It is has been noticed in human psychology that when humans feel dismayed with their progress and are crestfallen in their spirit, they tend to capitulate before their rivals and accept their dominance. This defeated mindset also manifests in the attitude of despondent actors to lament their fate and think that they have hit a dead-end, and they have no other option left but to live under the suzerainty of their competitor.
In the realm of International Relations, this tendency is labeled as bandwagoning, when weaker states decides to submit to will of powerful country, rather than opting for the option of balancing, when they can join forces to collectively thwart the threat posed by rivals and hegemon.
Of late, a few of the serving and retired diplomats and officers of armed forces, exuding the same tendency, have been opining that Pakistan needs to shun its obsession with Kashmir and mend fences with India. They believe that since India's economy has entered an elusive club where it is globally significant, recent developments have helped New Delhi to carve a toehold for itself in the realm of international relations, Pakistan will stand a good chance to accrue benefits from policy of burying hatchets and cozying up to India. In other words, the pros of closer ties with India outweigh the cons of shelving Kashmir issue and playing second fiddle to India.
Undoubtedly, India has made its mark on the world stage and great powers are jockeying to woo India to their side. And there are no two opinions that Pakistan will drive dividends from good relations with India. But will these dividends be enough to help us emulate the kind of innovation and stability India has achieved in its economy, bolster our coffers enough to bid goodbye to IMF, ramp up our exports enough to outnumber imports, and lastly usher our economy into advanced stages of development marked by production of value-added technological goods?
I don't think so. At best, India can help us slightly shrink our trade deficit and allow us to focus more on butter than bullet. Are these ostensible benefits worth the cost of putting Kashmir issue at the back burner and, more worryingly, admitting our failure to put our house in order, thus delivering a body blow to our already tattered reputation in the world?
Secondly, the predicament of our economy, and in consequence, our irrelevance in the world, is not due to our strained relations with India, but due to our unwillingness to take a harder road of carrying out structural reforms, such as privatization of bleeding SOEs, taxation of untaxed sectors, and provision of incentives to affluent citizens to invest their money in productive venues that generates employment and drives up GDP instead of parking their wealth in dormant real estate. Enforcing these tough yet vital measures alone will go a long way in remedying the wrongs and putting the economy on a path of sustainable development. That is why it is not bad blood between Pakistan and India that is preventing our country from breaking the boom and bust cycle that characterizes our stagnant economy, but our stubborn attitude to not enact reforms in various sectors.
Furthermore, going into dialogue from a position of weakness will also not help us much but instead will reflect poorly on us. India shows no interest in pursuing peace with Pakistan and this is not without some solid reasons - it finds little value in relations with Islamabad and finds more value in keeping the borders quiet and ensuring that cross-border terrorism doesn't happen; New Delhi has been able to achieve both these goal without any formal engagement with the Pakistani government. If India ever agreed to normalization of relations, it would do so on its own terms. And those terms are not hard to imagine.
Finally, the pretext on the basis of which we seek repairment of ties with India - that these ties will contribute towards easing our economic woes - is shaky. Consider this: Pakistan has higher-than-Himalayas relations with China and fraternal partnership with Gulf States; and these friendly states have extended billions of dollars on a number of occasions to bail us out. If these ties with friendly states and the assistance accompanied with them have not taken us out of our balance of payment crisis once and for all, how can we assume that good relations with India will serve as an antidote for our deep-seated structural problems? Hypothetically speaking, it is possible that we would have swallowed our pride, compromised on the Kashmir issue and have normalized our ties with India and yet we would still be in the midst of an existential crisis.
In that case, whom would we want to cozy up to next and what interest would we be willing to sacrifice to do just that to make our economy solvent?
To be sure, I am not against building bridges with India per se, but what I find faults with is the basis on which we seek recalibration of our policy vis-à-vis India and the cost we are willing to pay for this recalibration.
Pakistan will be in a much better position to extend an olive branch to India if the political elite are able to bring about at least some semblance of normalcy on the economic front. This will help Islamabad avoid appearing weak while it pursues peace with New Delhi, and make its offer of normalization more attractive for India to accept.
In the realm of International Relations, this tendency is labeled as bandwagoning, when weaker states decides to submit to will of powerful country, rather than opting for the option of balancing, when they can join forces to collectively thwart the threat posed by rivals and hegemon.
Of late, a few of the serving and retired diplomats and officers of armed forces, exuding the same tendency, have been opining that Pakistan needs to shun its obsession with Kashmir and mend fences with India. They believe that since India's economy has entered an elusive club where it is globally significant, recent developments have helped New Delhi to carve a toehold for itself in the realm of international relations, Pakistan will stand a good chance to accrue benefits from policy of burying hatchets and cozying up to India. In other words, the pros of closer ties with India outweigh the cons of shelving Kashmir issue and playing second fiddle to India.
Undoubtedly, India has made its mark on the world stage and great powers are jockeying to woo India to their side. And there are no two opinions that Pakistan will drive dividends from good relations with India. But will these dividends be enough to help us emulate the kind of innovation and stability India has achieved in its economy, bolster our coffers enough to bid goodbye to IMF, ramp up our exports enough to outnumber imports, and lastly usher our economy into advanced stages of development marked by production of value-added technological goods?
I don't think so. At best, India can help us slightly shrink our trade deficit and allow us to focus more on butter than bullet. Are these ostensible benefits worth the cost of putting Kashmir issue at the back burner and, more worryingly, admitting our failure to put our house in order, thus delivering a body blow to our already tattered reputation in the world?
Secondly, the predicament of our economy, and in consequence, our irrelevance in the world, is not due to our strained relations with India, but due to our unwillingness to take a harder road of carrying out structural reforms, such as privatization of bleeding SOEs, taxation of untaxed sectors, and provision of incentives to affluent citizens to invest their money in productive venues that generates employment and drives up GDP instead of parking their wealth in dormant real estate. Enforcing these tough yet vital measures alone will go a long way in remedying the wrongs and putting the economy on a path of sustainable development. That is why it is not bad blood between Pakistan and India that is preventing our country from breaking the boom and bust cycle that characterizes our stagnant economy, but our stubborn attitude to not enact reforms in various sectors.
Furthermore, going into dialogue from a position of weakness will also not help us much but instead will reflect poorly on us. India shows no interest in pursuing peace with Pakistan and this is not without some solid reasons - it finds little value in relations with Islamabad and finds more value in keeping the borders quiet and ensuring that cross-border terrorism doesn't happen; New Delhi has been able to achieve both these goal without any formal engagement with the Pakistani government. If India ever agreed to normalization of relations, it would do so on its own terms. And those terms are not hard to imagine.
Finally, the pretext on the basis of which we seek repairment of ties with India - that these ties will contribute towards easing our economic woes - is shaky. Consider this: Pakistan has higher-than-Himalayas relations with China and fraternal partnership with Gulf States; and these friendly states have extended billions of dollars on a number of occasions to bail us out. If these ties with friendly states and the assistance accompanied with them have not taken us out of our balance of payment crisis once and for all, how can we assume that good relations with India will serve as an antidote for our deep-seated structural problems? Hypothetically speaking, it is possible that we would have swallowed our pride, compromised on the Kashmir issue and have normalized our ties with India and yet we would still be in the midst of an existential crisis.
In that case, whom would we want to cozy up to next and what interest would we be willing to sacrifice to do just that to make our economy solvent?
To be sure, I am not against building bridges with India per se, but what I find faults with is the basis on which we seek recalibration of our policy vis-à-vis India and the cost we are willing to pay for this recalibration.
Pakistan will be in a much better position to extend an olive branch to India if the political elite are able to bring about at least some semblance of normalcy on the economic front. This will help Islamabad avoid appearing weak while it pursues peace with New Delhi, and make its offer of normalization more attractive for India to accept.