Language is not just important, it is vital. The words we use inform others of the positions we take. But strategic communication is also about how we can influence others into accepting the words we use.
The Nobel Laureate, Harold Pinter, once described language as “a highly ambiguous business.” It is. And yet, states, since the 19th century, have employed words, symbols, imagery to give specific politico-strategic meanings to certain words or terms, if you will. Terrorism is one such word. It is supposed to evoke a response. But its placement in the language is more than that. It is about setting a context and creating legitimacy for wielding power and employing force to that end.
Israel does this consistently. There’s an Israeli series on Netflix, Fauda (Chaos). Watching it is instructive in how the Palestinian characters are depicted as flat and one-dimensional ‘terrorists’ while members of the Israeli covert operations unit are shown as rounded characters, soldiers, complex and multi-dimensional.
Two days ago, the International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, announced that the ICC has opened a formal investigation into alleged war crimes in the Palestinian territories. Israel has rejected the probe and its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, immediately took to Twitter to say the ICC’s decision was “the essence of anti-Semitism and the essence of hypocrisy.” “[The ICC] found that our brave and moral soldiers, who are fighting the most brutal terrorists on earth, are, of all people, war criminals. The court, which was established to prevent a recurrence of the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis against the Jewish people, is now turning against the state of the Jewish people.”
The words and phrases italicised by me are a clear indicator of how Israel spins its narrative and how that narrative is then echoed through mainstream think tanks in the United States. The Israeli narrative is of course poppycock. But that’s not the point here. The central point is about how power helps push the narrative and how the narrative in turn is employed in support of power. The causality here is bi-directional.
Robin T. Lakoff, a linguistics professor who wrote the book The Language War, says, “…making meaning is a defining activity of Homo sapiens… it is more than just a cognitive exercise, since those who get to superimpose a meaning on events control the future of their society. And since so much of our cognitive capacity is achieved via language, control of language…is power. Hence the struggles I am discussing…are not tussles over ‘mere words,’ or ‘just semantics’—they are battles.”
But let me get to home to Occupied and Illegally-annexed Kashmir and Pakistan-India relations. I will use two recent articles to highlight the point I am trying to make here.
The first is a Hindustan Times story by Shishir Gupta, the paper’s Executive Editor and someone who is close to the security establishment. The story titled, “A rare phone call, secret letter: How India got Pak to release IAF’s Abhinandan,” uses the classic technique of presenting known facts with a spin. By now everyone knows about the call, what was threatened from the Indian side and the response by then-Director-General Inter-Services Intelligence. I wrote about it months ago, as have others, both here and in India.
So what’s new? That’s where Gupta’s spin comes in. “It is understood that after PM Modi saw images of the bleeding Indian pilot and his smiling captors, he told the Indian intelligence chief to clearly communicate to Pakistan that New Delhi will stop at nothing if Abhinandan is harmed and demand his immediate release. PM Modi’s message to Pakistan was: ‘Our weapon arsenal is not for Diwali.’” (italics mine).
The Indian pilot did get a beating by civilians on the ground but was rescued by Pakistan Army troops. He was treated as per the Geneva Conventions, given food, water and, by now, the famous cup of tea; was medically examined (standard procedure) and was in no danger of being harmed at any point after being taken into custody by army troops. By his own account, Pakistan Army had treated him with respect.
As for weapons and Diwali, Gupta doesn’t seem to realise that in trying to present Modi to the domestic audience as a leader with cojones, he has made a hash of India’s political declaration of no-first use (the adversary just cannot know whether the incoming missile has a tactical or strategic warhead); not just that, this line combined with his “It set alarm bells ringing in faraway Washington as well,” he has also, unwittingly, shown that India’s argument that there’s a band just short of a spiral in which India can play is flawed and highly destabilising.
He then says: “The message was conveyed by then RAW chief Anil Dhasmana to his then ISI counterpart Lt General Syed Asim Munir Ahmed Shah over a secure line. Dhasmana was so blunt that even the ISI chief was surprised at how the RAW chief was going ballistic over Abhinandan’s photographs.” Since Gupta was not present there, he is being fed this line. And since he is close to the security establishment and presumably wants that proximity to continue, he has swallowed it hook, line and sinker!
Yes, there was a conversation; yes, a threat was made too. But the response from this side — as reported by other sources — was that if India were to do this, Pakistan would respond in kind and more.
The entire report is for domestic consumption. Words and phrases are being used strategically to present Modi in a certain light. The report is dated February 27, 2021. The joint statement for a ceasefire at the LoC came on February 25. Need I say more?
The second example is an essay by Toby Dalton for Strafasia: “How Different Is the ‘New Normal’ from the Old Normal in South Asian Crises?”. Dalton is co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Programme at the Carnegie Endowment and a balanced commentator. This article too is a balanced one in its overall approach. But the issue is being framed in the way that has become predictable. In fact, I choose it to make the point that even balanced essays continue to frame the issues in known ways.
“The summer ‘fighting season’ in Kashmir appears to be heating up. Indian media reports suggest an increase in terrorist group infiltrations over the Line of Control from Pakistan.” While Dalton refers to Indian media reports to qualify what he is saying, by not choosing to question the veracity and using the term ‘terrorist infiltrations’, he is entrapping himself in the same language that India has consistently sought to push over the past three decades.
Freedom struggles, as per United National General Assembly resolutions, cannot be referred to as ‘terrorist’. The United Nations has spent over two decades trying to figure out a definition which can surmount the political interests of states and get a consensus on a narrower, more precise definition. It has been an exercise in futility. It’s the same baloney as Netanyahu’s ‘our moral soldiers’ juxtaposed with the ‘most brutal terrorists on earth’. As Lakoff said, “Hence the struggles I am discussing…are not tussles over ‘mere words,’ or ‘just semantics’—they are battles.” Secondly, Indian media reports with reference to Pakistan, barring some exceptional journalists, are penned by those who are in bed with the Indian security establishment. This is a fact known to everyone and Caravan once did a long report on how natsec issues are reported in India.
Thirdly, Dalton’s reference to Pulwama attack: “On February 14, 2019, after a suicide bomber – an Indian Kashmiri who reportedly had joined the banned, Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad – attacked an Indian police convoy near Pulwama…”. Since Dalton is talking about South Asian crises, it should be essential to question such attacks, as also the central question of Kashmir being a recognised dispute with Kashmiris still awaiting an opportunity to decide their future.
Take, for instance, an article in The Hindu by Sushant Singh, an incisive analyst who also served in the Indian Army. Titled “The right lessons from Pulwama and Balakot,” Singh writes: “Even though a video of the suicide bomber was released by the Jaish-e-Muhammad, there have been constant whispers about certain aspects of the Pulwama terror attack. Those questions have not been answered satisfactorily, even after the 13,800-page National Investigation Agency charge sheet was filed in August…”.
The cover story in Frontline, “The Plot Thickens,” by Anando Bhakto, has raised a number of questions with reference to Pulwama attack. “Frontline’s investigation reveals that 11 intelligence inputs warning of the Pulwama terrorist attack of February 14, 2019, were ignored. Who was responsible for the ‘oversight’, which resulted in the death of 40 CRPF personnel, the Balakot surgical strike, and ultimately the thumping electoral victory of the BJP?” The investigative report is damning and would have shaken any government in another democracy.
Another recent article, “Who are the Merchants of Cadavers,” in TheWireUrdu by Iftikhar Gilani looks at other such cases, including Mumbai and Akshardham. On September 24, 2002, two armed men attacked the Swaminarayan Akshardham complex at Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India. They killed 30 people and injured more than 80. Incidentally, Modi used that attack to his political advantage. According to Gilani, there was credible intelligence of these attacks and yet the governments didn’t take any precautions.
Here’s another quote from Singh’s The Hindu article cited above: “The responsibility for the intelligence failure, violation of standard operating procedures by security forces and the possible involvement of disgraced Jammu and Kashmir police officer, Davinder Singh, remain unexamined…He had earlier been named by Afzal Guru, who was hanged in 2013, as a key go-between in the 2001 terrorist attack on the Parliament.”
None of these questions are being asked or answered by the Indian government and western analysts. But it’s important for anyone writing about crisis stability in South Asia to go for a deeper dive into what’s happening than consuming the staple offered by the Indian government and a large section of Indian media and think tankers.
Equally, language being power, Pakistan needs to get its act together and develop the capacity to sift the grain from the chaff.
The writer is a former News Editor of The Friday Times. He tweets @ejazhaider
The Nobel Laureate, Harold Pinter, once described language as “a highly ambiguous business.” It is. And yet, states, since the 19th century, have employed words, symbols, imagery to give specific politico-strategic meanings to certain words or terms, if you will. Terrorism is one such word. It is supposed to evoke a response. But its placement in the language is more than that. It is about setting a context and creating legitimacy for wielding power and employing force to that end.
Israel does this consistently. There’s an Israeli series on Netflix, Fauda (Chaos). Watching it is instructive in how the Palestinian characters are depicted as flat and one-dimensional ‘terrorists’ while members of the Israeli covert operations unit are shown as rounded characters, soldiers, complex and multi-dimensional.
Two days ago, the International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, announced that the ICC has opened a formal investigation into alleged war crimes in the Palestinian territories. Israel has rejected the probe and its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, immediately took to Twitter to say the ICC’s decision was “the essence of anti-Semitism and the essence of hypocrisy.” “[The ICC] found that our brave and moral soldiers, who are fighting the most brutal terrorists on earth, are, of all people, war criminals. The court, which was established to prevent a recurrence of the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis against the Jewish people, is now turning against the state of the Jewish people.”
The words and phrases italicised by me are a clear indicator of how Israel spins its narrative and how that narrative is then echoed through mainstream think tanks in the United States. The Israeli narrative is of course poppycock. But that’s not the point here. The central point is about how power helps push the narrative and how the narrative in turn is employed in support of power. The causality here is bi-directional.
Robin T. Lakoff, a linguistics professor who wrote the book The Language War, says, “…making meaning is a defining activity of Homo sapiens… it is more than just a cognitive exercise, since those who get to superimpose a meaning on events control the future of their society. And since so much of our cognitive capacity is achieved via language, control of language…is power. Hence the struggles I am discussing…are not tussles over ‘mere words,’ or ‘just semantics’—they are battles.”
But let me get to home to Occupied and Illegally-annexed Kashmir and Pakistan-India relations. I will use two recent articles to highlight the point I am trying to make here.
The first is a Hindustan Times story by Shishir Gupta, the paper’s Executive Editor and someone who is close to the security establishment. The story titled, “A rare phone call, secret letter: How India got Pak to release IAF’s Abhinandan,” uses the classic technique of presenting known facts with a spin. By now everyone knows about the call, what was threatened from the Indian side and the response by then-Director-General Inter-Services Intelligence. I wrote about it months ago, as have others, both here and in India.
So what’s new? That’s where Gupta’s spin comes in. “It is understood that after PM Modi saw images of the bleeding Indian pilot and his smiling captors, he told the Indian intelligence chief to clearly communicate to Pakistan that New Delhi will stop at nothing if Abhinandan is harmed and demand his immediate release. PM Modi’s message to Pakistan was: ‘Our weapon arsenal is not for Diwali.’” (italics mine).
The Indian pilot did get a beating by civilians on the ground but was rescued by Pakistan Army troops. He was treated as per the Geneva Conventions, given food, water and, by now, the famous cup of tea; was medically examined (standard procedure) and was in no danger of being harmed at any point after being taken into custody by army troops. By his own account, Pakistan Army had treated him with respect.
As for weapons and Diwali, Gupta doesn’t seem to realise that in trying to present Modi to the domestic audience as a leader with cojones, he has made a hash of India’s political declaration of no-first use (the adversary just cannot know whether the incoming missile has a tactical or strategic warhead); not just that, this line combined with his “It set alarm bells ringing in faraway Washington as well,” he has also, unwittingly, shown that India’s argument that there’s a band just short of a spiral in which India can play is flawed and highly destabilising.
He then says: “The message was conveyed by then RAW chief Anil Dhasmana to his then ISI counterpart Lt General Syed Asim Munir Ahmed Shah over a secure line. Dhasmana was so blunt that even the ISI chief was surprised at how the RAW chief was going ballistic over Abhinandan’s photographs.” Since Gupta was not present there, he is being fed this line. And since he is close to the security establishment and presumably wants that proximity to continue, he has swallowed it hook, line and sinker!
Yes, there was a conversation; yes, a threat was made too. But the response from this side — as reported by other sources — was that if India were to do this, Pakistan would respond in kind and more.
The entire report is for domestic consumption. Words and phrases are being used strategically to present Modi in a certain light. The report is dated February 27, 2021. The joint statement for a ceasefire at the LoC came on February 25. Need I say more?
The second example is an essay by Toby Dalton for Strafasia: “How Different Is the ‘New Normal’ from the Old Normal in South Asian Crises?”. Dalton is co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Programme at the Carnegie Endowment and a balanced commentator. This article too is a balanced one in its overall approach. But the issue is being framed in the way that has become predictable. In fact, I choose it to make the point that even balanced essays continue to frame the issues in known ways.
“The summer ‘fighting season’ in Kashmir appears to be heating up. Indian media reports suggest an increase in terrorist group infiltrations over the Line of Control from Pakistan.” While Dalton refers to Indian media reports to qualify what he is saying, by not choosing to question the veracity and using the term ‘terrorist infiltrations’, he is entrapping himself in the same language that India has consistently sought to push over the past three decades.
Freedom struggles, as per United National General Assembly resolutions, cannot be referred to as ‘terrorist’. The United Nations has spent over two decades trying to figure out a definition which can surmount the political interests of states and get a consensus on a narrower, more precise definition. It has been an exercise in futility. It’s the same baloney as Netanyahu’s ‘our moral soldiers’ juxtaposed with the ‘most brutal terrorists on earth’. As Lakoff said, “Hence the struggles I am discussing…are not tussles over ‘mere words,’ or ‘just semantics’—they are battles.” Secondly, Indian media reports with reference to Pakistan, barring some exceptional journalists, are penned by those who are in bed with the Indian security establishment. This is a fact known to everyone and Caravan once did a long report on how natsec issues are reported in India.
Thirdly, Dalton’s reference to Pulwama attack: “On February 14, 2019, after a suicide bomber – an Indian Kashmiri who reportedly had joined the banned, Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad – attacked an Indian police convoy near Pulwama…”. Since Dalton is talking about South Asian crises, it should be essential to question such attacks, as also the central question of Kashmir being a recognised dispute with Kashmiris still awaiting an opportunity to decide their future.
Take, for instance, an article in The Hindu by Sushant Singh, an incisive analyst who also served in the Indian Army. Titled “The right lessons from Pulwama and Balakot,” Singh writes: “Even though a video of the suicide bomber was released by the Jaish-e-Muhammad, there have been constant whispers about certain aspects of the Pulwama terror attack. Those questions have not been answered satisfactorily, even after the 13,800-page National Investigation Agency charge sheet was filed in August…”.
The cover story in Frontline, “The Plot Thickens,” by Anando Bhakto, has raised a number of questions with reference to Pulwama attack. “Frontline’s investigation reveals that 11 intelligence inputs warning of the Pulwama terrorist attack of February 14, 2019, were ignored. Who was responsible for the ‘oversight’, which resulted in the death of 40 CRPF personnel, the Balakot surgical strike, and ultimately the thumping electoral victory of the BJP?” The investigative report is damning and would have shaken any government in another democracy.
Another recent article, “Who are the Merchants of Cadavers,” in TheWireUrdu by Iftikhar Gilani looks at other such cases, including Mumbai and Akshardham. On September 24, 2002, two armed men attacked the Swaminarayan Akshardham complex at Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India. They killed 30 people and injured more than 80. Incidentally, Modi used that attack to his political advantage. According to Gilani, there was credible intelligence of these attacks and yet the governments didn’t take any precautions.
Here’s another quote from Singh’s The Hindu article cited above: “The responsibility for the intelligence failure, violation of standard operating procedures by security forces and the possible involvement of disgraced Jammu and Kashmir police officer, Davinder Singh, remain unexamined…He had earlier been named by Afzal Guru, who was hanged in 2013, as a key go-between in the 2001 terrorist attack on the Parliament.”
None of these questions are being asked or answered by the Indian government and western analysts. But it’s important for anyone writing about crisis stability in South Asia to go for a deeper dive into what’s happening than consuming the staple offered by the Indian government and a large section of Indian media and think tankers.
Equally, language being power, Pakistan needs to get its act together and develop the capacity to sift the grain from the chaff.
The writer is a former News Editor of The Friday Times. He tweets @ejazhaider