Imagine a spacious house in which four brothers live with their families in a traditional joint-family system. Each brother has his own sources and level of income, therefore the set of rooms of each brother vary in their grandeur, or lack thereof. The brothers also have differing family sizes, with one of them, Brother A, having more children than all the other brothers put together.
To run their collective affairs, the brothers elect a family council on a numerical basis. This gives Brother A the most seats in the council and the resultant power to determine the body’s leader. Simply, none of the other brothers can attain a majority of council seats without gaining the support of Brother A’s family.
Needless to say, the lop-sided structure of the council often causes friction between the brothers. With Brother A more often than not in the driving seat on the council, the other brothers chaff at their peripheral influence in determining the affairs of the joint-family.
The relationship of Punjab with the rest of Pakistan essentially mirrors the relationship between Brother A and his siblings. The Land of the Five Rivers constitutes approximately 53% of the population of Pakistan, and this majority gives the Punjab 141 out of the 272 general seats in the National Assembly. Thus, it is a virtual impossibility for a federal government to be formed at Islamabad without the majority support of the Members National Assembly from the Punjab.
A different situation prevailed in the days of united Pakistan. Erstwhile East Pakistan then had the majority population, and it could override the combined population of the four provinces of former West Pakistan. The standard-bearer of the challenge to East Pakistan’s numerical superiority was none other than the Punjab, which then considered it undemocratic and inequitable that the provinces of West Pakistan should be consigned to perpetually playing the role of handmaiden to East Pakistan.
Various means were contrived to neutralise the majority of East Pakistan, foremost among which was the concept of parity and the creation of the One Unit of West Pakistan. In the end, these contrivances for subduing the aspirations of the majority came to naught and the bloody denouement of 1971 sounded the death-knell of united Pakistan.
Now that the roles are reversed, and the Punjab itself is in the majority in present-day Pakistan, it is obviously disinclined to water down its majority over the remaining three provinces of Pakistan. And based on the bitter experience of East Pakistan’s separation, I believe that unnaturally downsizing the Punjab’s numerical majority and thereby introducing parity with the other three provinces will be tantamount to another recipe for disaster.
But that does not mean that there is no constitutional imbalance in the Pakistani federation and that it does not need to be cured. Rather, the lop-sided nature of our constitutional scheme is glaringly evident from the fact that Pakistan is the only one among the leading federations of the world, if not among all noteworthy federations, in which one federating unit comprises more than half of the country’s population.
The USA, Indonesia and India are prime examples of other leading federations, but in none of these countries does one federating unit overwhelmingly dominate the others. California is the USA’s most populous state, but it only comprises 12% of the country’s population. West Java in Indonesia and Uttar Pradesh in India are the most heavily populated of the two countries’ federating units, but they, too, comprise 18 % and 17 % respectively of the overall population. Therefore, these federations do not suffer from any inherent imbalance, unlike the case in Pakistan.
But if parity or One Unit is not the solution to our disjointed federal mismatch, what is the alternative? The simple answer is: the carving out of one or more new provinces from the humongous Punjab.
To begin with, Bahawalpur under the Abbasi Nawabs, who ruled from 1802 – 1955, never was a part of the Punjab. Therefore its creation as a new province, comprising Bahawalpur, Rahimyar Khan and Bahawalnagar districts, will correct an anomaly and an injustice which was meted out to the people of the state when the territory was not given provincial status upon the abolition of One Unit in 1970.
Bahawalpur province should be stage 1 of the re-drawing of Punjab’s boundaries. Stage 2 would see the other districts in the Seraiki belt being consolidated as another province, with Multan as its capital.
The creation of these two provinces will result in the Punjab becoming a more manageable province, with its residents getting easier access to government services and more focused attention from the provincial government. The same benefits would be availed by the people of the two new provinces, on account of their compact size and homogeneity. But above all, this move will lessen – if not altogether remove – the feelings of rancour that are engendered in the three smaller provinces by the currently-constituted Punjab, which towers over them in size and strength.
Sadly, with the National Assembly currently not having its full strength on account of the absent PTI members, the requisite 2/3 majority of the total membership of the Senate and National Assembly is not available to pass the requisite constitutional amendments to redraw Punjab’s boundaries.
However, if any political party has the foresight and nous to make this matter a positive campaign issue for the next general election, they will probably be winners. The Seraiki belt will support them overwhelmingly, and the rest of the Punjab will also be supportive, since the prospect of becoming a less unwieldy province will appeal to most Punjabis. In addition, even the electorate in the other three provinces may well support such a political party, on the grounds that the proposed redistribution of Punjab’s boundaries will make the federation more equitable and give the other provinces a greater share in power at the federal level.
Finally, the establishment’s ability and capacity to indulge in political engineering – if it ever decides to renounce its current neutral stance – will be seriously lessened if the Punjab is split into three provinces. It is far easier to control a loyal pro-establishment clique in one province than it would be to do so in three separate provinces, which may have competing interests and differing priorities vis-à-vis each other. If for no other reason, then this prospect should by itself be sufficient incentive for our politicians to get their act in order and to strive for the cause of a more equitable federation.
To run their collective affairs, the brothers elect a family council on a numerical basis. This gives Brother A the most seats in the council and the resultant power to determine the body’s leader. Simply, none of the other brothers can attain a majority of council seats without gaining the support of Brother A’s family.
Needless to say, the lop-sided structure of the council often causes friction between the brothers. With Brother A more often than not in the driving seat on the council, the other brothers chaff at their peripheral influence in determining the affairs of the joint-family.
The relationship of Punjab with the rest of Pakistan essentially mirrors the relationship between Brother A and his siblings. The Land of the Five Rivers constitutes approximately 53% of the population of Pakistan, and this majority gives the Punjab 141 out of the 272 general seats in the National Assembly. Thus, it is a virtual impossibility for a federal government to be formed at Islamabad without the majority support of the Members National Assembly from the Punjab.
A different situation prevailed in the days of united Pakistan. Erstwhile East Pakistan then had the majority population, and it could override the combined population of the four provinces of former West Pakistan. The standard-bearer of the challenge to East Pakistan’s numerical superiority was none other than the Punjab, which then considered it undemocratic and inequitable that the provinces of West Pakistan should be consigned to perpetually playing the role of handmaiden to East Pakistan.
West Java in Indonesia and Uttar Pradesh in India are the most heavily populated of the two countries’ federating units, but they, too, comprise 18% and 17% respectively of the overall population. Therefore, these federations do not suffer from any inherent imbalance, unlike the case in Pakistan
Various means were contrived to neutralise the majority of East Pakistan, foremost among which was the concept of parity and the creation of the One Unit of West Pakistan. In the end, these contrivances for subduing the aspirations of the majority came to naught and the bloody denouement of 1971 sounded the death-knell of united Pakistan.
Now that the roles are reversed, and the Punjab itself is in the majority in present-day Pakistan, it is obviously disinclined to water down its majority over the remaining three provinces of Pakistan. And based on the bitter experience of East Pakistan’s separation, I believe that unnaturally downsizing the Punjab’s numerical majority and thereby introducing parity with the other three provinces will be tantamount to another recipe for disaster.
But that does not mean that there is no constitutional imbalance in the Pakistani federation and that it does not need to be cured. Rather, the lop-sided nature of our constitutional scheme is glaringly evident from the fact that Pakistan is the only one among the leading federations of the world, if not among all noteworthy federations, in which one federating unit comprises more than half of the country’s population.
The USA, Indonesia and India are prime examples of other leading federations, but in none of these countries does one federating unit overwhelmingly dominate the others. California is the USA’s most populous state, but it only comprises 12% of the country’s population. West Java in Indonesia and Uttar Pradesh in India are the most heavily populated of the two countries’ federating units, but they, too, comprise 18 % and 17 % respectively of the overall population. Therefore, these federations do not suffer from any inherent imbalance, unlike the case in Pakistan.
But if parity or One Unit is not the solution to our disjointed federal mismatch, what is the alternative? The simple answer is: the carving out of one or more new provinces from the humongous Punjab.
To begin with, Bahawalpur under the Abbasi Nawabs, who ruled from 1802 – 1955, never was a part of the Punjab. Therefore its creation as a new province, comprising Bahawalpur, Rahimyar Khan and Bahawalnagar districts, will correct an anomaly and an injustice which was meted out to the people of the state when the territory was not given provincial status upon the abolition of One Unit in 1970.
Bahawalpur province should be stage 1 of the re-drawing of Punjab’s boundaries. Stage 2 would see the other districts in the Seraiki belt being consolidated as another province, with Multan as its capital.
The creation of these two provinces will result in the Punjab becoming a more manageable province, with its residents getting easier access to government services and more focused attention from the provincial government. The same benefits would be availed by the people of the two new provinces, on account of their compact size and homogeneity. But above all, this move will lessen – if not altogether remove – the feelings of rancour that are engendered in the three smaller provinces by the currently-constituted Punjab, which towers over them in size and strength.
Sadly, with the National Assembly currently not having its full strength on account of the absent PTI members, the requisite 2/3 majority of the total membership of the Senate and National Assembly is not available to pass the requisite constitutional amendments to redraw Punjab’s boundaries.
However, if any political party has the foresight and nous to make this matter a positive campaign issue for the next general election, they will probably be winners. The Seraiki belt will support them overwhelmingly, and the rest of the Punjab will also be supportive, since the prospect of becoming a less unwieldy province will appeal to most Punjabis. In addition, even the electorate in the other three provinces may well support such a political party, on the grounds that the proposed redistribution of Punjab’s boundaries will make the federation more equitable and give the other provinces a greater share in power at the federal level.
Finally, the establishment’s ability and capacity to indulge in political engineering – if it ever decides to renounce its current neutral stance – will be seriously lessened if the Punjab is split into three provinces. It is far easier to control a loyal pro-establishment clique in one province than it would be to do so in three separate provinces, which may have competing interests and differing priorities vis-à-vis each other. If for no other reason, then this prospect should by itself be sufficient incentive for our politicians to get their act in order and to strive for the cause of a more equitable federation.