Recently, there has been much talk about relations between the United States and Pakistan, especially in the context of US pull out from Afghanistan and the presidential vote in that country. Let’s consider some factors before we get to a structural analysis.
One, US-Pakistan relations have always been transactional. The analysts who hark back to President Ayub Khan’s time and argue that those were the halcyon days of US-Pakistan strategic partnership need to revisit the history of relations between the two states.
Two, in the last decade US-Pakistan relations have steadily become shaky and while they are not as bad as they were at the beginning of this decade or in the first two-and-half years of President Donald Trump’s presidency, they remain tenuous and pegged on the single issue of Afghanistan: how can Pakistan help extricate the US from that morass and facilitate a peace process there. To be sure, there are other tricky issues like Pakistan’s relations with China, especially with reference to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Islamabad’s nuclear weapons programme, and tensions in South Asia. But they line up behind Afghanistan which remains the focal point of this transactional relationship.
The third factor relates to the US’ growing relations and strategic partnership with India. Trump might have drawn the two sides into a tariff war, but that’s more a bump than a major problem. In fact, most foreign policy wonks in the Beltway consider such actions by Trump — he has done the same with close allies — to be counter-productive.
Four, the US’ strategic partnership with India — the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the Indo-Pacific strategy etc — is geared towards Washington’s aggressive containment of Beijing. While India’s foreign minister, S Jaishankar, said in a recent interview that India is not looking for entry into an alliance, the fact is that given India’s relations with China and the US-China rivalry, New Delhi is likely to be drawn even closer to the US. Australia, another Quad member that was circumspect so far like India, has in recent months become fairly vocal in its criticism of China.
The fifth factor is India-Pakistan relations, which have been downgraded following India’s aerial attack on Pakistan in February 2019 and subsequently its illegal decision to annex the occupied state of Jammu and Kashmir. The possibility of normalisation is low to almost nil and the threat of conflict remains high.
This is the general terrain in which US-Pakistan relations will unfold in the coming years.
Let’s, therefore, look at the engagement envelope in terms of some structural constraints.
In sum, it is important to remain engaged with the United States, but to lower expectations of what can be achieved through those relations. Equally, it is important to not consider proximate relations with China (and also Russia) as a substitute for relations with the US. That has, unfortunately, been the thrust of many analyses in the recent past and must be avoided.
The writer is a former News Editor of The Friday Times. He reluctantly tweets @ejazhaider
One, US-Pakistan relations have always been transactional. The analysts who hark back to President Ayub Khan’s time and argue that those were the halcyon days of US-Pakistan strategic partnership need to revisit the history of relations between the two states.
Two, in the last decade US-Pakistan relations have steadily become shaky and while they are not as bad as they were at the beginning of this decade or in the first two-and-half years of President Donald Trump’s presidency, they remain tenuous and pegged on the single issue of Afghanistan: how can Pakistan help extricate the US from that morass and facilitate a peace process there. To be sure, there are other tricky issues like Pakistan’s relations with China, especially with reference to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Islamabad’s nuclear weapons programme, and tensions in South Asia. But they line up behind Afghanistan which remains the focal point of this transactional relationship.
The third factor relates to the US’ growing relations and strategic partnership with India. Trump might have drawn the two sides into a tariff war, but that’s more a bump than a major problem. In fact, most foreign policy wonks in the Beltway consider such actions by Trump — he has done the same with close allies — to be counter-productive.
Four, the US’ strategic partnership with India — the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the Indo-Pacific strategy etc — is geared towards Washington’s aggressive containment of Beijing. While India’s foreign minister, S Jaishankar, said in a recent interview that India is not looking for entry into an alliance, the fact is that given India’s relations with China and the US-China rivalry, New Delhi is likely to be drawn even closer to the US. Australia, another Quad member that was circumspect so far like India, has in recent months become fairly vocal in its criticism of China.
The fifth factor is India-Pakistan relations, which have been downgraded following India’s aerial attack on Pakistan in February 2019 and subsequently its illegal decision to annex the occupied state of Jammu and Kashmir. The possibility of normalisation is low to almost nil and the threat of conflict remains high.
This is the general terrain in which US-Pakistan relations will unfold in the coming years.
Let’s, therefore, look at the engagement envelope in terms of some structural constraints.
- Any discussion of US-Pakistan relations and their scope must follow a structural analysis. This means assessing the evolving security architecture in this region and beyond in terms both of geopolitics and geoeconomics.
- The second points flows from the first: i.e., it is difficult and will become increasingly more so, to look at and analyse US-Pakistan relations in isolation or purely as a bilateral arrangement without (a) appreciating the broader strategic interests of the United States in this region and beyond and (b) assessing on that basis the areas of convergence and divergence between Pakistan and the US. In other words, while Pakistan must work towards expanding and broadening relations with the US, it must appreciate the structural constraints informing US policy that will likely impede those efforts.
- Relations between Pakistan and the United States are not just a function of what Pakistan can do (endogenous factors) but are, and will be, determined by exogenous factors and actors, including the United States itself.
- In doing so, Pakistan also needs to seriously analyse its relations with China in terms of gains and losses. This point is important insofar as of late, and with relations with the US on the ebb, many influential voices have begun calling for moving away from the US and moving even closer to China. Interstate relations and strategies require broadening choices, not narrowing them down. This means shedding platitudes and rhetoric about China-Pakistan friendship and undertaking a cold, calculated assessment of (a) China’s internal politics under President Xi Jinping and (b) Beijing’s more assertive posture under Xi. This can be done without harming the closeness with China.
- Linked with the above, relations with China also need to assess the crucial question of the extent to which the overall conduct of Pakistan’s foreign policy might be affected by closer proximity to China in terms of making choices and exercising them. Put another way, Pakistan needs to be clear about whether relations with Beijing constrain its hand in dealing with other world capitals.
- The manner in which the security architecture is evolving, reshaping strategic alignments, means that no state in the Indian Ocean littoral or bordering South China Sea will be able to stay neutral in the sense of being strictly non-aligned. The challenge will be how to balance the strategic requirements of the US and China if they get further locked into what Graham Allison calls the Thucydides Trap.
- The US-China rivalry (Russia will play an important but secondary role in eastern Europe) will be the cynosure of states’ foreign policy approaches, including Pakistan’s, because it will be the most important determining factor, if not the factor.
- US-Pakistan relations, as also the entire gambit of US’ foreign policy itself, will be determined by the presidential vote in the United States. There are three possibilities: Trump loses; he wins; he loses and refuses to accept the result. If Trump loses, Washington will be back in the hands of the traditional foreign policy elite: Joe Biden will seek to mend relations with NATO allies and other partners, seek to end the isolation Trump had pushed the US into, embark more aggressively against what it considers Russian and Chinese advances, strengthen multilateral institutions (where it suits it), strengthen the Quad, increase the partnership with India et cetera.
If Trump loses and doesn’t accept the results, the internal politics of the US could see some turmoil. It is difficult to predict how much damage that might cause.
If, however, Trump wins, the chances of which appear to be slim at this point, the nature of the US polity and foreign policy approaches would continue to ‘covfefe’ the world.
- Finally, given all these factors, Pakistan must lower its expectations with reference to relations with the United States. This is regardless of who gets to the Oval Office. In other words, there isn’t going to be a razzmatazz, no closer defence cooperation, no big ticket items on the agenda. However, that does not mean that relations must necessarily go into cold-storage. Despite other problems, there’s still space for improving relations in other areas: trade, investment, health, education, infrastructure development, to name a few. However, much of this will depend on two factors: the ability of Pakistan’s private sector entrepreneurs to innovate, attract investment and discover areas of joint ventures and the ability and willingness of the state of Pakistan to create an enabling environment for facilitating such outreaches. Given the nature of relations, it is unlikely that there will be quotas and preferential treatment for Pakistan.
In sum, it is important to remain engaged with the United States, but to lower expectations of what can be achieved through those relations. Equally, it is important to not consider proximate relations with China (and also Russia) as a substitute for relations with the US. That has, unfortunately, been the thrust of many analyses in the recent past and must be avoided.
The writer is a former News Editor of The Friday Times. He reluctantly tweets @ejazhaider