy, resulting in the start of another round of rivalry between them. In the 2002 elections, the MQM and PPP negotiated a deal to form a government, but the negotiations broke down.
After the 2008 general elections, PPP co-chairman Asif Zardari rightly anticipating that he would need the MQM on board to form a government in the centre, did the unthinkable and visited the MQM’s headquarters and its martyrs’ graves on April 2, 2008, following his party’s policy of reconciliation. The PPP and the MQM formed an alliance at the centre and in Sindh.
But the coalition has been unstable for a number of reasons. The PPP’s local leadership wants to expand to urban Sindh, forgetting that traditionally, even in the pre-MQM days, it was right-wing political parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam that had a firm grip on the constituencies that the MQM now holds. The MQM needs to understand the complexities in Sindh and should expand to interior Sindh, and make a serious effort to make common cause with an average Sindhi who has been left in the dark ages, while all the development was being undertaken in urban Sindh.
The PPP-led government only provided six districts of Karachi with “special budgets”, ignoring the rest of the city. The budget documents say that a total of Rs 1.2 billion were allocated to Karachi’s Malir, West and South districts — Rs 400 million each — and Rs 300 million to the Central, East and Korangi districts — Rs100 million each. The allocation to Lyari, which falls within the South district and is traditionally considered a Pakistan People’s Party stronghold, is Rs 458 million — all for ongoing schemes that were part of previous budgets. In addition to the above packages, around Rs 1.05 billion are allocated to the Karachi Development Package. The funds are to be used by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation for various ongoing projects, including construction of flyovers and roads. An amount of Rs 55 million is allocated for only one new scheme — improvement of a three-kilometre road from Safora Chowrangi to Saadi Town.
The MQM has asked for stronger local governments, which give the party an opportunity to show its performance.
The party also thinks it is being unfairly targeted in what is called the Karachi Operation. But the PPP disagrees. “If the Karachi Operation is against the MQM, why has Lyari been swept up by the Rangers?” asks Sharjeel Memon. “In reality the Karachi Operation is against criminals.”
With the demands for a Mohajir province, relations between the PPP and the MQM will remain uncertain, and may go from bad to worse.
“We had accommodated MQM despite having a majority in the Sindh Assembly and that shows our commitment to a working relationship with the MQM,” says PPP’s Sharjeel Memon. “It’s the MQM which has issues.”
The bone of contention between the two paeties is the PPP’s posturing over the years over distribution of resources and the establishment of local governments in Sindh. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, PPP’s co-chariman, had been very critical of the MQM recently, and that is seen as the reason behind the recent flare-up, but the differences between the two parties are inherent in the ethnic fault lines and the urban-rural divide in Sindh. That is why when the MQM announced leaving the alliance with the PPP, they also announced to begin a struggle for what they call a Mohajir province.
The crisis in Sindh is very complex. In 1948, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was the governor general, had to dismiss Sindh chief minister Ayub Khuro’s government after he protested against making Karachi the federal capital and separating Karachi from Sindh. In 1956, more than 56 councilors for the first time demanded in the City Council that Karachi be made a separate province. “The issue here is deep, where the Sindhi PPP who had absolutely no interest in Karachi but whose leadership now lives in Karachi wants to expand against MQM’s wishes,” says Faizan Tahir, an assistant professor in sociology.
Historically, the Mohajirs have kept themselves politically, socially and culturally separate, to a large extent, from the native Sindhis—. The powerful feudals of the PPP had never made common cause with the common man’s Jiye Sindh factions, which had traditionally opposed the settlement of ‘non-Sindhis’. There have been different aspects to the MQM’s approach to the PPP, considering the bitter experiences between Sindhis and Mohajirs after the language riots in 1972. It was, to a certain extent, motivated by the strategic considerations of the party leadership, which realised that it had to join a coalition to gain power and rightly anticipated a victory for the PPP in the national elections of 1988. Altaf Hussain lobbied within the party for a closer relationship with the local Sindhis and had condemned any aggressive posturing towards the Sindhis, whom Altaf Hussain thanked in one of his addresses as “those who gave us their lands”.
[quote]MQM has made playful advances at Sindhi rural culture [/quote]
Famous Sindhi sociologist and historian Feroz Ahmed wrote a long article, which was published in four installments in the weekly Viewpoint of Lahore (August 18 & 25, and September 1 & 8, 1988), where, after discussing critically the historical, psychological, cultural and political aspects of such a claim, he made rather positive assessments: “By basing its approach on Mohajir rights, the MQM has avoided playing up Islam, a significant departure from the Mohajir political tradition. In a sense, the MQM could be considered secular and a natural ally of the Sindhis...The MQM has been instrumental in cutting the Mohajir’s umbilical cord from the Punjabi ruling establishment.”
At a popular level, the MQM has been flirtatious, making playful and semi-serious advances at a Sindhi rural culture that was portrayed as exotic and authentic rather than dangerous or backward. This element had an element of provocation, challenging the high cultural, Islamic, modernist values of the Mohajir cause. The MQM felt a sense of liberation, togetherness, power, and joy while interacting with various Sindhi political personalities, who had previously been against the Mohajirs. After the ethnic rioting in Sindh in the 1980s, the gap between the MQM and the PPP widened and the situation became so bad at one point that the two parties considered each other their sole enemy.
Eventually, the MQM contested the elections with the PPP and formed a coalition. Benazir Bhutto came down to Nine Zero and Altaf Hussain visited 70 Clifton. Altaf Hussain’s increasing interactions with GM Syed and Benazir Bhutto, and his frequent visits to the interior Sindh, transformed his MQM, at least in appearance, into a more ‘pro-Sindhi’ party and for the first time attempted to meld the Mohajirs with Sindhis with tags like ‘New Sindhi’. Altaf Hussain, in time, started wearing traditional Sindhi caps and ethnic ajrak in his speeches to convey to both the Sindhis and the Mohajirs that he represents not just the Mohajirs but the oppressed Sindhis and lower classes too. Despite the conflict of interests, the MQM joined the PPP’s coalition government following the general elections of 1988 on the pursuance of PPP and with the historic, ‘Karachi Charter’ signed by Benazir Bhutto, who overwhelmingly supported the Sindhis, and Altaf Hussain, who pretty much represented every Mohajir in Sindh and Pakistan.
Eventually, the PPP-MQM alliance of convenience crumbled, thanks to the absence of concrete political programmes, profound distrust on both sides, class differences and disagreements over political strategy, resulting in the start of another round of rivalry between them. In the 2002 elections, the MQM and PPP negotiated a deal to form a government, but the negotiations broke down.
After the 2008 general elections, PPP co-chairman Asif Zardari rightly anticipating that he would need the MQM on board to form a government in the centre, did the unthinkable and visited the MQM’s headquarters and its martyrs’ graves on April 2, 2008, following his party’s policy of reconciliation. The PPP and the MQM formed an alliance at the centre and in Sindh.
But the coalition has been unstable for a number of reasons. The PPP’s local leadership wants to expand to urban Sindh, forgetting that traditionally, even in the pre-MQM days, it was right-wing political parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam that had a firm grip on the constituencies that the MQM now holds. The MQM needs to understand the complexities in Sindh and should expand to interior Sindh, and make a serious effort to make common cause with an average Sindhi who has been left in the dark ages, while all the development was being undertaken in urban Sindh.
The PPP-led government only provided six districts of Karachi with “special budgets”, ignoring the rest of the city. The budget documents say that a total of Rs 1.2 billion were allocated to Karachi’s Malir, West and South districts — Rs 400 million each — and Rs 300 million to the Central, East and Korangi districts — Rs100 million each. The allocation to Lyari, which falls within the South district and is traditionally considered a Pakistan People’s Party stronghold, is Rs 458 million — all for ongoing schemes that were part of previous budgets. In addition to the above packages, around Rs 1.05 billion are allocated to the Karachi Development Package. The funds are to be used by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation for various ongoing projects, including construction of flyovers and roads. An amount of Rs 55 million is allocated for only one new scheme — improvement of a three-kilometre road from Safora Chowrangi to Saadi Town.
The MQM has asked for stronger local governments, which give the party an opportunity to show its performance.
The party also thinks it is being unfairly targeted in what is called the Karachi Operation. But the PPP disagrees. “If the Karachi Operation is against the MQM, why has Lyari been swept up by the Rangers?” asks Sharjeel Memon. “In reality the Karachi Operation is against criminals.”
With the demands for a Mohajir province, relations between the PPP and the MQM will remain uncertain, and may go from bad to worse.