The recent secret agreement between the government and the banned Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) has raised serious questions about the state’s security policies particularly with regard to the role of non-state actors in it.
The unwritten state security policy seems to have twin objectives: First, to project state power beyond national boundaries through non-state actors under the cover of a nuclear umbrella. Second, to nurture and sustain selected militant outfits for internal political re-engineering and arm twisting of the governments to toe the line.
Whatever the reasons, whether FATF sword, international pressure or diminishing returns of this policy, both Islamabad and Rawalpindi have been claiming that Pakistan has put ‘its own house in order’ as far as militancy and militant organisations were concerned.
The TLP agreement has placed a serious question mark over these claims. The security policies of the state where a silent ‘creeping coup’ has taken place remain unchanged. This indeed is the most important outcome of the recent agreement.
Governments forced to take decisions that run against their professed claims and promises face utter confusion. This is also what happened in the days leading up to the agreement as the narrative on dealing with the TLP changed mysteriously without any explanation.
The government initially decided to crush the banned TLP by all means stating also that army, Rangers and police would stop the long march from entering the capital. Not only were the TLP’s demands rejected out rightly it was decided to treat it as a militant organisation to be crushed as other such groups. If a militant organisation like Al Qaeda had been eliminated why TLP cannot be, it was boasted. TLP was not a political party, it was announced. Rangers were requisitioned in the Punjab for two months to quell rebellion. Rawalpindi and Islamabad were sealed in preparation for a showdown.
A federal minister giving a briefing to the media after the cabinet meeting said that the TLP did not have the status and quantum of arms of other militant organisations and it was no problem dealing with it. The government also claimed to have evidence that TLP was funded by some groups in India. A crackdown was inevitable. Enough was enough. The TLP militants had already killed four policemen near Muridke and Sadhuke.
Soon something puzzling happened of which there was no cogent explanation.
Just two days after expressions of resolve to act against the TLP, the National Security Committee (NSC) decided to dismount the high horse and begin negotiations with the group. It “gave a green signal to the government for talks with the TLP”. The meeting was also attended by the national security advisor, the chairman, joint chiefs of staff and the three service chiefs and the chief of ISI, IB and FIA.
No one knows what reasons were advanced to reverse the earlier decision. Curiously, the presser after the meeting said ”Participants endorsed the government’s decision to negotiate with the group”.
The TLP even refused to enter into negotiations until the government changed its negotiators to include those members who viewed TLP’s militancy sympathetically.
The TLP ended its threatened long march to the capital but not without bringing the government on its knees. Who are the backers of the TLP? The footage of a previous TLP dharna in Faizabad in November 2017 throws light on it. If there were any doubts these were removed by the Supreme Court verdict when it took suo motu notice of the case. The Judge who authored the judgement, Qazi Faez Isa, soon faced the wrath and escaped being sacked by the skin of his teeth.
When the agreement was inked, it was kept secret. There could be only two explanations for it. Either the government had agreed to do things that it dare not make public. Or the TLP wanted a face saving device and wanted it kept under wraps. Subsequent statements by TLP leaders, which have not been contradicted, however belie that the militants had something to hide.
The TLP ended its threatened long march to the capital but not without bringing the government on its knees. Who are the backers of the TLP? The footage of a previous TLP dharna in Faizabad in November 2017 throws light on it. If there were any doubts these were removed by the Supreme Court verdict when it took suo motu notice of the case. The Judge who authored the judgement, Qazi Faez Isa, soon faced the wrath and escaped being sacked by the skin of his teeth.
Having been thus legitimised the TLP has emerged stronger. On its demand it will no longer be labeled as ‘proscribed outfit’ and thus free to operate as a political party also. While the TLP has agreed to end its march to Islamabad it has also stated that it is waiting for the government to implement the agreement. It means that it sees the agreement beneficial to it and does not want it to be kept secret.
It appears that the mainstreamed TLP will now be allowed to contest elections. Strategic planners seem to assume that thus legitimised, TLP will be more potent and lethal for any future deployment to project state power beyond national borders or to deal with civilian governments depending on the need.
The Speaker National Assembly has called an in-camera meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) on Nov 8 for a briefing by the military officials on current national security issues. Without making public, the secret agreement with TLP will continue to cast long shadows over the state’s security policies.
