In the post-General Ziaul Haq period, Pakistan’s un-savvy political class with their unsophisticated ways of conducting themselves in power struggles, created larger-than-life images of the army generals. They were repeatedly offered opportunities to act as arbitrators in the bitter and ruthless power struggle between rival political parties. This has indeed destroyed the country’s political system.
The 1990s power struggles created the myth of an omnipotent and omnipresent army and its top brass. While political parties were fighting among themselves to attain power in the country, the generals were rejoicing at their newfound status as power arbitrators – as, the only force which could bring about political change by replacing the party in power with a party in opposition. This continued between 1988 and 1999 — with four governments deposed and two parties, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) playing musical chairs -- when the military would intervene, abrogate the constitution and impose martial law.
After repenting their political deeds of providing the army generals opportunities to become too powerful, the PML-N and PPP then embarked on the path of course correction. But hindsight provides us with new ways of looking at the past events: For instance, in early 1994, Nawaz Sharif as opposition leader went to the GHQ to meet the then Chief of the Army Staff, General Abdul Waheed Kakar, ostensibly to prevent defections in his parliamentary party orchestrated by the PPP government. This was a year after Sharif was forced to resign from the prime minister’s office by the same General Kakar in 1993. Nawaz Sharif found no way of preventing defection in his party other than grabbing a photo opportunity with the then COAS. This meeting went a long way in building the image of the army and its generals as the final arbiter in the political system.
On July 16, 1993, Benazir Bhutto marched on Islamabad but postponed it midway when the situation defused after General Kakar forced President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to resign. Benazir Bhutto wanted ouster of the Sharif government and she was not willing to negotiate with the government. In the absence of any communication between the parties in the parliament, the field was open for the army generals to assert themselves in an unstable political situation.
Benazir Bhutto afforded them the best opportunity: she called off her long march on the cajoling of the army generals, thus paving the way for their even more larger-than-life image in the country. Such power struggles continued between 1988 (the year democracy was restored in the country in the wake of Zia’s death in a plane crash) and 1999 (the year General Musharraf imposed martial law in the country).
In the post-Musharraf period, the Pakistan Army’s top brass deftly used this image to manipulate the political system. When Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif proved too ambitious in his plans to normalise relations with India, a plan to get rid of him went into action. In fact, the army became so powerful in the post-Musharraf period that it could precipitate a political crisis just by remaining inactive in the time of crunch -- as it did at the time of the no-confidence motion against Imran Khan recently.
Pakistani political class is directly responsible for this image of the army’s top brass. They have asked them to investigate allegations of financial corruption, to provide personnel and expertise in times of disaster and in electoral processes. The army is also called in to manage large-scale mobs.
Now, Pakistan’s political class is in the process of making another folly. They, in the post-Musharraf period, are helping create a larger-than-life image of superior court judges. Every political question is being decided in the courts of law. In the latest development, the Supreme Court will decide the fate of the Punjab Assembly.
This new larger-than-life image of judges build by the political leaders will push Pakistan’s representative institutions further into the background. Politicians are the prime culprits in making the system dysfunctional.
The 1990s power struggles created the myth of an omnipotent and omnipresent army and its top brass. While political parties were fighting among themselves to attain power in the country, the generals were rejoicing at their newfound status as power arbitrators – as, the only force which could bring about political change by replacing the party in power with a party in opposition. This continued between 1988 and 1999 — with four governments deposed and two parties, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) playing musical chairs -- when the military would intervene, abrogate the constitution and impose martial law.
After repenting their political deeds of providing the army generals opportunities to become too powerful, the PML-N and PPP then embarked on the path of course correction. But hindsight provides us with new ways of looking at the past events: For instance, in early 1994, Nawaz Sharif as opposition leader went to the GHQ to meet the then Chief of the Army Staff, General Abdul Waheed Kakar, ostensibly to prevent defections in his parliamentary party orchestrated by the PPP government. This was a year after Sharif was forced to resign from the prime minister’s office by the same General Kakar in 1993. Nawaz Sharif found no way of preventing defection in his party other than grabbing a photo opportunity with the then COAS. This meeting went a long way in building the image of the army and its generals as the final arbiter in the political system.
After repenting their political deeds of providing the army generals opportunities to become too powerful, the PML-N and PPP then embarked on the path of course correction.
On July 16, 1993, Benazir Bhutto marched on Islamabad but postponed it midway when the situation defused after General Kakar forced President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to resign. Benazir Bhutto wanted ouster of the Sharif government and she was not willing to negotiate with the government. In the absence of any communication between the parties in the parliament, the field was open for the army generals to assert themselves in an unstable political situation.
Benazir Bhutto afforded them the best opportunity: she called off her long march on the cajoling of the army generals, thus paving the way for their even more larger-than-life image in the country. Such power struggles continued between 1988 (the year democracy was restored in the country in the wake of Zia’s death in a plane crash) and 1999 (the year General Musharraf imposed martial law in the country).
In the post-Musharraf period, the Pakistan Army’s top brass deftly used this image to manipulate the political system. When Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif proved too ambitious in his plans to normalise relations with India, a plan to get rid of him went into action. In fact, the army became so powerful in the post-Musharraf period that it could precipitate a political crisis just by remaining inactive in the time of crunch -- as it did at the time of the no-confidence motion against Imran Khan recently.
Pakistani political class is directly responsible for this image of the army’s top brass. They have asked them to investigate allegations of financial corruption, to provide personnel and expertise in times of disaster and in electoral processes. The army is also called in to manage large-scale mobs.
Now, Pakistan’s political class is in the process of making another folly. They, in the post-Musharraf period, are helping create a larger-than-life image of superior court judges. Every political question is being decided in the courts of law. In the latest development, the Supreme Court will decide the fate of the Punjab Assembly.
This new larger-than-life image of judges build by the political leaders will push Pakistan’s representative institutions further into the background. Politicians are the prime culprits in making the system dysfunctional.