Since the move by India on August 5 to annex the occupied territory of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan has made much noise to get the world to listen to its position on Kashmir.
Let’s take stock of where matters stand and how successful Islamabad has been in this endeavour.
But first, a no-brainer. Noise is not strategy and doesn’t lead to strategy; strategy is supposed to lead to international noise against India. Corollary: the direction of causality must not go wrong.
Now to assessment.
What exactly is Pakistan’s position on Kashmir? This has always been a matter of ambiguity. Take for instance the slogan Kashmir banay ga Pakistan (Kashmir will become Pakistan). How does this square with the argument that Kashmiris have never exercised the right to make a choice to begin with? And this is as true of the people inhabiting the area controlled by Pakistan and known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir as it is of Kashmiris residing in the area occupied by India.
Since stupidity is abundantly available in this land and nuances are lost, let me explain: the issue is not whether Kashmiris will – or will not – choose Pakistan. That’s a question to be decided by ascertaining their wishes. The issue is that Pakistan has taken two contradictory positions on the dispute: calling for the implementation of the UN Resolutions to determine what choice the Kashmiris will make and simultaneously issuing an arbitrary pre-plebiscite verdict that Kashmir will become Pakistan.
To explain, the “Kashmir banay ga Pakistan” slogan assumes (1) that AJK is already ‘Pakistan’ (notwithstanding the trappings of a separate flag, anthem and governance structure) (2) that Occupied Jammu and Kashmir is the area that must be liberated from the oppressive clutches of India; and (3) that this liberation necessarily means the merger of Occupied Kashmir with Pakistan.
There are two big problems with this approach: first, Kashmir becomes a direct, territorial dispute between India and Pakistan (while the Kashmiris and their right to self-determination, central to the problem, are relegated to a secondary place); second (and as a consequence), all of Pakistan’s negative baggage gets transferred onto Kashmir, at least so far as the rest of the world is concerned. Given Pakistan’s perceived or real track record, that’s a very heavy cross to bear for the Kashmiris.
India has made effective use of this approach by Pakistan. It has managed to keep the world’s attention away from its repression of occupied J&K by framing the issue as (a) an India-Pakistan problem; and (b) as a problem of ‘terrorism’ rather than as a struggle for freedom and basic rights whose legality is underpinned and under-written by UN General Assembly resolutions with reference to peoples anywhere under occupation.
In short, India’s narrative of Kashmir has resonated with the world not because the Kashmiris were doing something wrong but because India managed to make it about Pakistan and latter’s sponsorship of “terrorism.” And this charge has stuck in part because the Pakistani leadership itself has repeatedly played to India’s taxonomy (remember General Musharraf?).
Here’s a recent example: since the arrest and incarceration of Yasin Malik, chief of his own faction of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, Pakistani media and government have been calling for his release. Malik’s spouse, a Pakistani, made several appearances on TV channels. Then August 5 happened. Pakistan has since consistently pointed to Indian state’s repression in occupied Kashmir, including arresting political leaders and activists. Rallies in AJK have also become a norm. But when JKLF took out a rally last week to go to the Line of Control — like many other groups — raising slogans against India and asking for independence, the AJK administration clashed with their cadres and arrested some 22 JKLF activists. This, when we are trying to make a case against India!
The administration’s argument that they were trying to prevent the rally to go to the LoC because it’s dangerous is clever-by-half because many other rallies did the same. Unfortunately, it is obvious to all that this was a thoughtless act, albeit one in line with usual administrative stupidity. Pakistan needs to develop some clarity on Kashmir; the quicker the better.
It should also be noted that whatever international support we might have been able to garner so far is about India’s rights abuses in the Valley and the poor hand Narendra Modi has played there. That support of Pakistan’s criticism of India is not an endorsement of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. If we don’t get that difference, then we are unlikely to turn the current focus on Kashmir to the advantage of Kashmir and Kashmiris.
Corollary: make this about Kashmir, not Pakistan. How to go about it and what concrete measures to take to that end is for another time. Suffice to say, however, that doing so would require a major rethink in Pakistan with reference to Kashmir as a whole and not just in relation to the occupied part of it.
Another important point relates to the talk about war, especially references to nuclear escalation. As noted in this space a couple of weeks ago, India’s defence minister, Rajnath Singh’s statement on India’s no-first-use commitment was a fabulous opportunity for Pakistan to present India (a) as an irresponsible state and (b) as a clear indication of the erosion of India’s NFU commitment.
True to form, however, Pakistan lost that moment. Not because Singh retracted his statement but because we have an array of geniuses on our side who are all too happy to shoot their mouths off about everything under the sun, including nuclear weapons. While Sheikh Rashid may personify the old adage “bandar kay haath meiN ustra”, he isn’t the only one, just the worst one.
Pakistan created the National Command Authority and the Strategic Plans Division as the secretariat of NCA for a reason. No other officials, and especially not itinerant twitter maestros, should shoot their mouths off on strategic weapons employment.
Pakistan has a ministry that deals with the external world. It’s called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its spokesperson speaks for Pakistan. All others, whether in civvies or uniform, are meant to speak only in relation to their operational mandate. No more or less.
But no. This basic, simple and sensible rule is flouted every day by the highest in the realm. Result: a cacophony of disparate voices, not a coordinated orchestra.
A final problem relates to our desire to speak unnecessarily and indulge in political theatrics. While that might be great for politics, it’s poison for the business of the state. Unfortunately, two of the most important officeholders, the prime minister and the foreign minister, are in love with their own voices. Worse, as I have noted before, both are loath to speak from clear, concise, sharp written texts, preferring to ad-lib and forgetting when to stop. Result: we get imprecise language and slips (Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir) et cetera.
There’s a reason texts are written, edited, vetted, and finalised with great care. Every comma, every clause and sub-clause, every word, every formulation means something. Let’s make sure it means what we want it to mean.
To recap: going forward, decide whether Kashmir is about Kashmiris or about Pakistan; put a gag order on officials who have no business discussing foreign policy or nuclear weapons; get every spokesperson to stick to his mandate and leave the state’s policy presentation to the MoFA spox; know that diplomacy is not about speaking too much but speaking less; develop coordination rather than operating separate shops.
Will this simple advice be heeded? I shan’t wager my money on that.
The writer is former News Editor of TFT and reluctantly tweets @ejazhaider
Let’s take stock of where matters stand and how successful Islamabad has been in this endeavour.
But first, a no-brainer. Noise is not strategy and doesn’t lead to strategy; strategy is supposed to lead to international noise against India. Corollary: the direction of causality must not go wrong.
Now to assessment.
What exactly is Pakistan’s position on Kashmir? This has always been a matter of ambiguity. Take for instance the slogan Kashmir banay ga Pakistan (Kashmir will become Pakistan). How does this square with the argument that Kashmiris have never exercised the right to make a choice to begin with? And this is as true of the people inhabiting the area controlled by Pakistan and known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir as it is of Kashmiris residing in the area occupied by India.
Since stupidity is abundantly available in this land and nuances are lost, let me explain: the issue is not whether Kashmiris will – or will not – choose Pakistan. That’s a question to be decided by ascertaining their wishes. The issue is that Pakistan has taken two contradictory positions on the dispute: calling for the implementation of the UN Resolutions to determine what choice the Kashmiris will make and simultaneously issuing an arbitrary pre-plebiscite verdict that Kashmir will become Pakistan.
Pakistan has taken two contradictory positions on the dispute: calling for the implementation of the UN Resolutions to determine what choice the Kashmiris will make and simultaneously issuing an arbitrary pre-plebiscite verdict that Kashmir will become Pakistan
To explain, the “Kashmir banay ga Pakistan” slogan assumes (1) that AJK is already ‘Pakistan’ (notwithstanding the trappings of a separate flag, anthem and governance structure) (2) that Occupied Jammu and Kashmir is the area that must be liberated from the oppressive clutches of India; and (3) that this liberation necessarily means the merger of Occupied Kashmir with Pakistan.
There are two big problems with this approach: first, Kashmir becomes a direct, territorial dispute between India and Pakistan (while the Kashmiris and their right to self-determination, central to the problem, are relegated to a secondary place); second (and as a consequence), all of Pakistan’s negative baggage gets transferred onto Kashmir, at least so far as the rest of the world is concerned. Given Pakistan’s perceived or real track record, that’s a very heavy cross to bear for the Kashmiris.
India has made effective use of this approach by Pakistan. It has managed to keep the world’s attention away from its repression of occupied J&K by framing the issue as (a) an India-Pakistan problem; and (b) as a problem of ‘terrorism’ rather than as a struggle for freedom and basic rights whose legality is underpinned and under-written by UN General Assembly resolutions with reference to peoples anywhere under occupation.
In short, India’s narrative of Kashmir has resonated with the world not because the Kashmiris were doing something wrong but because India managed to make it about Pakistan and latter’s sponsorship of “terrorism.” And this charge has stuck in part because the Pakistani leadership itself has repeatedly played to India’s taxonomy (remember General Musharraf?).
Here’s a recent example: since the arrest and incarceration of Yasin Malik, chief of his own faction of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, Pakistani media and government have been calling for his release. Malik’s spouse, a Pakistani, made several appearances on TV channels. Then August 5 happened. Pakistan has since consistently pointed to Indian state’s repression in occupied Kashmir, including arresting political leaders and activists. Rallies in AJK have also become a norm. But when JKLF took out a rally last week to go to the Line of Control — like many other groups — raising slogans against India and asking for independence, the AJK administration clashed with their cadres and arrested some 22 JKLF activists. This, when we are trying to make a case against India!
The administration’s argument that they were trying to prevent the rally to go to the LoC because it’s dangerous is clever-by-half because many other rallies did the same. Unfortunately, it is obvious to all that this was a thoughtless act, albeit one in line with usual administrative stupidity. Pakistan needs to develop some clarity on Kashmir; the quicker the better.
It should also be noted that whatever international support we might have been able to garner so far is about India’s rights abuses in the Valley and the poor hand Narendra Modi has played there. That support of Pakistan’s criticism of India is not an endorsement of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. If we don’t get that difference, then we are unlikely to turn the current focus on Kashmir to the advantage of Kashmir and Kashmiris.
Corollary: make this about Kashmir, not Pakistan. How to go about it and what concrete measures to take to that end is for another time. Suffice to say, however, that doing so would require a major rethink in Pakistan with reference to Kashmir as a whole and not just in relation to the occupied part of it.
Another important point relates to the talk about war, especially references to nuclear escalation. As noted in this space a couple of weeks ago, India’s defence minister, Rajnath Singh’s statement on India’s no-first-use commitment was a fabulous opportunity for Pakistan to present India (a) as an irresponsible state and (b) as a clear indication of the erosion of India’s NFU commitment.
True to form, however, Pakistan lost that moment. Not because Singh retracted his statement but because we have an array of geniuses on our side who are all too happy to shoot their mouths off about everything under the sun, including nuclear weapons. While Sheikh Rashid may personify the old adage “bandar kay haath meiN ustra”, he isn’t the only one, just the worst one.
Pakistan created the National Command Authority and the Strategic Plans Division as the secretariat of NCA for a reason. No other officials, and especially not itinerant twitter maestros, should shoot their mouths off on strategic weapons employment.
Pakistan has a ministry that deals with the external world. It’s called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its spokesperson speaks for Pakistan. All others, whether in civvies or uniform, are meant to speak only in relation to their operational mandate. No more or less.
But no. This basic, simple and sensible rule is flouted every day by the highest in the realm. Result: a cacophony of disparate voices, not a coordinated orchestra.
A final problem relates to our desire to speak unnecessarily and indulge in political theatrics. While that might be great for politics, it’s poison for the business of the state. Unfortunately, two of the most important officeholders, the prime minister and the foreign minister, are in love with their own voices. Worse, as I have noted before, both are loath to speak from clear, concise, sharp written texts, preferring to ad-lib and forgetting when to stop. Result: we get imprecise language and slips (Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir) et cetera.
There’s a reason texts are written, edited, vetted, and finalised with great care. Every comma, every clause and sub-clause, every word, every formulation means something. Let’s make sure it means what we want it to mean.
To recap: going forward, decide whether Kashmir is about Kashmiris or about Pakistan; put a gag order on officials who have no business discussing foreign policy or nuclear weapons; get every spokesperson to stick to his mandate and leave the state’s policy presentation to the MoFA spox; know that diplomacy is not about speaking too much but speaking less; develop coordination rather than operating separate shops.
Will this simple advice be heeded? I shan’t wager my money on that.
The writer is former News Editor of TFT and reluctantly tweets @ejazhaider