The PDM huddle organized after the Senate elections has raised questions about the movement’s ‘seriousness’ and its ‘ability’ in taking on the current regime. The internal disagreements (primarily between the PPP and the PML-N) came to the front and left many analysts wondering if it is only a matter of time that PPP and PDM may part ways. This may be a very reductive view of looking at the politics of the alliance and overlooks the main point(s) of agreement between the two main parties of the movement. Both the PPP and the PML-N agree that establishment’s continuous interference in politics is no longer acceptable and it must be pushed back and confined to perform its constitutional duties. The parties also agree that the country needs broad constitutional and electoral reforms to become a true democratic polity. Many critics point out that the parties’ commitment to democratic principles is not borne out of any principled stance but the constraints that they must operate under when out of power (or favour with the establishment). This might be true; however, it is important to understand that the histories of democratic movements in many different parts of the world is littered with unwitting participants agreeing to rules that they may have flouted earlier.
The disagreements that came to the front in the recent PDM meeting should be understood in the context of the constraints that the two parties face. The disagreement primarily lies in the tactics to be adopted in confronting the establishment. The PML-N wants a direct confrontation through street agitation and a long march, while the PPP prefers a challenge through parliamentary means. Both are democratic in its essence but have different implications for the parties involved. This disagreement on tactics seems to have become a main bone of contention between the PPP and PML-N (and other parties) within the movement. Why is this disagreement so important for the parties involved?
Mian Nawaz Sharif’s understanding of the current regime is not limited to just the PTI. He sees the current military leadership as a force that put the PTI in power by first engineering his removal from the government and later by rigging the 2018 election. He believes that he has been personally wronged by the military leadership and is opposed to their interference both at a personal and a political level. His insistence to shock allies and his audiences by naming serving officers of the military high command raises the stakes for the military’s involvement in politics and puts the individuals named on the defensive both inside and outside the institutions. A successful vote of no-confidence in the parliament, however difficult, will only remove the face of the regime but keep its foundations intact. In his calculations, resigning en masse from the parliament and initiating a long march will create enough pressure for the troika to leave the (political) scene. Once that happens, free and fair elections can be held.
Asif Ali Zardari’s politics since 2008 is one of accommodation rather than an outright confrontation. He is more willing to negotiate with powers that be and prefers to pursue a parliamentary route to confront the establishment’s interference in the country’s politics. In my opinion, his opposition to a country wide agitational movement is based on the following three points. First, he may think that political parties, particularly the PPP and the PML-N, may mobilize their voters for a march but may not be able to create enough pressure to either remove the government or the troika. In such a scenario the establishment will become even more powerful in the short-term, which may restrict the space currently available to democratic forces in the country further. Second, even if a street level agitation will send this government packing and will create enough pressure for the military leadership to resign, it may not produce the benefits/results being perceived with such a scenario. In other words, this is precisely the situation that he wants to avoid. Zaradari’s politics is about giving face saving exits to leaders of our establishment. This is his way of keeping a door open for negotiations at an institutional level. His politics in general and his negotiations with the military, is guided by the principle of always keeping the door of negotiations open. In that limited sense he is a quintessential (parliamentary) democrat but only forced to behave that way by the constraints that he and his party faces at the national level. A long march by PDM may send the troika packing but it will open a new can of worms for Zardari as he may not be able to gauge how the new establishment leadership might behave. Third, in the current economic climate where economy is finding hard to recover and IMF’s constraints on fiscal spending, no party has ideas that can pull the country out of the current mess. Coming to power in such a situation will be akin to establishing government with both hands tied behind ones back. Zardari might be willing to remove Imran Khan’s government with the help of PML-N but that is as far as he is willing to go. If it was truly his call, he would only be interested in creating just enough pressure to force the establishment to the negotiating table and get free and fair elections in 2023. The tackling of the establishment’s interference in politics can be dealt in the new setup that emerges after 2023.
The preference for different tactical approaches to confront the current regime is also based on the possible gains from a free and fair election once the present government is removed. Sharif realizes that given his party’s current popularity in the Punjab, he may be in a good position to sweep elections there. A few electoral victories scattered over other provinces will give him the simple majority to form a government at the center. If ‘luck’ favours him, he may land in the national assembly with another ‘heavy mandate.’ This will allow him to rule without sharing power with any other party. Asif Ali Zardari cannot have such hopes even in his wildest dreams. For reasons mentioned earlier, a post ‘revolutionary’ world may hold an even greater degree of uncertainty for him and his party. In such a context his fear would be to lose what he already holds rather than what he may gain in the future. The loss of power in Sindh will have grave implications for the party and the coalition of the landed elite that he has been able to piece together in Sindh since 2010. His best bets are therefore placed on letting the current government continue with all its faults and shortcomings. The political confrontation both inside and outside the parliament should only be to force the establishment to a negotiating table. Once that happens, a free and fair election can be negotiated in exchange for a face-saving exit for the establishment from the current political quagmire. In such a scenario, Zaradari believes he would retain Sindh and make some gains in South Punjab. If ‘luck’ favours him he may gain some seats in central Punjab and with a few seats from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, he can be a powerful coalition partner. Zardari’s future consists of Pakistan being run through coalition governments formed in alliance with PPP and a parliament making long term constitutional arrangements that pushes the establishment out of the politics. In some ways, this is an ideal form of what he was able to achieve in 2008.
The possibility of opening democratic space in Pakistan in the short run depends on what PDM decides to do in the next six months. That requires a resolution of its internal disagreements to forge a unified stance. Surprising or unsavory as it may be, Pakistan’s march to ‘democratic normalcy’ is inextricably linked to the cooperation that PPP and PML-N extend to each other. This may just be an unwitting consequence of the establishment’s interference in the country’s politics. The sooner the two political parties realize this the better it will be for all of us.
The writer is an assistant professor in the Department of Economics, Information Technology University, Lahore. He can be contacted on Twitter @alifdaru
The disagreements that came to the front in the recent PDM meeting should be understood in the context of the constraints that the two parties face. The disagreement primarily lies in the tactics to be adopted in confronting the establishment. The PML-N wants a direct confrontation through street agitation and a long march, while the PPP prefers a challenge through parliamentary means. Both are democratic in its essence but have different implications for the parties involved. This disagreement on tactics seems to have become a main bone of contention between the PPP and PML-N (and other parties) within the movement. Why is this disagreement so important for the parties involved?
Mian Nawaz Sharif’s understanding of the current regime is not limited to just the PTI. He sees the current military leadership as a force that put the PTI in power by first engineering his removal from the government and later by rigging the 2018 election. He believes that he has been personally wronged by the military leadership and is opposed to their interference both at a personal and a political level. His insistence to shock allies and his audiences by naming serving officers of the military high command raises the stakes for the military’s involvement in politics and puts the individuals named on the defensive both inside and outside the institutions. A successful vote of no-confidence in the parliament, however difficult, will only remove the face of the regime but keep its foundations intact. In his calculations, resigning en masse from the parliament and initiating a long march will create enough pressure for the troika to leave the (political) scene. Once that happens, free and fair elections can be held.
Asif Ali Zardari’s politics since 2008 is one of accommodation rather than an outright confrontation. He is more willing to negotiate with powers that be and prefers to pursue a parliamentary route to confront the establishment’s interference in the country’s politics. In my opinion, his opposition to a country wide agitational movement is based on the following three points. First, he may think that political parties, particularly the PPP and the PML-N, may mobilize their voters for a march but may not be able to create enough pressure to either remove the government or the troika. In such a scenario the establishment will become even more powerful in the short-term, which may restrict the space currently available to democratic forces in the country further. Second, even if a street level agitation will send this government packing and will create enough pressure for the military leadership to resign, it may not produce the benefits/results being perceived with such a scenario. In other words, this is precisely the situation that he wants to avoid. Zaradari’s politics is about giving face saving exits to leaders of our establishment. This is his way of keeping a door open for negotiations at an institutional level. His politics in general and his negotiations with the military, is guided by the principle of always keeping the door of negotiations open. In that limited sense he is a quintessential (parliamentary) democrat but only forced to behave that way by the constraints that he and his party faces at the national level. A long march by PDM may send the troika packing but it will open a new can of worms for Zardari as he may not be able to gauge how the new establishment leadership might behave. Third, in the current economic climate where economy is finding hard to recover and IMF’s constraints on fiscal spending, no party has ideas that can pull the country out of the current mess. Coming to power in such a situation will be akin to establishing government with both hands tied behind ones back. Zardari might be willing to remove Imran Khan’s government with the help of PML-N but that is as far as he is willing to go. If it was truly his call, he would only be interested in creating just enough pressure to force the establishment to the negotiating table and get free and fair elections in 2023. The tackling of the establishment’s interference in politics can be dealt in the new setup that emerges after 2023.
The preference for different tactical approaches to confront the current regime is also based on the possible gains from a free and fair election once the present government is removed. Sharif realizes that given his party’s current popularity in the Punjab, he may be in a good position to sweep elections there. A few electoral victories scattered over other provinces will give him the simple majority to form a government at the center. If ‘luck’ favours him, he may land in the national assembly with another ‘heavy mandate.’ This will allow him to rule without sharing power with any other party. Asif Ali Zardari cannot have such hopes even in his wildest dreams. For reasons mentioned earlier, a post ‘revolutionary’ world may hold an even greater degree of uncertainty for him and his party. In such a context his fear would be to lose what he already holds rather than what he may gain in the future. The loss of power in Sindh will have grave implications for the party and the coalition of the landed elite that he has been able to piece together in Sindh since 2010. His best bets are therefore placed on letting the current government continue with all its faults and shortcomings. The political confrontation both inside and outside the parliament should only be to force the establishment to a negotiating table. Once that happens, a free and fair election can be negotiated in exchange for a face-saving exit for the establishment from the current political quagmire. In such a scenario, Zaradari believes he would retain Sindh and make some gains in South Punjab. If ‘luck’ favours him he may gain some seats in central Punjab and with a few seats from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, he can be a powerful coalition partner. Zardari’s future consists of Pakistan being run through coalition governments formed in alliance with PPP and a parliament making long term constitutional arrangements that pushes the establishment out of the politics. In some ways, this is an ideal form of what he was able to achieve in 2008.
The possibility of opening democratic space in Pakistan in the short run depends on what PDM decides to do in the next six months. That requires a resolution of its internal disagreements to forge a unified stance. Surprising or unsavory as it may be, Pakistan’s march to ‘democratic normalcy’ is inextricably linked to the cooperation that PPP and PML-N extend to each other. This may just be an unwitting consequence of the establishment’s interference in the country’s politics. The sooner the two political parties realize this the better it will be for all of us.
The writer is an assistant professor in the Department of Economics, Information Technology University, Lahore. He can be contacted on Twitter @alifdaru