During the 1914-1918 Great War, the province of Punjab, the “Sword Arm of India” provided over 50 percent of the one million troops who served overseas in seven theaters. Impressive as this sounds, the impression that the majority enlisted ‘voluntarily’ with no coercion or pressure is faulty.
There is sufficient evidence to substantiate the fact that as the war progressed and casualties mounted, an increasing number were recruited under duress. This was made possible by a major change in the system of recruitment, with the entire muscle of the civil administration being brought to bear and supported by a network of notables and the rural elite. It ensured that the ever increasing targets were met in spite of high mortality caused by recurring epidemics of Malaria, Spanish Flu and Plague and the growing threat of revolt in the final year of the war by a war-weary population.
Within six months of the outbreak of war, India dispatched seven divisions of infantry and nearly three divisions of cavalry to four theaters. The Indian component consisted of 210,000 officers and men, the majority of whom were from the Punjab. Of the 69 regiments, 41 were either wholly or partially composed of Punjabis. The Indian regiments lost heavily in France and in the fierce battles against the Turks near Baghdad. To make up its dwindling strength, the Army Department in India sanctioned an increase of 10 per cent in cavalry and infantry regiments and raised 20 additional companies. This coupled with the drafts sent to war fronts to replace casualties resulted in a substantial increase in recruitment.
Punjabi Muslims, Sikhs and Dogras serving in the army during the First World War
The prewar annual recruitment for the Indian army was 15,000. However, in the last four months of 1914, 14,000 troops had already been enlisted from the Punjab and in the following six months the number nearly tripled to 37,600. By the end of 1915, 45,800 had been recruited for that year from the Punjab which was eight times the yearly peace-time requirement.
Initially there was no difficulty in finding ready volunteers but as the demand kept rising, it became increasingly challenging for the recruiting officers to meet the targets. To some extent, at fault was the narrow base of classes eligible for recruitment and the system/structure of recruiting depots and recruiting parties. This system worked well in peacetime but had considerable drawbacks in coping with a major increase in the size of the army and replacing casualties. However, there were other factors that effected recruitment. The shock to the Indian soldiers of the scale and intensity of battle (with its resultant casualties) was conveyed home through letters and created apprehension. The tales narrated by the sick and injured soldiers on their return, added to the unease amongst potential recruits and their families.
The shock to the Indian soldiers of the scale and intensity of battle (with its resultant casualties) was conveyed home through letters and created apprehension
The bulk of the fighting manpower was drawn from the economically deprived classes and clans from the Salt Range (Gakkhars, Janjuas and Awans), the Hill States (Chibb Rajputs), and Rohtak District (Jats), for whom military service was in most case the only means of livelihood. This made them more vulnerable to coercion and recruitment continued uninterrupted. On the other hand, for the Sikhs from the heavily cultivated Manjha region of Central Punjab (who were recruited in large numbers), military service was less an economic compulsion and more a means of supplementing their income to support their relatively extravagant lifestyle. Consequently, there was a growing reluctance to enlist and wives and mothers tried very hard to hold back their menfolk.
Recruitment was also effected by a sharp outbreak of plague (the first of two), which caused a high degree of mortality because many of the medical staff in the rural areas had been drafted. The demand for manpower reached crisis proportion as the casualties in France mounted due to death, injuries and exposure to cold. In August 1915, the far sighted soldier–bureaucrat, Lt. Col. Popham-Young, Commissioner Rawalpindi Division, proposed closer cooperation between the military and provincial administration. The civil administration would be able to “bring influence to bear on the local population” for better recruitment. Two years later, this influence would reach near draconian proportions.
A mixed battalion of Indian soldiers in France during the winter of 1914-15
Improved coordination produced limited results and ultimately the direct involvement of the civil administration emerged in April 1916 when Lord Chelmsford was appointed as Viceroy. His views on a total involvement of the machinery of the civil government in raising manpower was fully supported by Sir Michael O’Dwyer, Governor Punjab, who for the past two years had been asserting the same. In December 1916, the Government of India (GOI) instituted a territorial system of recruiting with a full integration of civil and military officials at all levels. Recruiting areas were redrawn to correspond with the administrative divisions of the province and in every district a civilian recruiting officer was appointed by the administration. Appointments of honorary magistrates and district sub-registrars were based on their contributions in recruitment, and vacancies in the district administration were filled by only those who enlisted the largest number. When there was a serious shortage of non-combatants in Mesopotamia in the summer of 1916, the GOI even recruited from the lowest segment of the society. With large preparations afoot for launching the counteroffensive to take Baghdad, convicts were formed into labor battalions (another term for penal labour), and 5,500 from the Punjab were dispatched on terms which included conditional release. As to how many of them had been convicted of heinous crimes is not on record.
Sir Michael O'Dwyer, Lietenant Governor of the Punjab, 1913-19
1917 was a wet and unhealthy year in the Punjab. It caused a widespread epidemic of malaria which combined with the second virulent outbreak of plague, resulted in heavy mortality. In spite of this, in the first six months, 30,000 recruits had been enlisted from British Districts and Indian States but demands for more was unrelenting. The Provincial Recruiting Board formed in July 1917, assessed the man-power each district could contribute and fixed quotas. The responsibility of meeting these quotas on the pain of losing their posts rested on the local officials of the district and tehsil right down to the zaildars and lambardars (village headmen). In a letter in December 1917, to his brother Dafadar Kartar Singh, serving with 9th Hodson’s Horse in France, Zaildar Jawala Singh laments “[...].my child of eight months is dead, and your sister in law is dead, and thirdly I am threatened with dismissal from my position both of Zaildar and Lamberdar. If my life would depart, that would be the best solution of the difficulty! On 29th November, the Deputy Commissioner sent for me and gave me a month to finish my recruiting, saying that if I did not supply the men in that time I should be dismissed from both my Zaildarship and Lamberdarship”.
Indian infantry digging trenches
Even the village revenue officials were made part of the recruiting drive by amending the rules. The most effective way of meeting the targets was to involve the rural notables including landlords, tribal chiefs and religious leaders who also propped up the administration that had been weakened by the departure of its staff to the war front. As an incentive, over 370 Recruiting Badges were awarded to those non-officials (civilians) who enrolled over 1100 recruits each and many of whom were also awarded titles and substantial grants of land. In short the population was caged in and it doesn’t take much imagination to visualize the pressure that was applied to enlist. The results paid off and the number doubled to 60,000 in the second half of 1917.
To release British troops for the battlefields of France and Flanders, the ‘Indianization’ of the Egypt Expeditionary Force (EEF) operating in Palestine was initiated at the end of 1917. The GOI committed to raise and send 21 Indian infantry and pioneer battalions by May 1918 and double the number by the end of the year by reorganizing 24 battalions returning from East Africa. The manpower crisis on the battlefields of Europe coincided with a reemergence of the plague in India and an epidemic of Spanish Flu carried by troops returning from abroad. The rural areas which provided the base for recruitment were the most effected since the medical staff had been drafted into the military, however the recruitment drive went on unabated. Pressure was placed on districts in the south west of the Punjab (Multan, Muzaffargargh and Dera Ghazi Khan), which had hitherto not contributed in sufficient number. The government accepted recruits through contractors who purchased them for large amounts of money (often financed through contributions by villagers who wanted to avoid enlistment), or forcibly recruited them against their will. There were also cases of recruits being ‘press-ganged’ and of magistrates summoning villagers under the Penal Code and then recruiting them under threat. There is documented evidence that to compel villagers to enlist in Punjab (as well as in the United Provinces and Mysore), district officials cut off the irrigation water. To avoid enlistment, eligible men purchased medical certificates and there were cases of self-inflicted injuries. On hearing that a recruiting team was heading their way, villagers would abandon their homes and certain tribes and ‘tracts’ along the Salt Range who were unwilling to provide more recruits clashed with the police.
Muslim soldiers, likely Punjabis, pray at their camp during the campaign in Mesopotamia, circa 1918
By the end of 1917, the situation was so serious that O’Dwyer appealed to the Adjutant General to suspend recruitment from the Punjab for ten weeks starting 1 April 1918 “to allow the recruiters and recruited a much needed respite.” However, the German Spring Offensive of 1918 intervened and placed a severe strain in the British forces in France. On the first day of the offensive, they lost 38,500 men. The process of Indianization of the EEF was speeded up to allow all the British divisions save one to be shipped to France. New Indian battalions were formed in Palestine by splitting the older ones and filling in the shortfall with drafts from India. The GOI committed its self on doubling the intake of recruits and to meet the added demands, the Government of Punjab proposed conscription as scare tactics. However, after very serious consideration by the GOI, it was rejected because rumors of conscription had already created unrest in Bombay and the states of Hyderabad, Kholapur, Alwar and Janpur. The same could not be risked in the Punjab.
Consequently, the Government of Punjab further expanded and strengthened the vast network of notables and rural elite (Zamindars) involved in meeting the assigned quotas some of whom went the extra mile and used strong arm tactics. As a result, the Recruiting Clock ticked even faster and in the first five months of 1918, 67,000 were enlisted. This was in spite of a much more lethal outbreak of Spanish Flu as winter approached. Of the roughly 8 million who died in the British-controlled provinces, close to one million were from the Punjab and mortality was especially high among adults within the recruiting age limits. However, the coercion by the elaborate recruiting apparatus that the administration had activated performed well above expectations and in the second half of the year touched 88,000 recruits. By the end of 1918, the situation in the Punjab was near critical but fortunately the war came to an end and both the administration and the population of the Sword Arm of India heaved a sigh of relief.
Twenty years later, India was once again called upon to raise large forces to fight in Africa, the Middle East, Italy and Burma and by the end of the war it had raised and equipped over 26 divisions. Though the Punjab still provided a large percentage of the manpower, the GOI had learned its lesson and enlarged its recruiting base to an extent that no single province came under the sort of pressure that Punjab faced during the Great War.
