The Red Mosque never posed a military threat to the state of Pakistan, nor does it present any now. The situation in the mosque can easily be handled by the city police.
But what exactly is the nature of threat Lal Masjid poses to the state of Pakistan? To answer this question, two political and strategic realities need to be considered; first, that the Afghan Taliban have overthrown the government of President Ashraf Ghani in Kabul and there are serious warnings that the military advances of the Taliban will embolden militant groups in Pakistan. Second, in the last few days, terror attacks on the peripheries, although taken lightly in Islamabad’s political and media circles, may prove to be indicators of what is in store for us.
Two recent attacks have heightened fears of the public as well as the security apparatus; the first one took place at an under-construction girls’ school in Tank, near South Waziristan. In the second attack, four paramilitary soldiers were killed in an improvised explosive device (IED) explosion.
Pakistani military officials have already informed the government that the country should expect a dreadful terror situation in the border towns and provinces in the wake of the Taliban takeover. These incidents and a sense of fear among the population might just come to nothing and things might just remain normal in these towns and regions.
But there is an alternative scenario in which Lal Masjid and Maulana Abdul Aziz may try to occupy a central role. Recall July 2007, when, after a prolonged troublemaking campaign by clerics at the mosque, Pakistan Army commandos finally entered Lal Masjid and killed more than 100 students.
Two things happened between the last days of June 2007 and July 11, 2007 — the day when the army finally entered the mosque to quell the militants.
First, Pakistani government’s writ and its image as an entity, which is in full control of its territory, received a severe jolt after daily forays by seminary students into the city markets, kidnapping beauty parlor workers and burning CD shops or forcing owners to shut down their shops permanently. Second, as the army put besieged the mosque, it started to get bigger and bigger, with towns and cities in the north of the country rising up in arms against the government.
The already existing militant groups behaved as if they were just waiting for the cue: in December 2007, about 13 groups united under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud to form the TTP. Among the stated objectives of the TTP is resistance against the Pakistani state.
Suicide terrorism in 2007 emerged as the popular trend among militants, particularly after the Lal Masjid event and the breakdown of a peace agreement between the tribal lords of North Waziristan and the military government. Fifty-six suicide attacks took place in Pakistan in 2007 (a remarkable increase to the 22 total suicide attacks to take place between March 2002 to 2006). In July 2008, a year after the commando raid on Lal Masjid, Pakistan’s The News reported that forty-four of these acts of terrorism had occurred after the military raid on Red Mosque and had claimed the lives of up to 2,729 people between July-December 2007.
Lal Masjid might not pose a military grade threat to the state itself. But it has the potential to become a big media issue, attract the attention of militant groups, provide a rallying point for them and finally galvanize them into action.
Baitullah Mehsud, the first leader of TTP who was killed in a US drone strike, and Mullah Fazlullah alias Mullah Radio, both pledged allegiance to Lal Masjid and its cleric, Maulana Abdul Aziz.
Maulana Abdul Aziz knows how to attract Pakistan's media with emotional sloganeering and knows how to galvanize the militant groups—the two elements needed to recreate the July 2007 like situation in the city. For the media, he set the bait of cheap and emotional sloganeering, while for militants he put the bait of what they like most: blood.
This time the white flag of the Afghan Taliban, which was hoisted on the roof of the red mosque, is the point of confrontation. The white flag of the Taliban remained visible to all those who were visiting the heart of the city — the Melody Market and its adjacent bazaars. For two weeks the police failed to force the mosque administration to remove the flags as they continued to demand the enforcement of Sharia law in the country in return for removal of the flags.
The flags were removed only after the federal government moved a contingent of riot police close to the mosque. The city administration, however, had placed barbed wires and concrete blocks around all the roads leading up to the mosque almost a year back.
There is a large number of city residents who are fond of going to the Red Mosque for their Friday prayers. Therefore, the city administration did not prevent ordinary citizens from proceedings towards the mosque on Friday afternoon. “We have temporarily removed the flags on the condition that the city officials will put our demands before the government high ups and our demands are clear. We want implementation of Sharia in the country on an immediate basis,” said Shakeel Ghazi.
There was a showdown between seminary students—who were assisted by armed members of militant groups—and Pakistani army commandos in July 2007 as a result of which more than around 100 students were killed in the army operation.
This time the government is tightly controlling any movement in and out of the mosque and is not allowing any outsider to travel by vehicle towards the mosque, just in case they try to smuggle weapons into the seminary and the mosque.
The government policy should be focused on two elements: don’t give him the blood and don’t let him take the media spotlight.
But what exactly is the nature of threat Lal Masjid poses to the state of Pakistan? To answer this question, two political and strategic realities need to be considered; first, that the Afghan Taliban have overthrown the government of President Ashraf Ghani in Kabul and there are serious warnings that the military advances of the Taliban will embolden militant groups in Pakistan. Second, in the last few days, terror attacks on the peripheries, although taken lightly in Islamabad’s political and media circles, may prove to be indicators of what is in store for us.
Two recent attacks have heightened fears of the public as well as the security apparatus; the first one took place at an under-construction girls’ school in Tank, near South Waziristan. In the second attack, four paramilitary soldiers were killed in an improvised explosive device (IED) explosion.
Pakistani military officials have already informed the government that the country should expect a dreadful terror situation in the border towns and provinces in the wake of the Taliban takeover. These incidents and a sense of fear among the population might just come to nothing and things might just remain normal in these towns and regions.
But there is an alternative scenario in which Lal Masjid and Maulana Abdul Aziz may try to occupy a central role. Recall July 2007, when, after a prolonged troublemaking campaign by clerics at the mosque, Pakistan Army commandos finally entered Lal Masjid and killed more than 100 students.
Two things happened between the last days of June 2007 and July 11, 2007 — the day when the army finally entered the mosque to quell the militants.
First, Pakistani government’s writ and its image as an entity, which is in full control of its territory, received a severe jolt after daily forays by seminary students into the city markets, kidnapping beauty parlor workers and burning CD shops or forcing owners to shut down their shops permanently. Second, as the army put besieged the mosque, it started to get bigger and bigger, with towns and cities in the north of the country rising up in arms against the government.
The already existing militant groups behaved as if they were just waiting for the cue: in December 2007, about 13 groups united under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud to form the TTP. Among the stated objectives of the TTP is resistance against the Pakistani state.
Suicide terrorism in 2007 emerged as the popular trend among militants, particularly after the Lal Masjid event and the breakdown of a peace agreement between the tribal lords of North Waziristan and the military government. Fifty-six suicide attacks took place in Pakistan in 2007 (a remarkable increase to the 22 total suicide attacks to take place between March 2002 to 2006). In July 2008, a year after the commando raid on Lal Masjid, Pakistan’s The News reported that forty-four of these acts of terrorism had occurred after the military raid on Red Mosque and had claimed the lives of up to 2,729 people between July-December 2007.
Suicide terrorism in 2007 emerged as the popular trend among militants, particularly after the Lal Masjid event and the breakdown of a peace agreement between the tribal lords of North Waziristan and the military government
Lal Masjid might not pose a military grade threat to the state itself. But it has the potential to become a big media issue, attract the attention of militant groups, provide a rallying point for them and finally galvanize them into action.
Baitullah Mehsud, the first leader of TTP who was killed in a US drone strike, and Mullah Fazlullah alias Mullah Radio, both pledged allegiance to Lal Masjid and its cleric, Maulana Abdul Aziz.
Maulana Abdul Aziz knows how to attract Pakistan's media with emotional sloganeering and knows how to galvanize the militant groups—the two elements needed to recreate the July 2007 like situation in the city. For the media, he set the bait of cheap and emotional sloganeering, while for militants he put the bait of what they like most: blood.
This time the white flag of the Afghan Taliban, which was hoisted on the roof of the red mosque, is the point of confrontation. The white flag of the Taliban remained visible to all those who were visiting the heart of the city — the Melody Market and its adjacent bazaars. For two weeks the police failed to force the mosque administration to remove the flags as they continued to demand the enforcement of Sharia law in the country in return for removal of the flags.
The flags were removed only after the federal government moved a contingent of riot police close to the mosque. The city administration, however, had placed barbed wires and concrete blocks around all the roads leading up to the mosque almost a year back.
There is a large number of city residents who are fond of going to the Red Mosque for their Friday prayers. Therefore, the city administration did not prevent ordinary citizens from proceedings towards the mosque on Friday afternoon. “We have temporarily removed the flags on the condition that the city officials will put our demands before the government high ups and our demands are clear. We want implementation of Sharia in the country on an immediate basis,” said Shakeel Ghazi.
There was a showdown between seminary students—who were assisted by armed members of militant groups—and Pakistani army commandos in July 2007 as a result of which more than around 100 students were killed in the army operation.
This time the government is tightly controlling any movement in and out of the mosque and is not allowing any outsider to travel by vehicle towards the mosque, just in case they try to smuggle weapons into the seminary and the mosque.
The government policy should be focused on two elements: don’t give him the blood and don’t let him take the media spotlight.