There are three ways to get rid of a government. First, martial law. Second, resignation by the prime minister. Third, a vote of no-confidence in the government.
Martial Law has no pre-determined mind of its own. There was no provocation in 1958, only the personal ambitions of General Ayub Khan who knew he could bank on the support of the United States. Nor were civil society and its institutions strong enough to resist it. Indeed, the judiciary upheld it. In 1977, however, ML was provoked by a combination of factors: a powerful, pro-Miltablishment civilian protest movement; an intransigent and autocratic prime minister unwilling to negotiate timely terms for a new election; and a wily and ambitious general in the wings. There was no prospect of US support at the time. In 1999, however, neither the conditions were ripe, nor was the army chief ambitious; the civilian prime minister sacked the army chief, triggering an institutional coup against himself. Once again, there was no assurance of US support for the incoming regime. Today, there are powerful factors arrayed against martial law. First, there is a popular anti-Miltablishment sentiment fueling an opposition movement against a government selected and propped up by the military; second, following the Restoration of Judiciary Movement a decade ago, the current bar and bench are not likely to cave in before another coup-making general (the Musharraf trial and the Qazi Faez Isa are cases in point); third, no general would be stupid enough to lay a hand on the country in its parlous economic state today and risk personal and institutional failure. Indeed, this is one of the main reasons for opting for indirect rule though a puppet hybrid regime.
It is also inconceivable that Imran Khan is the sort of person who can be compelled to resign under any circumstances as long as his parliamentary majority is intact. He has dug his heels in under the most adverse circumstances when his popularity has plunged and the prospects of improvement in the economic and political outlook are grim. Nawaz Sharif didn’t budge when Imran and the Miltablishment were jointly engaged in pressurizing him to resign. Why should Imran do so now especially when the Miltablishment is supporting him and targeting the opposition?
A vote of no-confidence is the third option. But history suggests that certain conditions are necessary for its success. First, the numbers and alliances in parliament must be conducive to a revolt. Second, the government must be sufficiently unpopular for the opposition to harvest support for it inside and outside parliament. Third, the Miltablishment must not be actively opposed to it. In the developing scenario, the first two conditions can be sufficiently met provided the Miltablishment signals its readiness to support such a move.
This is the gist of Asif Zardari’s calculations. Instead of anti-Miltablishment forces led by Nawaz Sharif trying to manoeuver Imran Khan’s ouster, Mr Zardari is proposing a deal with the Miltablishment that brings in a “friendly national government” via a vote of no-confidence against the PTI government supported by the Miltablishment. The Miltablishment might be persuaded to buy into this provided (1) Nawaz and Mariam Sharif are not part of the proposed government (2) fresh elections are not held until due date in 2023 so that the PMLN doesn’t sweep into power and upset this arrangement (3) COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa is guaranteed completion of his extended tenure without hiccups. The problem is not that Nawaz Sharif is opposed to an in-house change per se. He is opposed to one that pre-empts and thwarts a quick election that enables the PMLN to sweep into office. Nor does he want the PMLN to be part of a “national” coalition government for any length of time that incurs the wrath of the masses by the constant infighting of coalition partners and bad governance that damages its electoral prospects. Of course, the formula suits the PPP. It hopes to retain its government in Sindh while becoming a central part of a national government in Islamabad, possibly headed by Bilawal Bhutto.
This is the core dispute within the PDM. The PPP wants an in-house change to usher in a pro-Miltablishment national government led by the PPP until 2023. The PMLN wants an in-house change or forced resignation of Imran Khan to yield an immediate, free and fair general election which it is sure of winning. Asif Zardari wants a done deal straight away to get the better of it. Nawaz Sharif wants to go all the way for a long march and resignations from parliament to trigger a bigger crisis so that he doesn’t get a bad hand in the end.
Mr Zardari’s formula has immediately received the big stick from Imran Khan. The new Commission of Inquiry against the Broadsheet affair entrusted to Justice (Retd) Azmat Saeed, whose conflict of interest is established, is tasked to reopen various cases against the PPP, including the Surrey Palace case. That is one consequence of any weakening of the PDM alliance. Mr Sharif’s formula has a better chance of success: mass resignations in March-April will delegitimize the hybrid regime and bring government to a halt: bye-elections on over 100 seats can either be blocked by the PDM or won (followed by resignations again). This will compel the Miltablishment to rethink its strategy of backing a loser like Imran Khan. At that time, the Miltablishment may be ready to clutch at a less anti-Nawaz-Maryam formula, and they in turn ready to accept a less anti-Qamar Bajwa stance, to break the deadlock and move ahead.
There is thus no prospect of any quick breakthrough in the political stalemate. Asif Zardari can’t persuade his PDM partners to abandon the long march and resignations route even if the PPP doesn’t become part of it. But when that stage arrives after the Senate elections in March, both the Miltablishment and PPP may be compelled to abandon their respective tactics and strategy. The End Game will still begin with an In-House change.
Martial Law has no pre-determined mind of its own. There was no provocation in 1958, only the personal ambitions of General Ayub Khan who knew he could bank on the support of the United States. Nor were civil society and its institutions strong enough to resist it. Indeed, the judiciary upheld it. In 1977, however, ML was provoked by a combination of factors: a powerful, pro-Miltablishment civilian protest movement; an intransigent and autocratic prime minister unwilling to negotiate timely terms for a new election; and a wily and ambitious general in the wings. There was no prospect of US support at the time. In 1999, however, neither the conditions were ripe, nor was the army chief ambitious; the civilian prime minister sacked the army chief, triggering an institutional coup against himself. Once again, there was no assurance of US support for the incoming regime. Today, there are powerful factors arrayed against martial law. First, there is a popular anti-Miltablishment sentiment fueling an opposition movement against a government selected and propped up by the military; second, following the Restoration of Judiciary Movement a decade ago, the current bar and bench are not likely to cave in before another coup-making general (the Musharraf trial and the Qazi Faez Isa are cases in point); third, no general would be stupid enough to lay a hand on the country in its parlous economic state today and risk personal and institutional failure. Indeed, this is one of the main reasons for opting for indirect rule though a puppet hybrid regime.
It is also inconceivable that Imran Khan is the sort of person who can be compelled to resign under any circumstances as long as his parliamentary majority is intact. He has dug his heels in under the most adverse circumstances when his popularity has plunged and the prospects of improvement in the economic and political outlook are grim. Nawaz Sharif didn’t budge when Imran and the Miltablishment were jointly engaged in pressurizing him to resign. Why should Imran do so now especially when the Miltablishment is supporting him and targeting the opposition?
A vote of no-confidence is the third option. But history suggests that certain conditions are necessary for its success. First, the numbers and alliances in parliament must be conducive to a revolt. Second, the government must be sufficiently unpopular for the opposition to harvest support for it inside and outside parliament. Third, the Miltablishment must not be actively opposed to it. In the developing scenario, the first two conditions can be sufficiently met provided the Miltablishment signals its readiness to support such a move.
This is the gist of Asif Zardari’s calculations. Instead of anti-Miltablishment forces led by Nawaz Sharif trying to manoeuver Imran Khan’s ouster, Mr Zardari is proposing a deal with the Miltablishment that brings in a “friendly national government” via a vote of no-confidence against the PTI government supported by the Miltablishment. The Miltablishment might be persuaded to buy into this provided (1) Nawaz and Mariam Sharif are not part of the proposed government (2) fresh elections are not held until due date in 2023 so that the PMLN doesn’t sweep into power and upset this arrangement (3) COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa is guaranteed completion of his extended tenure without hiccups. The problem is not that Nawaz Sharif is opposed to an in-house change per se. He is opposed to one that pre-empts and thwarts a quick election that enables the PMLN to sweep into office. Nor does he want the PMLN to be part of a “national” coalition government for any length of time that incurs the wrath of the masses by the constant infighting of coalition partners and bad governance that damages its electoral prospects. Of course, the formula suits the PPP. It hopes to retain its government in Sindh while becoming a central part of a national government in Islamabad, possibly headed by Bilawal Bhutto.
This is the core dispute within the PDM. The PPP wants an in-house change to usher in a pro-Miltablishment national government led by the PPP until 2023. The PMLN wants an in-house change or forced resignation of Imran Khan to yield an immediate, free and fair general election which it is sure of winning. Asif Zardari wants a done deal straight away to get the better of it. Nawaz Sharif wants to go all the way for a long march and resignations from parliament to trigger a bigger crisis so that he doesn’t get a bad hand in the end.
Mr Zardari’s formula has immediately received the big stick from Imran Khan. The new Commission of Inquiry against the Broadsheet affair entrusted to Justice (Retd) Azmat Saeed, whose conflict of interest is established, is tasked to reopen various cases against the PPP, including the Surrey Palace case. That is one consequence of any weakening of the PDM alliance. Mr Sharif’s formula has a better chance of success: mass resignations in March-April will delegitimize the hybrid regime and bring government to a halt: bye-elections on over 100 seats can either be blocked by the PDM or won (followed by resignations again). This will compel the Miltablishment to rethink its strategy of backing a loser like Imran Khan. At that time, the Miltablishment may be ready to clutch at a less anti-Nawaz-Maryam formula, and they in turn ready to accept a less anti-Qamar Bajwa stance, to break the deadlock and move ahead.
There is thus no prospect of any quick breakthrough in the political stalemate. Asif Zardari can’t persuade his PDM partners to abandon the long march and resignations route even if the PPP doesn’t become part of it. But when that stage arrives after the Senate elections in March, both the Miltablishment and PPP may be compelled to abandon their respective tactics and strategy. The End Game will still begin with an In-House change.