Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has entered its fourth month. The war is not going well for Russia. Putin made a serious error of judgment when he invaded Ukraine on February 24. The resistance was fierce, and the invasion brought mass opprobrium onto Russia.
Many observers expected Putin would declare victory on May 9, and call for a ceasefire. But the date came and went with no such declaration. Just about no one in the West expected Putin to attack Ukraine. In an interview, Henry Kissinger, who had met Putin more than 20 times in his career, never thought Putin would miscalculate so badly.
President Obama said he was surprised by Putin’s brutality: “I don’t know that the person I knew is the same as the person who is now leading this charge. He was always ruthless. You witnessed what he did in Chechnya, he had no qualms about crushing those whom he considered a threat. That’s not new. For him to bet the farm in this way — I would not have necessarily predicted that from him five years ago.”
In his 2020 book, A Promised Land, President Barack Obama records his impression of Putin when they first met in Moscow in July 2009. Putin had previously served as president for two consecutive terms and was the prime minister when they met. Obama knew that the real power in the Kremlin resided with Putin. Obama writes that Putin resembled “the leader of a criminal syndicate… [which] had its tentacles wrapped around every aspect of the economy.”
Earlier, Obama met Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in London at the G20 summit. Medvedev was the “poster child for the new Russia: young, trim, and clothed in hip.” But behind that exterior, there was the man who had presided over Russia’s invasion of Georgia, disguised as a “peacekeeping operation” in August 2008. To Obama, that invasion was “a sign of Putin’s escalating boldness and general belligerence, a troubling unwillingness to respect another nation’s sovereignty.”
President George W. Bush had looked the other way when Georgia was invaded. Obama wanted to prevent a recurrence and reset America’s ties with Russia. Obama opened his discussions with Medvedev by talking about the Russian occupation of Georgia. The Russian president dismissed those concerns, saying Russian forces had been greeted as liberators by the Georgians, unliked the Americans in Iraq. Obama told Medvedev that he had opposed the invasion of Iraq. After the meeting, Obama could not help recall the chilling words of Russian novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who had written that in Russia, “The lie has become not just a moral category but a pillar of the state.”
Then came the day when Obama met Putin at his dacha in the suburbs of Moscow. As they greeted each other, Putin displayed the type of studied politeness one gets from a man who thinks he is superior to everyone. His demeaner was suffused with paranoia.
As they sat down to chat, Putin launched into a tirade against the US. In his monologue, Putin “chronicled every perceived injustice, betrayal, and slight that he and the Russian people had suffered at the hands of the American people.”
Putin was concerned the US had pulled out of the ABM treaty and was planning to house missile defense systems on Russia’s border. He felt threatened by NATO’s decision to admit former Warsaw Pact countries. Putin made it clear that America needs to treat Russia as an equal partner and not seek to be the world’s sole superpower.
By the time he stopped talking, 45 of the 60 minutes allotted to the meeting were used up. Obama started responding to each of Putin’s objections but Putin was not moved. The meeting ran into overtime and ended abruptly.
While speaking at other functions in Moscow, Obama continued to be bothered by the stultifying encounter with Putin. He had come across to him as a “ward boss,” except with nukes and a UN Security Council veto. Putin reminded him of the sorts of men “who had once run the Chicago machine or Tammany Hall – tough, street smart, unsentimental characters who knew what they knew, who never moved outside their narrow experiences, and who viewed patronage, bribery, shakedowns, fraud, and occasional violence as legitimate tools of the trade.” In Putin’s world, “there was a lack of scruples, a contempt for any high-minded aspirations beyond accumulating power.” These were not viewed as flaws in the dynamics of Putin’s Russia but as assets.
Putin, soon after coming to power in 1999, had called Marxism-Leninism “a historic mistake.” He had stabilized the Russian economy, which was in deep trouble at the time that he took office, begun the process of holding regular elections, replaced communism with capitalism, and stopped sending high-profile dissidents like Gary Kasparov, the world chess champion, to the Gulag.
Yet, with each year that Putin remained in power, “the new Russia looked more like the old.” Its newness was a sham. Oligarchs who cooperated with Putin became some of the world’s wealthiest men. Those who broke from Putin ended up incarcerated, tortured, or dead.
Because Putin had brought about significant economic progress, and because he had pandered to Russian nationalism, he remained popular. His approval ratings rarely fell below 60 percent. Obama notes that when democratic activists challenged him, he called them tools of the West. He embraced the long-suppressed Russian Orthodox Church, and wanted to be seen as a religious figure. At the same time, he lost no opportunity to project his virility. He would often have his picture taken while riding bare chested on horses, playing hockey, or practicing judo.
But something had changed. The magic he wanted to create on the world stage was missing. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia was not a superpower. Everyone around the globe knew it, and so did Putin. The Russian economy was even smaller than Canada’s, and it was entirely dependent on its exports of oil and gas, other minerals, and arms exports.
Obama felt that Putin was traumatized by the demise of the Soviet Union, calling it the most tragic event of the 20th century. He was doing his damnedest to prevent former Soviet republics from breaking free of Russia’s orbit. Unfortunately for him, those countries wanted to move as far away from Russia as possible, and enjoy their new-found freedom. They wanted to emulate the nations of Western Europe, not Russia.
Their “rebellious” behaviour stoked the insecurities that lay deep in Putin’s personality. As we look at recent events, all of the qualities identified by Obama in 2009 are on full display. In the battle for Russia’s identify, fear and fatalism have overwhelmed the hope for change.
Putin has emerged as the most isolated of the world’s leaders. He knows he is not winning. That makes him even more dangerous than if he was winning, since Russia is armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons. More than once, he has hinted he might use them. He is behaving like a cornered tiger.
Many observers expected Putin would declare victory on May 9, and call for a ceasefire. But the date came and went with no such declaration. Just about no one in the West expected Putin to attack Ukraine. In an interview, Henry Kissinger, who had met Putin more than 20 times in his career, never thought Putin would miscalculate so badly.
President Obama said he was surprised by Putin’s brutality: “I don’t know that the person I knew is the same as the person who is now leading this charge. He was always ruthless. You witnessed what he did in Chechnya, he had no qualms about crushing those whom he considered a threat. That’s not new. For him to bet the farm in this way — I would not have necessarily predicted that from him five years ago.”
In his 2020 book, A Promised Land, President Barack Obama records his impression of Putin when they first met in Moscow in July 2009. Putin had previously served as president for two consecutive terms and was the prime minister when they met. Obama knew that the real power in the Kremlin resided with Putin. Obama writes that Putin resembled “the leader of a criminal syndicate… [which] had its tentacles wrapped around every aspect of the economy.”
Earlier, Obama met Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in London at the G20 summit. Medvedev was the “poster child for the new Russia: young, trim, and clothed in hip.” But behind that exterior, there was the man who had presided over Russia’s invasion of Georgia, disguised as a “peacekeeping operation” in August 2008. To Obama, that invasion was “a sign of Putin’s escalating boldness and general belligerence, a troubling unwillingness to respect another nation’s sovereignty.”
President George W. Bush had looked the other way when Georgia was invaded. Obama wanted to prevent a recurrence and reset America’s ties with Russia. Obama opened his discussions with Medvedev by talking about the Russian occupation of Georgia. The Russian president dismissed those concerns, saying Russian forces had been greeted as liberators by the Georgians, unliked the Americans in Iraq. Obama told Medvedev that he had opposed the invasion of Iraq. After the meeting, Obama could not help recall the chilling words of Russian novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who had written that in Russia, “The lie has become not just a moral category but a pillar of the state.”
Then came the day when Obama met Putin at his dacha in the suburbs of Moscow. As they greeted each other, Putin displayed the type of studied politeness one gets from a man who thinks he is superior to everyone. His demeaner was suffused with paranoia.
Then came the day when Obama met Putin at his dacha in the suburbs of Moscow. As they greeted each other, Putin displayed the type of studied politeness one gets from a man who thinks he is superior to everyone. His demeaner was suffused with paranoia.
As they sat down to chat, Putin launched into a tirade against the US. In his monologue, Putin “chronicled every perceived injustice, betrayal, and slight that he and the Russian people had suffered at the hands of the American people.”
Putin was concerned the US had pulled out of the ABM treaty and was planning to house missile defense systems on Russia’s border. He felt threatened by NATO’s decision to admit former Warsaw Pact countries. Putin made it clear that America needs to treat Russia as an equal partner and not seek to be the world’s sole superpower.
By the time he stopped talking, 45 of the 60 minutes allotted to the meeting were used up. Obama started responding to each of Putin’s objections but Putin was not moved. The meeting ran into overtime and ended abruptly.
While speaking at other functions in Moscow, Obama continued to be bothered by the stultifying encounter with Putin. He had come across to him as a “ward boss,” except with nukes and a UN Security Council veto. Putin reminded him of the sorts of men “who had once run the Chicago machine or Tammany Hall – tough, street smart, unsentimental characters who knew what they knew, who never moved outside their narrow experiences, and who viewed patronage, bribery, shakedowns, fraud, and occasional violence as legitimate tools of the trade.” In Putin’s world, “there was a lack of scruples, a contempt for any high-minded aspirations beyond accumulating power.” These were not viewed as flaws in the dynamics of Putin’s Russia but as assets.
Putin, soon after coming to power in 1999, had called Marxism-Leninism “a historic mistake.” He had stabilized the Russian economy, which was in deep trouble at the time that he took office, begun the process of holding regular elections, replaced communism with capitalism, and stopped sending high-profile dissidents like Gary Kasparov, the world chess champion, to the Gulag.
With each year that Putin remained in power, “the new Russia looked more like the old.” Its newness was a sham. Oligarchs who cooperated with Putin became some of the world’s wealthiest men. Those who broke from Putin ended up incarcerated, tortured, or dead.
Yet, with each year that Putin remained in power, “the new Russia looked more like the old.” Its newness was a sham. Oligarchs who cooperated with Putin became some of the world’s wealthiest men. Those who broke from Putin ended up incarcerated, tortured, or dead.
Because Putin had brought about significant economic progress, and because he had pandered to Russian nationalism, he remained popular. His approval ratings rarely fell below 60 percent. Obama notes that when democratic activists challenged him, he called them tools of the West. He embraced the long-suppressed Russian Orthodox Church, and wanted to be seen as a religious figure. At the same time, he lost no opportunity to project his virility. He would often have his picture taken while riding bare chested on horses, playing hockey, or practicing judo.
But something had changed. The magic he wanted to create on the world stage was missing. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia was not a superpower. Everyone around the globe knew it, and so did Putin. The Russian economy was even smaller than Canada’s, and it was entirely dependent on its exports of oil and gas, other minerals, and arms exports.
Obama felt that Putin was traumatized by the demise of the Soviet Union, calling it the most tragic event of the 20th century. He was doing his damnedest to prevent former Soviet republics from breaking free of Russia’s orbit. Unfortunately for him, those countries wanted to move as far away from Russia as possible, and enjoy their new-found freedom. They wanted to emulate the nations of Western Europe, not Russia.
Their “rebellious” behaviour stoked the insecurities that lay deep in Putin’s personality. As we look at recent events, all of the qualities identified by Obama in 2009 are on full display. In the battle for Russia’s identify, fear and fatalism have overwhelmed the hope for change.
Putin has emerged as the most isolated of the world’s leaders. He knows he is not winning. That makes him even more dangerous than if he was winning, since Russia is armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons. More than once, he has hinted he might use them. He is behaving like a cornered tiger.