Gulf War Log: The Making Of Operation Desert Storm - Part I

Gulf War Log: The Making Of Operation Desert Storm - Part I
Prince Bandar bin Sultan, nephew of King Fahd bin Abdulaziz al Saud, had been Saudi ambassador in Washington since 1983. In early April 1990 he received a call from the King to reach Baghdad for an important meeting with Saddam Hussein. Price Bandar, who had flown jet fighters for the Saudi air force, enjoyed a unique and enviable position in Washington due to his close and personal relations with Bush, Cheney, Scowcroft, and General Colin Powell. The prince was in the good books of Saddam Hussein as well, because he had acted as the middleman between Iraq and the CIA Director William J. Casey, who had provided classified satellite photos of the Iranian troop movements during the Iran-Iraq war. Not only that, he had also arranged for the delivery of French Mirage fighter planes for the Iraqi air force.

Piloting his personal jet, Prince Bandar landed in Baghdad in the early hours of April 5, 1990. He was immediately taken to a secret meeting place where Saddam Hussein stood waiting. Saddam had a short message to be delivered to George Bush, “Tell Bush I will not attack Israel unless attacked by them, and my speech of 1st April has been misunderstood in Washington.”

Bandar then flew back to Washington, and Saddam’s message was delivered to Bush in the Oval Office. “Does he have to say that when he has no such intentions?” remarked George Bush. Bandar left the White House after the normal diplomatic chitchat and all concerned authorities conveniently forgot the incident.

Three months later, on July 16, 1990, retired army colonel Walter Pat Lang Jr. was busy in his office of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), when his attention was drawn to a batch of satellite photos, from an area north of Kuwait in Southern Iraq. Col. Lang was an intelligence officer in the DIA and his specialty was the Middle East. His trained eyes immediately picked up the formation of a brigade of T-72 tanks that had travelled hundreds of miles from Baghdad. The satellite images were so clear and detailed that divisional signs of the Hummarabi Division could be identified.

The next day brought more disturbing evidence. The entire Hummarabi division with 300 tanks and 10,000 men was on the border of Kuwait. The Medina division was moving up as well. By July 19, three crack-armored divisions were within 10 miles of the Kuwaiti border.

This intelligence report was immediately passed on to General Colin Powell. After discussions with Gen. Norman H. Schwarzkopf, the commander of the US Central Command, with headquarters at the Macdill Air Force Base, it was concluded that Saddam was only flexing his muscles to scare Kuwaitis or to launch a limited punitive operation against them. Col. Lang continued to monitor the situation.
Piloting his personal jet, Prince Bandar landed in Baghdad in the early hours of April 5, 1990. He was immediately taken to a secret meeting place where Saddam Hussein stood waiting. Saddam had a short message to be delivered to George Bush, “Tell Bush I will not attack Israel unless attacked by them, and my speech of 1st April has been misunderstood in Washington.”

Within 11 days, eight divisions had moved towards Kuwait, and were poised in a threatening offensive posture. On July 19, during a press briefing, Dick Cheney stated, “We will take seriously any threat to American interests or friends in the Middle East.”

On July 25, April Glaspie, US Ambassador in Baghdad, was summoned by Saddam Hussein, and asked to explain Cheney’s statement. Glaspie a career diplomat, replied: “We have no opinions on Arab-Arab conflicts like your border dispute with Kuwait.”

Saddam informed Glaspie that on the intervention of Hosnie Mubarak, he has agreed to hold talks with Kuwait. Glaspie congratulated Saddam, and decided to take a short trip to the US.

On July 27, Prince Bandar gave more news to Colin Powell. King Fahd had received assurances from Hosnie Mubarak and King Hussein of Jordan that all Iraqi troop movements were only a military exercise, and there was no cause for alarm. A personal message was also received by George Bush from Hosnie Mubarak, asking that the US should stop trying to influence the situation inside Iraq, as this was an entirely Arab problem.

The feeling in the US administration was that the real enemy of Iraq was Israel, so why should an Arab ruler attack a much weaker and smaller Arab neighbour, and the Kuwaiti ruler had not asked for any US help.

On July 30, Col. Pat Lang wrote a top secret report to his boss Gen. Harry E. Soyester, the head of the DIA, “I have been looking at the pattern of reinforcements along the Kuwaiti borders. There is some artillery and logistics moving, aircrafts are also moving, Saddam Hussein has created the capability to over run all of Kuwait and Eastern Saudi Arabia.” Gen. Soyester disagreed with the conclusions of Col. Lang, and passed on the report immediately to Dick Cheney and Colin Powell.

On Wednesday August 1, Col. Lang looked carefully at the latest satellite pictures. Three Iraqi divisions were within three miles of the Kuwaiti border, while hundreds of tanks were facing Kuwait. The Medina division had taken up positions on the Western side of Kuwait. As many as 80 helicopters could also be seen ready, and waiting for a textbook air-land assault. The Hummarabi, and In God We Trust divisions were in position along the four lane highway leading to the centre of Kuwait city. In the worried mind of Col. Lang, the whole scene looked like a razor sharp dagger pointed at the heart of Kuwait, anxious to claim its pound of flesh. That morning Colin Powell read two reports, one from the DIA, and the other a CIA assessment, which stated in plain language that Iraq was about to invade Kuwait.

The invasion started at 2am Baghdad time on August 2, 1990, spearheaded by three Republican Guards Divisions. One division attacked and occupied the Kuwait city, the other seized the inland oil fields, while the third raced on to the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. The Kuwaiti Amir Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah barely managed to escape to Saudi Arabia.

On August 3, the rest of Kuwait was subjugated. By August 4, Iraqi divisions were poised all along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border, heightening fears of an invasion of Saudi Arabia, which could make Saddam Hussein leader of the Arab world, and in complete control of 45 percent of the known oil reserves in the world.

Alarm bells had started ringing all over Washington. Cheney and Colin Powell were informed at their homes by Admiral Owens. Vice Chairman Admiral David Jeremiah and Gen. Kelly reached the crisis situation room and a line was kept open with Gen. Schwarzkopf at the headquarters in Florida. Scowcroft informed George Bush, who issued an immediate statement condemning the invasion of Kuwait, and calling for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Scowcroft and lawyer Boyden Gray prepared a plan to freeze all Iraqi assets in the US, and over USD 100 billion of Kuwaiti assets in various countries of Europe and Americas and this plan was signed by George Bush as an emergency executive order.
The Americans were pleasantly surprised at this immediate decision by the Saudi King. “This has been a truly historic meeting,” Cheney said.

“No doubt about this,” Fahd replied.

A meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) started in the cabinet room at 8am with George Bush in the chair, and attended by Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, Schwarzkopf, Wolfowitz and Gates. James Baker was in Siberia meeting Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister. The US ambassador to the United Nations had worked through out the night and the invasion was condemned by the UN with the adoption of resolution 660. Various options were debated and discussed in the meeting of the NSC. Schwarzkopf presented the Central Command's plan “90-1002” or “Ten-Oh-two.” This plan was formulated in the early 1980s, and was a comprehensive plan for transporting ground troops to the Middle East for the defense of the US interests in line with the Carter Doctrine of 1980. In the afternoon, Bush declared, “We are not ruling any options in, but we are not ruling any options out.”

At the same time Bush remained busy through out the day, conferring with King Fahd in Riyadh and Hosnie Mubarak and King Hussein of Jordan, who were both in Alexandria at the time.

One major obstacle for executing Central Commands Plan 90-1002 was the absence of any US base in Saudi Arabia. King Fahd agreed to receive a high level US delegation to present their plan for the defense of the kingdom. The US team headed by Cheney, and including Gates, Schwarzkopf, Wolfowitz and Ambassador Freeman landed in Jeddah on August 6, and a few hours later had their crucial meeting with King Fahd and his top advisors. Prince Bandar acted as an interpreter.

The meeting started with a reference to the special relationship of Fahd with George Bush since the time when Bush was the CIA director in 1976. Schwarzkopf then briefed the Saudi Monarch with the help of charts and the latest satellite photos, concluding: “We believe that Saddam Hussein could attack Saudi Arabia in as little as forty eight hours.”

Dick Cheney then explained the diplomatic offensive: “President Bush has spoken personally with the leaders of France, Britain, Germany, Turkey, Japan and Italy. The Soviet Union and China have agreed to co-operate. James Baker is on his way to Moscow where a joint declaration will be issued.”

Cheney finished his presentation before King Fahd in his bid to secure Saudi permission to land US troops in Saudi Arabia with the remarks; “The President has asked me to assure you, that we will stay as long as you want. We will leave when you no longer need it. We will stay until justice is done and not a minute longer. We are not seeking permanent bases, but we will need to make joint preparations now.” A lively discussion followed between the King and his advisors in Arabic. Which was not translated by Bandar.

After some time King Fahd finally spoke amidst pin drop silence, “We have to do this. The Kuwaitis waited. They waited too long,” King Fahd continued, “We approve of the principle. Let’s do what has to be done. We will proceed with the details.”

The Americans were pleasantly surprised at this immediate decision by the Saudi King. “This has been a truly historic meeting,” Cheney said.

“No doubt about this,” Fahd replied.

Back in his quarters, Cheney called Bush in the US, who took the call in the Oval Office, where he was in conference with Margaret Thatcher. “King Fahd has approved the deployment of US forces on Saudi Arabian soil,” Cheney informed Bush who appeared to be elated.

Cheney continued, “I am now seeking your formal approval to begin moving forces.”

The White House immediately gave the green signal.

After his call to President Bush, Dick Cheney called Gen. Colin Powell, and conveyed the presidential order to start the movement of the US forces.

To be continued.