Imran Khan’s team had a bad start, tripping from one error to another. This necessitated a quick rescue operation by the mighty Brass. Why ever not, one might ask, after all, the Brass heaved him into office in the first place and must shoulder responsibility for his actions. Indeed, the Brass has invested so heavily in him – without any credible backup in case he doesn’t deliver – that it really has no option but to prop him up whenever he falters.
The optics were certainly unprecedented. Salutes galore by a line-up of starred generals. Even a photo-op of the PM in the Army Chief’s very own chair. And a guard of honour to boot. The message rang out loud and clear: Watch it! This is our man. He will speak for us. And we will defend him.
But there was another part of the message that was solely aimed at Imran Khan and deliberately kept vague. “He was briefed on national security issues”, we are advised. And why ever not? Isn’t “national security” the overriding concern of the Brass? This includes its budgets for weapons systems, internal security, salaries and pensions. Austerity and accountability are all very well for corrupt civilians but the valiant armed forces are already stretched thin, what with US economic and military assistance having dried up even as the internal and regional environment has become immeasurably more challenging, even hostile. It also implies an unequivocal buy-in by Imran Khan of the Brass’ national security doctrines. The briefing was necessary so that the civil-military leadership could stand united on core issues (Nawaz Sharif paid the price for challenging it). And it was timed to keep the invading American delegation led by the US Secretary of State and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff at bay.
The US-Pak relationship has been stuck in no-man’s land for many years. But President Trump is getting impatient. He wants a “solution” in Afghanistan in line with US interests in the larger Asia-Pacific region. Therefore a “reset” in US-Pak relations is deemed necessary so that “agreements” at the table can be “implemented” on the ground. This is a last-ditch effort to salvage the relationship. But no one is under any illusions, despite the positive gloss presented to its public by Pakistan’s leaders. The US Secretary of State was clear in his own mind: “We still have a long way to go, lots more discussions to be had”.
Washington’s strategic objective in the Asia-Pacific region is to “contain” China. India fits snugly into this objective but Pakistan sticks out like a sore thumb. CPEC is critical to both China and Pakistan. The former wants an alternative trade route to the Middle East and Europe following American attempts to control the Asia-Pacific sea lanes with India’s help. The latter is desperate for Chinese investment in infrastructure to keep its economy afloat. By the same token, the US-India axis is hostile to CPEC. The nature of the state and regime in Afghanistan therefore becomes critical for both Pakistan and China. If Kabul is pro-US-India, it will threaten CPEC and become a platform to destabilize Pakistan’s western borders just as India has done on its eastern borders. The problem for Pakistan is that a pro-Pakistan or even “friendly” Afghanistan is inconceivable in the present circumstances. For a variety of historical reasons, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and most other Afghans, including non-Taliban Pakhtuns, hate Pakistan. Even the Taliban, who are not anti-Pakistan, have strong “ideological” ambitions in the region inimical to Pakistan. So what should Pakistan do?
If, in the quest for a peace settlement in Afghanistan, Pakistan helps the US significantly degrade the Taliban – the one stakeholder which is not anti-Pakistan – and thereby strengthen and consolidate the disparate anti-Pakistan forces in Afghanistan, it will be undermining its own national security in the long term by making one more enemy in the region. If it doesn’t, it risks being destabilized itself by the US-India axis. Thus Pakistan is damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t.
The original Pakistan strategy was to help the Taliban capture Kabul. But 9/11 put paid to Taliban rule. Since then the US-India axis has fought to keep them out of Kabul and Pakistan has hedged its bets by giving them strategic succor. The stalemate has taken a heavy toll of American lives and extracted a huge financial cost. Now it is crunch time. President Trump is desperate to show “positive” results in Afghanistan. But the US-puppet Ghani regime in Kabul is riven with internal fissures and crumbling on the eve of parliamentary and presidential elections while the Taliban are rampant and disinterested in talks that don’t serve their interests.
Meanwhile, Pakistan is extremely vulnerable on two fronts. Its economy is tanking and needs an urgent IMF injection administered by the US. And the new political dispensation engineered by the Brass and led by Imran Khan is too brittle to inspire confidence and hope.
Under these conflicted circumstances, the US-Pak outlook for “resetting” Kabul and Islamabad is not bright.
The optics were certainly unprecedented. Salutes galore by a line-up of starred generals. Even a photo-op of the PM in the Army Chief’s very own chair. And a guard of honour to boot. The message rang out loud and clear: Watch it! This is our man. He will speak for us. And we will defend him.
But there was another part of the message that was solely aimed at Imran Khan and deliberately kept vague. “He was briefed on national security issues”, we are advised. And why ever not? Isn’t “national security” the overriding concern of the Brass? This includes its budgets for weapons systems, internal security, salaries and pensions. Austerity and accountability are all very well for corrupt civilians but the valiant armed forces are already stretched thin, what with US economic and military assistance having dried up even as the internal and regional environment has become immeasurably more challenging, even hostile. It also implies an unequivocal buy-in by Imran Khan of the Brass’ national security doctrines. The briefing was necessary so that the civil-military leadership could stand united on core issues (Nawaz Sharif paid the price for challenging it). And it was timed to keep the invading American delegation led by the US Secretary of State and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff at bay.
The US-Pak relationship has been stuck in no-man’s land for many years. But President Trump is getting impatient. He wants a “solution” in Afghanistan in line with US interests in the larger Asia-Pacific region. Therefore a “reset” in US-Pak relations is deemed necessary so that “agreements” at the table can be “implemented” on the ground. This is a last-ditch effort to salvage the relationship. But no one is under any illusions, despite the positive gloss presented to its public by Pakistan’s leaders. The US Secretary of State was clear in his own mind: “We still have a long way to go, lots more discussions to be had”.
Washington’s strategic objective in the Asia-Pacific region is to “contain” China. India fits snugly into this objective but Pakistan sticks out like a sore thumb. CPEC is critical to both China and Pakistan. The former wants an alternative trade route to the Middle East and Europe following American attempts to control the Asia-Pacific sea lanes with India’s help. The latter is desperate for Chinese investment in infrastructure to keep its economy afloat. By the same token, the US-India axis is hostile to CPEC. The nature of the state and regime in Afghanistan therefore becomes critical for both Pakistan and China. If Kabul is pro-US-India, it will threaten CPEC and become a platform to destabilize Pakistan’s western borders just as India has done on its eastern borders. The problem for Pakistan is that a pro-Pakistan or even “friendly” Afghanistan is inconceivable in the present circumstances. For a variety of historical reasons, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and most other Afghans, including non-Taliban Pakhtuns, hate Pakistan. Even the Taliban, who are not anti-Pakistan, have strong “ideological” ambitions in the region inimical to Pakistan. So what should Pakistan do?
If, in the quest for a peace settlement in Afghanistan, Pakistan helps the US significantly degrade the Taliban – the one stakeholder which is not anti-Pakistan – and thereby strengthen and consolidate the disparate anti-Pakistan forces in Afghanistan, it will be undermining its own national security in the long term by making one more enemy in the region. If it doesn’t, it risks being destabilized itself by the US-India axis. Thus Pakistan is damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t.
The original Pakistan strategy was to help the Taliban capture Kabul. But 9/11 put paid to Taliban rule. Since then the US-India axis has fought to keep them out of Kabul and Pakistan has hedged its bets by giving them strategic succor. The stalemate has taken a heavy toll of American lives and extracted a huge financial cost. Now it is crunch time. President Trump is desperate to show “positive” results in Afghanistan. But the US-puppet Ghani regime in Kabul is riven with internal fissures and crumbling on the eve of parliamentary and presidential elections while the Taliban are rampant and disinterested in talks that don’t serve their interests.
Meanwhile, Pakistan is extremely vulnerable on two fronts. Its economy is tanking and needs an urgent IMF injection administered by the US. And the new political dispensation engineered by the Brass and led by Imran Khan is too brittle to inspire confidence and hope.
Under these conflicted circumstances, the US-Pak outlook for “resetting” Kabul and Islamabad is not bright.