In a surprise announcement on Wednesday, newly-minted Finance Minister Hammad Azhar informed the media that the Economic Coordination Council had cleared import by the private sector of 0.5 million tonne white sugar from India. He also said that beginning end-June, Pakistan will also import cotton and cotton yarn from India.
His reasoning, as stated by him and as reported by Dawn newspaper: “We have allowed the import of sugar but in the rest of the world too, sugar prices are high because of which imports are not possible. But in our neighbouring country — India — the prices of sugar are much less as compared to Pakistan so we have decided to reopen sugar trade with India for up to 0.5 million tonnes for the private sector.”
With reference to importing cotton and cotton yarn, he stated that there was high demand for it because Pakistan’s textile exports had increased but last year’s cotton crop was not good. “The difference [in prices] affects the SMEs [small and medium enterprises]. Big industry can buy it from Egypt or other countries.”
Azhar’s presser comes on the heels of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s response to India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s March 23 letter. Khan’s letter, though not officially released, has been confirmed by high-level government sources. In the letter Khan stated that “The people of Pakistan also desire peaceful and cooperative relations with all neighbours, including India. We are convinced that durable peace and stability in South Asia is contingent upon resolving all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan, in particular the Jammu & Kashmir dispute.” The letter also stressed the imperative of creating an “enabling environment” for a “constructive and result-oriented dialogue”.
Minor editing aside — disputes instead of issues, process instead of dialogue — Khan’s letter was a clear reiteration of Pakistan’s stated position with reference to any forward movement: reverse the unilateral actions of Aug 5, 2019.
So, how does one square Azhar’s announcement with Khan’s (his boss) letter? Did something change between March 29 and 31?
The opposition, expectedly, has accused the government of kowtowing to India and sidelining Kashmir. In that the opposition is paying Khan and the PTI back in the same coin. The problem with this approach, whether it is taken by PTI or the opposition, should be obvious. But that’s not really my concern here because poor decisions do not necessarily emerge from ulterior motives. Decision-making in Pakistan, often in the silos created by Rules of Business, is usually a function of Hanlon’s Razor. Lack of a coordinated approach, incompetence and sheer stupidity are generally more problematic than any wilful wrongdoing.
In this case, Azhar, who by all accounts is a refined, intelligent young man — a rarity in the party he belongs to — seems to have worked out the problem within the narrow framework of his and the ECC’s remit. Sugar import from India is cheaper so it makes obvious sense to import from there; SMEs can’t import from Egypt so let us turn to India. On the surface, and within Azhar’s and ECC’s framework, it is logical. Yet, within the broader framework of India-Pakistan relations, this announcement is an utter disaster. It comes at a time when there is a growing perception that Pakistan is moving away from its original precondition for a meaningful and result-oriented peace. Minister Azhar and the ECC should know, unless they have short memories, that there is a reason Pakistan has not traded with India since August 2019. And that decision had nothing to do with cheaper imports because imports from India would always be cheaper.
In other words, Azhar’s reasoning at Wednesday’s presser, while logical within a narrow framework, becomes a non sequitur if we were to place it within the logic and imperatives of Pakistan’s broader interest.
It’s not about the pitiful volumes that we are talking about — 0.5 million tonnes of sugar and cotton imports for SMEs. The issue at stake here is a policy much bigger and far more sensitive. Going by ECC’s logic, why just sugar or cotton? There’s so much more that can be imported. Cinemas in Pakistan, even before the Covid-19 pandemic were losing money because of the ban on Bollywood films. The point is that if we were to use the ECC’s logic apropos of sugar and cotton, the same logic could be extended to other sectors and imports.
The ECC seems to have taken this decision with its eyes wide shut. That should generally be a cause for concern, but in the case of India, especially at such a crucial juncture, it is a cause for grave concern: it sends the wrong signal, creates confusion, gives India another handle on the narrative and makes a hash of the broader India policy. Worse, it sends another shockwave to the hapless Kashmiris.
But leaving other factors aside, Pakistan-India relations need to be looked at and analysed within the structural-realist framework. Put another way, let’s assume that Pakistan and India did not have any major historical disputes. How would relations pan out then? India, like all aspiring powers, has a natural inclination to increase its influence within and outside the region. This is a given within the structural-realist framework. That being so, Pakistan would still need to position itself in a way that prevented India from emerging as a regional hegemon. Now pull in the historical baggage and we get to an obvious constant in Pakistan’s security (and I use the term both in its narrow hard sense and the broader sense): deny India the capability to coerce Pakistan, through a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic strategies, into accepting its terms. There is empirical evidence that India has reached a state of uneasy peace with only those neighbours who have accepted New Delhi’s terms for it.
In real-world policymaking this would require a mix of strategies to inform Pakistan’s India policy. Those strategies could range from select areas of cooperation to competition to matching military capability. But, and this is important to remember, post-August 2019 is a changed environment. By taking unilateral measures, India has indicated that it has no regard for either bilateral agreements or the UN Security Council resolutions. This is an expression of unilateral hegemony. In other words, Pakistan is left with little space to engage India unless we return to pre-August 2019 and pick up the pieces again.
It bears repeating and understanding that Pakistan’s precondition is not a maximalist bargaining position. It is the legitimate rejection of a hegemonic move. The argument that some way can and must be found to work around this is flawed for a simple reason: if Pakistan accepts what has happened, it not only dilutes its locus standi with reference to Kashmir, it also concedes, tacitly, India’s status as the regional hegemon.
This is why it would be appropriate for the federal cabinet to reverse this decision by the ECC, as announced by the finance minister. Secondly, the prime minister should make sure, given this faux pas, that all relevant ministries and bodies have a clear perspective on Pakistan’s India policy.
The writer is a former News Editor of
The Friday Times and tweets @ejazhaider
His reasoning, as stated by him and as reported by Dawn newspaper: “We have allowed the import of sugar but in the rest of the world too, sugar prices are high because of which imports are not possible. But in our neighbouring country — India — the prices of sugar are much less as compared to Pakistan so we have decided to reopen sugar trade with India for up to 0.5 million tonnes for the private sector.”
With reference to importing cotton and cotton yarn, he stated that there was high demand for it because Pakistan’s textile exports had increased but last year’s cotton crop was not good. “The difference [in prices] affects the SMEs [small and medium enterprises]. Big industry can buy it from Egypt or other countries.”
Azhar’s presser comes on the heels of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s response to India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s March 23 letter. Khan’s letter, though not officially released, has been confirmed by high-level government sources. In the letter Khan stated that “The people of Pakistan also desire peaceful and cooperative relations with all neighbours, including India. We are convinced that durable peace and stability in South Asia is contingent upon resolving all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan, in particular the Jammu & Kashmir dispute.” The letter also stressed the imperative of creating an “enabling environment” for a “constructive and result-oriented dialogue”.
Minor editing aside — disputes instead of issues, process instead of dialogue — Khan’s letter was a clear reiteration of Pakistan’s stated position with reference to any forward movement: reverse the unilateral actions of Aug 5, 2019.
So, how does one square Azhar’s announcement with Khan’s (his boss) letter? Did something change between March 29 and 31?
The opposition, expectedly, has accused the government of kowtowing to India and sidelining Kashmir. In that the opposition is paying Khan and the PTI back in the same coin. The problem with this approach, whether it is taken by PTI or the opposition, should be obvious. But that’s not really my concern here because poor decisions do not necessarily emerge from ulterior motives. Decision-making in Pakistan, often in the silos created by Rules of Business, is usually a function of Hanlon’s Razor. Lack of a coordinated approach, incompetence and sheer stupidity are generally more problematic than any wilful wrongdoing.
In this case, Azhar, who by all accounts is a refined, intelligent young man — a rarity in the party he belongs to — seems to have worked out the problem within the narrow framework of his and the ECC’s remit. Sugar import from India is cheaper so it makes obvious sense to import from there; SMEs can’t import from Egypt so let us turn to India. On the surface, and within Azhar’s and ECC’s framework, it is logical. Yet, within the broader framework of India-Pakistan relations, this announcement is an utter disaster. It comes at a time when there is a growing perception that Pakistan is moving away from its original precondition for a meaningful and result-oriented peace. Minister Azhar and the ECC should know, unless they have short memories, that there is a reason Pakistan has not traded with India since August 2019. And that decision had nothing to do with cheaper imports because imports from India would always be cheaper.
In other words, Azhar’s reasoning at Wednesday’s presser, while logical within a narrow framework, becomes a non sequitur if we were to place it within the logic and imperatives of Pakistan’s broader interest.
It’s not about the pitiful volumes that we are talking about — 0.5 million tonnes of sugar and cotton imports for SMEs. The issue at stake here is a policy much bigger and far more sensitive. Going by ECC’s logic, why just sugar or cotton? There’s so much more that can be imported. Cinemas in Pakistan, even before the Covid-19 pandemic were losing money because of the ban on Bollywood films. The point is that if we were to use the ECC’s logic apropos of sugar and cotton, the same logic could be extended to other sectors and imports.
The ECC seems to have taken this decision with its eyes wide shut. That should generally be a cause for concern, but in the case of India, especially at such a crucial juncture, it is a cause for grave concern: it sends the wrong signal, creates confusion, gives India another handle on the narrative and makes a hash of the broader India policy. Worse, it sends another shockwave to the hapless Kashmiris.
But leaving other factors aside, Pakistan-India relations need to be looked at and analysed within the structural-realist framework. Put another way, let’s assume that Pakistan and India did not have any major historical disputes. How would relations pan out then? India, like all aspiring powers, has a natural inclination to increase its influence within and outside the region. This is a given within the structural-realist framework. That being so, Pakistan would still need to position itself in a way that prevented India from emerging as a regional hegemon. Now pull in the historical baggage and we get to an obvious constant in Pakistan’s security (and I use the term both in its narrow hard sense and the broader sense): deny India the capability to coerce Pakistan, through a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic strategies, into accepting its terms. There is empirical evidence that India has reached a state of uneasy peace with only those neighbours who have accepted New Delhi’s terms for it.
In real-world policymaking this would require a mix of strategies to inform Pakistan’s India policy. Those strategies could range from select areas of cooperation to competition to matching military capability. But, and this is important to remember, post-August 2019 is a changed environment. By taking unilateral measures, India has indicated that it has no regard for either bilateral agreements or the UN Security Council resolutions. This is an expression of unilateral hegemony. In other words, Pakistan is left with little space to engage India unless we return to pre-August 2019 and pick up the pieces again.
It bears repeating and understanding that Pakistan’s precondition is not a maximalist bargaining position. It is the legitimate rejection of a hegemonic move. The argument that some way can and must be found to work around this is flawed for a simple reason: if Pakistan accepts what has happened, it not only dilutes its locus standi with reference to Kashmir, it also concedes, tacitly, India’s status as the regional hegemon.
This is why it would be appropriate for the federal cabinet to reverse this decision by the ECC, as announced by the finance minister. Secondly, the prime minister should make sure, given this faux pas, that all relevant ministries and bodies have a clear perspective on Pakistan’s India policy.
The writer is a former News Editor of
The Friday Times and tweets @ejazhaider