Even by Pakistan’s volatile standards, 2018 was an extraordinary year. PMLN Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif survived the most robust Miltablishment siege of an elected government in history but was eventually felled by the fig leaf of “iqama” conjured up by the Supreme Court. He got up and carried the bout to the opposition’s quarter in the general elections, but was knocked out again by mysterious “khalai makhlook” who romped across the finishing line with the Skipper on their shoulders.
Such political engineering is unprecedented. The Miltablishment has a track record of discreetly pulling strings behind the scenes during “democratic” interludes. But this time round it was upfront about it. Similarly, the judiciary has a history of being handmaiden to civilian governments. But this time round it effectively sided with the Miltablishment. Is this an omen of Naya Pakistan?
The political economy forecast for 2109 is bad on most counts. Imran Khan’s coalition governments in Islamabad and Punjab are hanging by the Puppeteer’s threads. Should the PPP and PMLN join hands, it will be all over for the PTI. That they haven’t done so is solely due to the aggressive divide-and-rule strategy of the Miltablishment. One JIT has dragged Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif to jail while another is hounding Asif Zardari and Feryal Talpur from one court to another. It’s a delicate balancing act. If both PPPites are also scalped, the younger Bhutto-Zardari will be forced to pull the plug on the PTI government in Balochistan and on the Senate Chairman just as easily as the elder Zardari set them up in the first place. Both Nawaz and Zardari have great experience in, and resources for, horse trading. The PTI toyed with the prospect of toppling the PPP government in Sindh by getting mileage from the anti-Zardari JIT but was stopped in its tracks by the ever-vigilant SC. The problem is that any “Get Zardari” attack could rebound into a “Get Imran” counter attack with arch nemesis Nawaz Sharif emerging as the biggest winner by default. We are therefore likely to witness many such destabilizing moves by one stakeholder or another as the current balances backed by an army chief and supreme court chief justice are inevitably reviewed, amended, or updated by their successors in the new year.
Bad governance is compounding the PTI’s woes. The administrative reforms pledged by Dr Ishrat Hussain’s well-meaning committee are already in the throes of being strangulated by the PTI’s Young Turks and IK cronies. The maverick finance minister is up the creek. Civil servants in Punjab are in deep freeze, fearful of NAB. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa has been left to its own devices.
A grim economic outlook is bound to add to people’s misery and frustration. It will also provide ammunition to the opposition. Economic growth is likely to be halved from about 6% pa to 3% pa, with negative consequences for tax revenues, which will squeeze expenditures for development and poverty alleviation. The opposition will howl if the federal government tries to increase its pie by reducing the financial share of the provinces. If it prints more money, it will fuel inflation that is already surging with rupee devaluation. If it latches on to the IMF for borrowing, it will have to tighten belts further and make political compromises in foreign policy. Yet, amidst this doom and gloom, the PTI has no viable reform policies for privatization of bleeding state enterprises, no consistent policies for ending direct and indirect subsidies to the sugar, fertilizer and similar industries controlled by powerful vested interests, no policies for rationalizing defense expenditures and cutting administrative overheads. It has not demonstrated policies for reviving exports and plugging the balance of payments gap. Businessmen are wringing their hands in despair as production costs rise and consumption declines in an environment of stop-go policies. Direct foreign investment in the manufacturing sector is zilch. And so the story goes on.
Pakistan’s external relations with neighbours India and Afghanistan and superpower America are also in a mess. Despite Islamabad’s Kartarpur initiative and offer of unconditional dialogue, Narendra Modi’s India remains hostile, constantly fomenting terrorism in Balochistan and FATA and threatening surgical strikes across the LoC. This threat is likely to become more potent as the Indian general elections near and Pakistan-bashing becomes an attractive vote-catching option in the far right Hindu heartlands. The situation vis a vis America is more brittle. If Pakistan is unable to bring the Taliban to the table for suitable rapprochement with the US – whose prospects are dim — then Washington may decide to scapegoat Pakistan for its own litany of errors. The blowback from renewed violence and conflict in Afghanistan could strain the security apparatus of the country and trigger political change internally.
Naya Pakistan cannot be built on a framework of propaganda and conflict, bureaucratic inaction and political self-righteousness, insecure borders and diplomatic isolation. The sooner our rulers understand that the demonization of the opposition is not a survival strategy, let alone a substitute for good governance, the better.
Such political engineering is unprecedented. The Miltablishment has a track record of discreetly pulling strings behind the scenes during “democratic” interludes. But this time round it was upfront about it. Similarly, the judiciary has a history of being handmaiden to civilian governments. But this time round it effectively sided with the Miltablishment. Is this an omen of Naya Pakistan?
The political economy forecast for 2109 is bad on most counts. Imran Khan’s coalition governments in Islamabad and Punjab are hanging by the Puppeteer’s threads. Should the PPP and PMLN join hands, it will be all over for the PTI. That they haven’t done so is solely due to the aggressive divide-and-rule strategy of the Miltablishment. One JIT has dragged Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif to jail while another is hounding Asif Zardari and Feryal Talpur from one court to another. It’s a delicate balancing act. If both PPPites are also scalped, the younger Bhutto-Zardari will be forced to pull the plug on the PTI government in Balochistan and on the Senate Chairman just as easily as the elder Zardari set them up in the first place. Both Nawaz and Zardari have great experience in, and resources for, horse trading. The PTI toyed with the prospect of toppling the PPP government in Sindh by getting mileage from the anti-Zardari JIT but was stopped in its tracks by the ever-vigilant SC. The problem is that any “Get Zardari” attack could rebound into a “Get Imran” counter attack with arch nemesis Nawaz Sharif emerging as the biggest winner by default. We are therefore likely to witness many such destabilizing moves by one stakeholder or another as the current balances backed by an army chief and supreme court chief justice are inevitably reviewed, amended, or updated by their successors in the new year.
Bad governance is compounding the PTI’s woes. The administrative reforms pledged by Dr Ishrat Hussain’s well-meaning committee are already in the throes of being strangulated by the PTI’s Young Turks and IK cronies. The maverick finance minister is up the creek. Civil servants in Punjab are in deep freeze, fearful of NAB. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa has been left to its own devices.
A grim economic outlook is bound to add to people’s misery and frustration. It will also provide ammunition to the opposition. Economic growth is likely to be halved from about 6% pa to 3% pa, with negative consequences for tax revenues, which will squeeze expenditures for development and poverty alleviation. The opposition will howl if the federal government tries to increase its pie by reducing the financial share of the provinces. If it prints more money, it will fuel inflation that is already surging with rupee devaluation. If it latches on to the IMF for borrowing, it will have to tighten belts further and make political compromises in foreign policy. Yet, amidst this doom and gloom, the PTI has no viable reform policies for privatization of bleeding state enterprises, no consistent policies for ending direct and indirect subsidies to the sugar, fertilizer and similar industries controlled by powerful vested interests, no policies for rationalizing defense expenditures and cutting administrative overheads. It has not demonstrated policies for reviving exports and plugging the balance of payments gap. Businessmen are wringing their hands in despair as production costs rise and consumption declines in an environment of stop-go policies. Direct foreign investment in the manufacturing sector is zilch. And so the story goes on.
Pakistan’s external relations with neighbours India and Afghanistan and superpower America are also in a mess. Despite Islamabad’s Kartarpur initiative and offer of unconditional dialogue, Narendra Modi’s India remains hostile, constantly fomenting terrorism in Balochistan and FATA and threatening surgical strikes across the LoC. This threat is likely to become more potent as the Indian general elections near and Pakistan-bashing becomes an attractive vote-catching option in the far right Hindu heartlands. The situation vis a vis America is more brittle. If Pakistan is unable to bring the Taliban to the table for suitable rapprochement with the US – whose prospects are dim — then Washington may decide to scapegoat Pakistan for its own litany of errors. The blowback from renewed violence and conflict in Afghanistan could strain the security apparatus of the country and trigger political change internally.
Naya Pakistan cannot be built on a framework of propaganda and conflict, bureaucratic inaction and political self-righteousness, insecure borders and diplomatic isolation. The sooner our rulers understand that the demonization of the opposition is not a survival strategy, let alone a substitute for good governance, the better.