I still vividly remember the day in the early months of year 2000 when the then US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Karl Inderfurth told a crowded press conference in the Islamabad-American Center, which was still operational then, that the focus of US diplomacy with Pakistan would now shift from non-proliferation to counter terrorism. He didn’t clearly specify that nuclear non-proliferation would not be the focus of the US diplomatic agenda in Pakistan, but he was not at all forthcoming when I as a diplomatic correspondent of a local newspaper asked him pointedly whether his assertion that terrorism would be the focus of US diplomacy meant that non-proliferation would be off the diplomatic agenda. Those were dreadful times - every other day we used to wake up to new developments in Washington, and Tokyo, as they were reported in the newspapers, that new restrictions in the military, diplomatic and economic domains were been envisaged against the state of Pakistan for its continued journey on the path of weaponization of its nuclear program.
Tokyo and Washington were particularly zealous about squeezing Pakistan economically and diplomatically after it carried out nuclear weapons testing in May 1998. As a diplomatic correspondent of a local newspaper, I used to report on the arrivals of US and Japanese diplomats who would visit with new warnings for Pakistani rulers. Pakistanis were rejoicing at their newly acquired nuclear status. But something happened along the way that changed perceptions in Washington, if not in Tokyo – the hijacking of an Indian passenger plane in December 1999—only two months after the military coup in Islamabad. The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington DC were almost two years away. But Osama Bin Laden had started threatening the West from his base in Afghanistan. In such a grim environment Karl Inderfurth was telling the media in Islamabad that the focus of US diplomacy in Pakistan would no longer be non-proliferation, but would shift towards counter terrorism.
Mr. Inderfurth’s assertion was a harbinger of future events and changes in the direction of US diplomacy in South Asia. India was granted de facto nuclear status when US diplomacy paved the way for finalization of the civil nuclear deal with New Delhi. Pakistan became a military ally against forces of international terrorism and its non-proliferation sins were conveniently forgotten.
Later in the twenty first century, Washington started to perceive India as a counterweight to China. In the case of Pakistan, the military regime and its intelligence services were seen as partners against forces of international terrorism. The US completely ignored the non-proliferation agenda. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the international agreement that bans any kind of nuclear testing that American, Japanese and other western diplomats compelled both Pakistan and India to sign in the wake of nuclear tests by the two rivals in 1998, was conveniently dropped from the US diplomacy agenda. Even the Japanese, with their much-advertised abhorrence for anything nuclear, stopped talking about it.
Conveniently, the CTBT and FMCT (Fissile Material Cut off Treaty), another treaty whose signing and ratification were the cause of much harassment for Pakistan’s ruling elite at the hands of American diplomats, were conveniently forgotten when al-Qaeda carried out the 9/11 attacks. The world completely changed for Pakistani ruling elites after that fateful day. Apart from occasional expression of concern by international non-governmental organizations that continued to voice concerns over the expansion of the Pakistani and Indian nuclear programs, we didn’t hear a word from the Americans or the Japanese.
Why am I recounting all of this now? What’s the occasion? The occasion is recent developments in international politics that will shape the non-proliferation mechanics in the years to come. These developments have the potential to significantly impact the nuclear proliferation landscape in South Asia. These developments could provide strong incentives for nuclear proliferation, handling bureaucratic structures in India and Pakistan the impetus to further strengthen the agendas of nuclear weaponization and proliferation in respective countries.
The two developments are the war in Ukraine, where Russian President Vladimir Putin’s naked nuclear threats are galvanizing western countries’ nuclear bureaucracy to wake up from their long slumber. They are now talking about improving their delivery systems and improving the models of their nuclear weapons i.e. they are about to embark on a path of nuclear proliferation of their own, and active deployment of nuclear weapons to counter Russian threats. The second is the process of American militarization in response to the rise of China as an economic and military giant.
Two organizations are indicative of American efforts to militarize its response to Chinese rise, the first is the Australia—United Kingdom—United States (AUKUS) Security Pact. Last month “U.S. President Joe Biden met with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak in San Diego last month, the three leaders announced a crucial next step for the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) security pact. Australia will purchase at least three, and possibly five, Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the United States and eventually, alongside Britain, deploy a new class of nuclear-powered submarines jointly developed by the three nations.” An international military experts said in his latest report that all this was part of deepening security collaboration among the three countries, “next steps could include basing U.S. nuclear-capable platforms—such as strategic bombers—in Australia…” The second organization is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. After American diplomacy overcame Indian reluctance over militarization (praiseworthy reluctance, Pakistanis should give the devil its due) the Quad may very soon operationalize its military component in an attempt to contain China.
In this way the former non-proliferation fundamentalists will eventually pave the way for further strengthening of nuclear bureaucracies in Pakistan and India, and further development of nuclear weapons programs in the respective countries. Indian literature on strategic issues in this regard points to growing Chinese nuclear ballistic missile and surveillance capability. Indian experts also say that increased Chinese footprints in the Indian Ocean are making them nervous. This could lead to a cascading security dilemma that could engulf both India and Pakistan. The militarization of the American response to China’s rise will force China to work to enhance its military and nuclear capabilities, and increase its footprints in the Indian Ocean. This will make Indian nervous, who has the financial wherewithal to take matching steps. And finally, Pakistan will perceive these developments emerging from these processes as threats to its deterrent capability. So, the countries which were formerly advocates of non-proliferation in our region will be responsible for the rise in nuclear proliferation in South Asia.
Ironically, we have not even started to perceive these developments and their likely impact on our security. Maybe in some dark and insulated military planning rooms these developments are being debated. But as a society we are completely in a state of oblivion. How will our resources be allocated and utilized for our security? How will essential questions of our security be decided? What impact do these new developments in international politics have on our security? How do we plan on responding to them? We have left all of these questions in the hands of our civil and military bureaucracies, who have repeatedly failed us.
Tokyo and Washington were particularly zealous about squeezing Pakistan economically and diplomatically after it carried out nuclear weapons testing in May 1998. As a diplomatic correspondent of a local newspaper, I used to report on the arrivals of US and Japanese diplomats who would visit with new warnings for Pakistani rulers. Pakistanis were rejoicing at their newly acquired nuclear status. But something happened along the way that changed perceptions in Washington, if not in Tokyo – the hijacking of an Indian passenger plane in December 1999—only two months after the military coup in Islamabad. The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington DC were almost two years away. But Osama Bin Laden had started threatening the West from his base in Afghanistan. In such a grim environment Karl Inderfurth was telling the media in Islamabad that the focus of US diplomacy in Pakistan would no longer be non-proliferation, but would shift towards counter terrorism.
Mr. Inderfurth’s assertion was a harbinger of future events and changes in the direction of US diplomacy in South Asia. India was granted de facto nuclear status when US diplomacy paved the way for finalization of the civil nuclear deal with New Delhi. Pakistan became a military ally against forces of international terrorism and its non-proliferation sins were conveniently forgotten.
Later in the twenty first century, Washington started to perceive India as a counterweight to China. In the case of Pakistan, the military regime and its intelligence services were seen as partners against forces of international terrorism. The US completely ignored the non-proliferation agenda. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the international agreement that bans any kind of nuclear testing that American, Japanese and other western diplomats compelled both Pakistan and India to sign in the wake of nuclear tests by the two rivals in 1998, was conveniently dropped from the US diplomacy agenda. Even the Japanese, with their much-advertised abhorrence for anything nuclear, stopped talking about it.
Conveniently, the CTBT and FMCT (Fissile Material Cut off Treaty), another treaty whose signing and ratification were the cause of much harassment for Pakistan’s ruling elite at the hands of American diplomats, were conveniently forgotten when al-Qaeda carried out the 9/11 attacks. The world completely changed for Pakistani ruling elites after that fateful day. Apart from occasional expression of concern by international non-governmental organizations that continued to voice concerns over the expansion of the Pakistani and Indian nuclear programs, we didn’t hear a word from the Americans or the Japanese.
Why am I recounting all of this now? What’s the occasion? The occasion is recent developments in international politics that will shape the non-proliferation mechanics in the years to come. These developments have the potential to significantly impact the nuclear proliferation landscape in South Asia. These developments could provide strong incentives for nuclear proliferation, handling bureaucratic structures in India and Pakistan the impetus to further strengthen the agendas of nuclear weaponization and proliferation in respective countries.
The two developments are the war in Ukraine, where Russian President Vladimir Putin’s naked nuclear threats are galvanizing western countries’ nuclear bureaucracy to wake up from their long slumber. They are now talking about improving their delivery systems and improving the models of their nuclear weapons i.e. they are about to embark on a path of nuclear proliferation of their own, and active deployment of nuclear weapons to counter Russian threats. The second is the process of American militarization in response to the rise of China as an economic and military giant.
Two organizations are indicative of American efforts to militarize its response to Chinese rise, the first is the Australia—United Kingdom—United States (AUKUS) Security Pact. Last month “U.S. President Joe Biden met with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak in San Diego last month, the three leaders announced a crucial next step for the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) security pact. Australia will purchase at least three, and possibly five, Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the United States and eventually, alongside Britain, deploy a new class of nuclear-powered submarines jointly developed by the three nations.” An international military experts said in his latest report that all this was part of deepening security collaboration among the three countries, “next steps could include basing U.S. nuclear-capable platforms—such as strategic bombers—in Australia…” The second organization is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. After American diplomacy overcame Indian reluctance over militarization (praiseworthy reluctance, Pakistanis should give the devil its due) the Quad may very soon operationalize its military component in an attempt to contain China.
In this way the former non-proliferation fundamentalists will eventually pave the way for further strengthening of nuclear bureaucracies in Pakistan and India, and further development of nuclear weapons programs in the respective countries. Indian literature on strategic issues in this regard points to growing Chinese nuclear ballistic missile and surveillance capability. Indian experts also say that increased Chinese footprints in the Indian Ocean are making them nervous. This could lead to a cascading security dilemma that could engulf both India and Pakistan. The militarization of the American response to China’s rise will force China to work to enhance its military and nuclear capabilities, and increase its footprints in the Indian Ocean. This will make Indian nervous, who has the financial wherewithal to take matching steps. And finally, Pakistan will perceive these developments emerging from these processes as threats to its deterrent capability. So, the countries which were formerly advocates of non-proliferation in our region will be responsible for the rise in nuclear proliferation in South Asia.
Ironically, we have not even started to perceive these developments and their likely impact on our security. Maybe in some dark and insulated military planning rooms these developments are being debated. But as a society we are completely in a state of oblivion. How will our resources be allocated and utilized for our security? How will essential questions of our security be decided? What impact do these new developments in international politics have on our security? How do we plan on responding to them? We have left all of these questions in the hands of our civil and military bureaucracies, who have repeatedly failed us.