Pakistan Navy is demonstrably the most neglected service. There are reasons for this state of affairs, all of them bad.
One, as the largest and senior-most service, the Pakistan Army has traditionally dominated military-operational thinking and plans.
Two, the Army’s politico-praetorian streak has added another dimension to its heft and further ensured it gets the lion’s share of defence allocations.
Three, air and naval platforms are almost always big ticket items and require monies that are difficult to find in a poor country like Pakistan.
Four, historically, even when Muslim empires dominated large parts of the world, the ruling dynasts — barring some attempts by the Ottomans — neglected naval power. To stress the salience of this point, one only need contrast the naval exploits of Italian city-states, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English with, for instance, the Muslim rulers of India.
What makes this Muslim reticence even more surprising is the fact that Arabs were great seafarers and navigators and traded with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. For example, Ahmed Ibn-e Majid was an Arab navigator and cartographer whose book, “The Book of the Benefits of the Principles and Foundations of Seamanship,” was used by navigators right up to the 18th Century. The book discussed the difference between coastal and open-sea sailing, the locations of ports from East Africa to Indonesia, accounts of the monsoon and other seasonal winds, typhoons and other topics for professional navigators. [NB: for a detailed account of how difficult seafaring was and the five different seafaring traditions in the ancient world, the first chapter of Daniel Headrick’s Power Over Peoples… is a great primer. I am thankful to Dr Ilhan Niaz for pointing it to me.]
Five, this land-focused approach to warfare has continued in Pakistan. As mentioned above, this is due to the power of the army which (a) remains bound by traditional thinking and (b) has stymied any fresh thinking about war itself, including maritime security and the importance of naval power to a state’s offensive and defensive capabilities.
As I said earlier, these are all bad reasons.
Yet, despite these handicaps, the PN has acted professionally and remains prepared for the defence of territorial waters. To expect any more from it would be like expecting a sedan to win a Formula 1 race. Accordingly, the Pakistan Navy’s performance has to be evaluated within the functions and framework of a brown-, or at most green-water navy.
The PN is holding its 7th AMAN (Peace) exercise off the coast of Karachi in February. AMAN exercises began in March 2007. The exercise, which has harbour and sea phases, has drawn naval contingents from around the world. This year’s new entrant is a Russian naval contingent from its Baltic Fleet.
According to the Russian Navy’s website, Russia plans to send a frigate, a patrol ship, a tugboat, a sea-based helicopter and some other units. This is also the first time since 2011 that Russia will take part in a naval exercise with naval contingents from NATO countries. The last time Russian naval continent participated in naval drills with NATO vessels was in 2011 in a NATO-led exercise codenamed Bold Monarch held off the coast of Spain.
Exercise AMAN focuses on interoperability with other navies in anti-Piracy and counterterrorism operations. The drill allows navies to discuss best practices and establish operational relationships towards the common goal of maritime security.
Pakistan Navy is also the only regional navy since 2004 to be part of US-led Coalition Task Force 150 and 151 under the broader umbrella of Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan. PN has also commanded CTF-150 nine times, a distinction.
But while it is important to list the professional achievements of PN within its resource constraints, it is equally important to point out that Pakistan must review its navy’s role. The famous US naval officer and theoretician, Alfred Mahan wrote in his “The Influence of Sea Power Upon World History”: “The history of sea power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war.” Mahan also argues, somewhat exaggeratedly, that a country’s military and political strength directly correlates with their sea power. As is well known, Mahan’s thinking greatly influenced the US’ approach to command of the seas.
There’s much literature on the correlation between technology, naval expeditions and power projection and European imperialism. According to Hedrick, “The innovativeness of the West came from two sources. One is a culture that encourages the domination of nature through experimentation, scientific research, and the rewards of capitalism. The other is the competitive nature of the Western world…”. A similar nexus between capitalism, scientific and technological innovations and imperialism is made by Yuval Noah Harari in “Sapiens.”
But imperialism (even of the non-occupation kind) requires projecting power. Until the arrival of the digital world, power was projected through powerful navies. Pax Britannica was underpinned by a small island country’s formidable naval power. Britain displaced the Portuguese and the Dutch as the dominant naval power and the French could not challenge British naval power even when Napoleon was winning battles on land.
Even today a blue-water navy is the ultimate symbol of the reach of a state’s flag. As British naval historian Andrew Lambert says, “Sea power played a large role in the Allied victory, as the sea determined the control of global communications and getting the most advantage out of food, raw materials, manpower, and industrial products.”
In 1914, Britain dominated global communications and resources by sea power. The Allies economically blockaded Germany. They also used unrestricted submarine warfare in 1915 and 1917. Germans called it “Britain’s Oceanic Tyranny”.
It is interesting to note the naval component of China’s military modernisation programme. By all estimates, China has fast-tracked its development of naval power because Beijing understands that without naval power projection, it cannot dominate the South and East China Seas. And it also knows that it will be contending against the US and its allies.
India, Pakistan’s primary threat, is trying to develop blue-water capability. However, if a blue water navy is defined as “a maritime force capable of sustained operation across the deep waters of open oceans,” Indian Navy can only be called a limited-range blue-water navy. A blue-water navy should also allow “a country to project power far from the home country”. And while India has operated an aircraft carrier since 1961, it does not have the full range of capabilities to meet this condition. In response, Pakistan requires, at a minimum, green-water capabilities. In other words, it needs to be able to operate in the open oceans of its surrounding region to counter the Indian naval threat.
From a nuclear strategy perspective, the most credible second-strike capability rests on a ship submersible ballistic nuclear (SSBN) platform. That’s where the navy comes back into the picture again. So far, while Pakistan has developed the capability to put nuclear-armed cruise missiles on conventional subs, the country does not have an SSBN platform.
Corollary: let’s reorient away from a purely land-based approach to war-fighting and focus on enhancing PN’s capabilities.
The writer is a former News Editor of The Friday Times. He reluctantly tweets @ejazhaider
One, as the largest and senior-most service, the Pakistan Army has traditionally dominated military-operational thinking and plans.
Two, the Army’s politico-praetorian streak has added another dimension to its heft and further ensured it gets the lion’s share of defence allocations.
Three, air and naval platforms are almost always big ticket items and require monies that are difficult to find in a poor country like Pakistan.
Four, historically, even when Muslim empires dominated large parts of the world, the ruling dynasts — barring some attempts by the Ottomans — neglected naval power. To stress the salience of this point, one only need contrast the naval exploits of Italian city-states, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the English with, for instance, the Muslim rulers of India.
What makes this Muslim reticence even more surprising is the fact that Arabs were great seafarers and navigators and traded with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. For example, Ahmed Ibn-e Majid was an Arab navigator and cartographer whose book, “The Book of the Benefits of the Principles and Foundations of Seamanship,” was used by navigators right up to the 18th Century. The book discussed the difference between coastal and open-sea sailing, the locations of ports from East Africa to Indonesia, accounts of the monsoon and other seasonal winds, typhoons and other topics for professional navigators. [NB: for a detailed account of how difficult seafaring was and the five different seafaring traditions in the ancient world, the first chapter of Daniel Headrick’s Power Over Peoples… is a great primer. I am thankful to Dr Ilhan Niaz for pointing it to me.]
Five, this land-focused approach to warfare has continued in Pakistan. As mentioned above, this is due to the power of the army which (a) remains bound by traditional thinking and (b) has stymied any fresh thinking about war itself, including maritime security and the importance of naval power to a state’s offensive and defensive capabilities.
As I said earlier, these are all bad reasons.
Yet, despite these handicaps, the PN has acted professionally and remains prepared for the defence of territorial waters. To expect any more from it would be like expecting a sedan to win a Formula 1 race. Accordingly, the Pakistan Navy’s performance has to be evaluated within the functions and framework of a brown-, or at most green-water navy.
The PN is holding its 7th AMAN (Peace) exercise off the coast of Karachi in February. AMAN exercises began in March 2007. The exercise, which has harbour and sea phases, has drawn naval contingents from around the world. This year’s new entrant is a Russian naval contingent from its Baltic Fleet.
According to the Russian Navy’s website, Russia plans to send a frigate, a patrol ship, a tugboat, a sea-based helicopter and some other units. This is also the first time since 2011 that Russia will take part in a naval exercise with naval contingents from NATO countries. The last time Russian naval continent participated in naval drills with NATO vessels was in 2011 in a NATO-led exercise codenamed Bold Monarch held off the coast of Spain.
Exercise AMAN focuses on interoperability with other navies in anti-Piracy and counterterrorism operations. The drill allows navies to discuss best practices and establish operational relationships towards the common goal of maritime security.
Pakistan Navy is also the only regional navy since 2004 to be part of US-led Coalition Task Force 150 and 151 under the broader umbrella of Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan. PN has also commanded CTF-150 nine times, a distinction.
But while it is important to list the professional achievements of PN within its resource constraints, it is equally important to point out that Pakistan must review its navy’s role. The famous US naval officer and theoretician, Alfred Mahan wrote in his “The Influence of Sea Power Upon World History”: “The history of sea power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war.” Mahan also argues, somewhat exaggeratedly, that a country’s military and political strength directly correlates with their sea power. As is well known, Mahan’s thinking greatly influenced the US’ approach to command of the seas.
There’s much literature on the correlation between technology, naval expeditions and power projection and European imperialism. According to Hedrick, “The innovativeness of the West came from two sources. One is a culture that encourages the domination of nature through experimentation, scientific research, and the rewards of capitalism. The other is the competitive nature of the Western world…”. A similar nexus between capitalism, scientific and technological innovations and imperialism is made by Yuval Noah Harari in “Sapiens.”
But imperialism (even of the non-occupation kind) requires projecting power. Until the arrival of the digital world, power was projected through powerful navies. Pax Britannica was underpinned by a small island country’s formidable naval power. Britain displaced the Portuguese and the Dutch as the dominant naval power and the French could not challenge British naval power even when Napoleon was winning battles on land.
Even today a blue-water navy is the ultimate symbol of the reach of a state’s flag. As British naval historian Andrew Lambert says, “Sea power played a large role in the Allied victory, as the sea determined the control of global communications and getting the most advantage out of food, raw materials, manpower, and industrial products.”
In 1914, Britain dominated global communications and resources by sea power. The Allies economically blockaded Germany. They also used unrestricted submarine warfare in 1915 and 1917. Germans called it “Britain’s Oceanic Tyranny”.
It is interesting to note the naval component of China’s military modernisation programme. By all estimates, China has fast-tracked its development of naval power because Beijing understands that without naval power projection, it cannot dominate the South and East China Seas. And it also knows that it will be contending against the US and its allies.
India, Pakistan’s primary threat, is trying to develop blue-water capability. However, if a blue water navy is defined as “a maritime force capable of sustained operation across the deep waters of open oceans,” Indian Navy can only be called a limited-range blue-water navy. A blue-water navy should also allow “a country to project power far from the home country”. And while India has operated an aircraft carrier since 1961, it does not have the full range of capabilities to meet this condition. In response, Pakistan requires, at a minimum, green-water capabilities. In other words, it needs to be able to operate in the open oceans of its surrounding region to counter the Indian naval threat.
From a nuclear strategy perspective, the most credible second-strike capability rests on a ship submersible ballistic nuclear (SSBN) platform. That’s where the navy comes back into the picture again. So far, while Pakistan has developed the capability to put nuclear-armed cruise missiles on conventional subs, the country does not have an SSBN platform.
Corollary: let’s reorient away from a purely land-based approach to war-fighting and focus on enhancing PN’s capabilities.
The writer is a former News Editor of The Friday Times. He reluctantly tweets @ejazhaider