What unique capacity does the military possess that political parties in Pakistan do not? Why are the political leaders in awe of the military?
Although Pakistani media churns out supernatural accounts of Pakistan military’s adventures and prowess, its capability has hardly ever generated a serious debate in the local media. Some civil-military experts have analyzed why and how the military dominates the political structures of the society. Their accounts however fall short of plausible explanations on what constitutes the nature and content of the military’s unique political capacity.
According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Pakistan Army has strength of 560,000 active duty personnel spread across every part of the country. This gives the army and its high command a unique social and political capacity to influence developments and events in the country. They extend a helping hand in natural disasters and parliamentary elections. This image of the military, as omnipotent and omnipresent force in the country, lends further credence to its political capability.
There are two facets to this phenomenon: a) the painstakingly constructed image of the Pakistani military as omnipotent and omnipresent force works to serve interests of the country and its people. and b) its capacity to influence political events by accessing information that is not available to political leaders. The militarisation of the intelligence apparatus has helped the military greatly.
The military top brass and intelligence agencies have in the post-Musharraf era demonstrated the capacity to control the state machinery. This gives them immense political power to influence the events at local as well as at national level in a political system that is required to provide legal protection to the ruling elites and classes in a highly manipulated criminal justice system.
Additionally, the role the military has played in international and regional power games, like the Cold War and the War on Terror, has added to its international legitimacy. Any foreign dignitary visiting Islamabad visits the GHQ to meet the army chief without fail. In the post-Musharraf period, the Chiefs of the Army Staff have routinely visited Washington DC, London, Brussels, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Beijing and other countries. Constitutionally the COAS has no role in running diplomacy of the country.
The Pakistan military has always disliked two types of leaders: one who could rival them in international stature and international connections (the then military top brass was jealous of Benazir Bhutto), and two, the one which is in command of an armed organization (examples are countless in Pakistan’s history).
Pakistan military is in love with its image, and draws unique political power from it. They have built this image even more in the post-Musharraf period. In a religious Muslim society like Pakistan, the proclivities of the dominant ethnic groups towards militarisation of narratives and religious interpretations greatly aided the media campaign of Pakistani military to construct its image as a saviour of the nation. This process of Islamisation of the society was beneficial for military leaders — since in popular imagination, the man of sword was the man of piety.
They however faced a crisis of legitimacy and image, when religious leaders declared Osama bin Laden their heroes in the wake of 9/11. This crisis seems to have subsided, but not entirely.
Although Pakistani media churns out supernatural accounts of Pakistan military’s adventures and prowess, its capability has hardly ever generated a serious debate in the local media. Some civil-military experts have analyzed why and how the military dominates the political structures of the society. Their accounts however fall short of plausible explanations on what constitutes the nature and content of the military’s unique political capacity.
According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Pakistan Army has strength of 560,000 active duty personnel spread across every part of the country. This gives the army and its high command a unique social and political capacity to influence developments and events in the country. They extend a helping hand in natural disasters and parliamentary elections. This image of the military, as omnipotent and omnipresent force in the country, lends further credence to its political capability.
According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Pakistan Army has strength of 560,000 active duty personnel spread across every part of the country. This gives the army and its high command a unique social and political capacity to influence developments and events in the country.
There are two facets to this phenomenon: a) the painstakingly constructed image of the Pakistani military as omnipotent and omnipresent force works to serve interests of the country and its people. and b) its capacity to influence political events by accessing information that is not available to political leaders. The militarisation of the intelligence apparatus has helped the military greatly.
The military top brass and intelligence agencies have in the post-Musharraf era demonstrated the capacity to control the state machinery. This gives them immense political power to influence the events at local as well as at national level in a political system that is required to provide legal protection to the ruling elites and classes in a highly manipulated criminal justice system.
Additionally, the role the military has played in international and regional power games, like the Cold War and the War on Terror, has added to its international legitimacy. Any foreign dignitary visiting Islamabad visits the GHQ to meet the army chief without fail. In the post-Musharraf period, the Chiefs of the Army Staff have routinely visited Washington DC, London, Brussels, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Beijing and other countries. Constitutionally the COAS has no role in running diplomacy of the country.
The Pakistan military has always disliked two types of leaders: one who could rival them in international stature and international connections; and two, the one which is in command of an armed organisation.
The Pakistan military has always disliked two types of leaders: one who could rival them in international stature and international connections (the then military top brass was jealous of Benazir Bhutto), and two, the one which is in command of an armed organization (examples are countless in Pakistan’s history).
Pakistan military is in love with its image, and draws unique political power from it. They have built this image even more in the post-Musharraf period. In a religious Muslim society like Pakistan, the proclivities of the dominant ethnic groups towards militarisation of narratives and religious interpretations greatly aided the media campaign of Pakistani military to construct its image as a saviour of the nation. This process of Islamisation of the society was beneficial for military leaders — since in popular imagination, the man of sword was the man of piety.
They however faced a crisis of legitimacy and image, when religious leaders declared Osama bin Laden their heroes in the wake of 9/11. This crisis seems to have subsided, but not entirely.