President Trump met his new “best friend,” Kim Jong-un, the North Korean dictator, in Singapore on June 12 in what was billed as a summit meeting that would begin the process of denuclearising North Korea, but seemed more like a replay of his reality TV series.
Having insulted the closest allies of the United States, the other leaders of the G-7 after the meeting held in Canada only two days earlier by reneging on his agreement to the communique (to which he had agreed before he left the meeting to go to Singapore) and called the Canadian prime minister “weak” and “dishonest,” I guess he needed a new best friend. He leans toward dictators as friends, but this may not be a match made in heaven. We’ll see how long it lasts.
Nevertheless, it was a spectacular show while it lasted, the “will he, won’t he” kind that only Trump seems able (or willing) to pull off in US politics. Spectacle, of course, is his primary modus operandi in politics, his way of ensuring the media focus is exclusively on him and avoids reference to the negative information coming from the Mueller investigation and his trashing of many other political norms. It was particularly necessary for him to make sure the summit was a spectacle that would take people’s minds off its results. When he thought that the North Koreans might spoil the spectacle by being nasty, he called it off; but when they showed they wanted a summit as much as he did by backing away from their nasty remarks (which implies to me that they wanted spectacle to replace substance), he reversed course.
Trump wanted a summit he could brag about as the November midterm election approaches. He has hope of stopping or at least minimising the Democratic wave that could be developing. He also wanted it because he is looking to strengthen his standing with Republicans as he begins a frontal attack on the Mueller investigation and try to stop it before it comes to a close and presents its conclusions. He needs the backing of all of his own party in that attack to have a chance of success. If there is a Democratic House after November 6, there will be the threat of impeachment. More importantly, he wants to avoid the danger to cherished policies that a Democratic House would threaten. There must have been a moment too when he savoured the idea that his so-called breakthrough summit with the “hermit kingdom” dictator would bring him the Nobel Prize that some of his more intense followers were predicting. That seems to have faded fast, however.
Kim’s eagerness to engage in this spectacle is easier to understand. He wants be seen in North Korea as well as in the world as able to play in the big leagues and get the recognition that he deserved for bringing the US to the table. This he seemed to have gained for almost nothing, in what some US experts describe as diplomacy in reverse. Past presidents have always held out summits as the reward for tightly negotiated disarmament agreements which merit Presidential imprimatur at completion. This was especially true in North Korea’s case because of its history of failing to negotiate in good faith.
Kim also wants to see sanctions and economic and political pressure on his country reduced so that the lot of the North Korean people can be improved. And most of all, he wants to eliminate the danger of regime change. By seeming to be willing to work toward denuclearising, he might achieve all that. I suspect he envisions a long stretched-out period of negotiation while he makes gains in these areas. Kim had a lot to gain by just showing up, smiling, refraining from calling Trump a “dotard” (which he did last year), and being friendly. It would not surprise me if he intended to negotiate as if he was willing to give up, over time, his nuclear arsenal. And possibly he would agree to cap it at its present or some agreed reasonable level. But I have not heard or seen an expert on North Korea, and we have quite a few, who believes he would ever completely denuclearise. That fear of regime change runs very deep, inherited from his father and grandfather.
So what did we get out of this spectacle called a summit? Clearly the first and by far the most important thing is that the threat of war with North Korea is significantly reduced as long as we are talking. There was among the experts a palpable fear of war when the US and North Korea were in what seemed an escalating verbal slanging match over most of 2017, and given the nature of the Trump administration, this has to be taken seriously. This change from verbal mutual hostility to talking and negotiating is huge in itself and makes the spectacle worthwhile. I think this is the reason so many of the experts are giving it positive reviews - a huge collective sigh of relief and a search in what seems an empty box of so-called results for something that portends that something good will come of it.
If you read the summit declaration, your immediate impression is that it really is an empty box. There is, in what serves as a chapeau, lofty promises from Trump of security guarantees for North Korea and expressions from Kim of unwavering commitment to complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. No specifics are offered. Both affirm four points that appear to be an effort at some specificity, but are mostly just as vague as the chapeau: 1) promising a new era in US-DPRK relations; 2) joint efforts at a lasting peace in the region: North Korea commits to working toward complete denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula (a repeat of the chapeau): and 4) both countries commit to the recovery of the remains of American military personnel still left in North Korea from the 1950-53 war. This latter point is the only tangible gain the US achieved according in the declaration. Over 30,000 Americans were killed in the war and around 8000 bodies were never recovered.
Trump seems to have made a concession that is not in the declaration as he announced after the meeting that he was suspending the annual joint military exercises that the US has conducted with South Korea; they are provocative, he said. One analyst, the odd man out I think, suggested this was the price of North Korea’s suspension of testing nuclear devices and ballistic missiles. But that suspension was announced in mid-April, almost two months before the summit, and if anything was the price North Korea paid to obtain US agreement to a summit. Trump was asked directly at his press conference what he got in return for conceding on the joint exercises, and his answer was vague but seemed to imply that it was the suspension of testing. If that is the case, he paid twice for that suspension, which makes his self-image as a great deal maker somewhat suspect.
Listening to Trump, as he ruminates about five hours of talks with Kim, it seems much of the progress he perceives somehow never got into the declaration. Clearly, in negotiating, as in the rest of his Presidential activities, Trump eschews analysis and ignores fact, and goes on gut instinct. His first two minutes with Kim must have had positive vibes as his reading of the results far outruns the evidence of the declaration. But it was a beginning, and one hopes we have settled in for a long drawn out period of negotiation, which will last far beyond the Trump years. Whether they lead to any serious success on the nuclear issue, talking will obviate the issue of war. The scary possibility is that the lack of any immediate progress on that core issue will frustrate the volatile Trump to the point that he loses patience and we are again at daggers drawn with North Korea.
The author is a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC, and a former US diplomat who was ambassador to Pakistan and Bangladesh
Having insulted the closest allies of the United States, the other leaders of the G-7 after the meeting held in Canada only two days earlier by reneging on his agreement to the communique (to which he had agreed before he left the meeting to go to Singapore) and called the Canadian prime minister “weak” and “dishonest,” I guess he needed a new best friend. He leans toward dictators as friends, but this may not be a match made in heaven. We’ll see how long it lasts.
Nevertheless, it was a spectacular show while it lasted, the “will he, won’t he” kind that only Trump seems able (or willing) to pull off in US politics. Spectacle, of course, is his primary modus operandi in politics, his way of ensuring the media focus is exclusively on him and avoids reference to the negative information coming from the Mueller investigation and his trashing of many other political norms. It was particularly necessary for him to make sure the summit was a spectacle that would take people’s minds off its results. When he thought that the North Koreans might spoil the spectacle by being nasty, he called it off; but when they showed they wanted a summit as much as he did by backing away from their nasty remarks (which implies to me that they wanted spectacle to replace substance), he reversed course.
Trump wanted a summit he could brag about as the November midterm election approaches. He has hope of stopping or at least minimising the Democratic wave that could be developing. He also wanted it because he is looking to strengthen his standing with Republicans as he begins a frontal attack on the Mueller investigation and try to stop it before it comes to a close and presents its conclusions. He needs the backing of all of his own party in that attack to have a chance of success. If there is a Democratic House after November 6, there will be the threat of impeachment. More importantly, he wants to avoid the danger to cherished policies that a Democratic House would threaten. There must have been a moment too when he savoured the idea that his so-called breakthrough summit with the “hermit kingdom” dictator would bring him the Nobel Prize that some of his more intense followers were predicting. That seems to have faded fast, however.
What did we get out of this spectacle called a summit? Clearly the first and by far the most important thing is that the threat of war with North Korea is significantly reduced
Kim’s eagerness to engage in this spectacle is easier to understand. He wants be seen in North Korea as well as in the world as able to play in the big leagues and get the recognition that he deserved for bringing the US to the table. This he seemed to have gained for almost nothing, in what some US experts describe as diplomacy in reverse. Past presidents have always held out summits as the reward for tightly negotiated disarmament agreements which merit Presidential imprimatur at completion. This was especially true in North Korea’s case because of its history of failing to negotiate in good faith.
Kim also wants to see sanctions and economic and political pressure on his country reduced so that the lot of the North Korean people can be improved. And most of all, he wants to eliminate the danger of regime change. By seeming to be willing to work toward denuclearising, he might achieve all that. I suspect he envisions a long stretched-out period of negotiation while he makes gains in these areas. Kim had a lot to gain by just showing up, smiling, refraining from calling Trump a “dotard” (which he did last year), and being friendly. It would not surprise me if he intended to negotiate as if he was willing to give up, over time, his nuclear arsenal. And possibly he would agree to cap it at its present or some agreed reasonable level. But I have not heard or seen an expert on North Korea, and we have quite a few, who believes he would ever completely denuclearise. That fear of regime change runs very deep, inherited from his father and grandfather.
So what did we get out of this spectacle called a summit? Clearly the first and by far the most important thing is that the threat of war with North Korea is significantly reduced as long as we are talking. There was among the experts a palpable fear of war when the US and North Korea were in what seemed an escalating verbal slanging match over most of 2017, and given the nature of the Trump administration, this has to be taken seriously. This change from verbal mutual hostility to talking and negotiating is huge in itself and makes the spectacle worthwhile. I think this is the reason so many of the experts are giving it positive reviews - a huge collective sigh of relief and a search in what seems an empty box of so-called results for something that portends that something good will come of it.
If you read the summit declaration, your immediate impression is that it really is an empty box. There is, in what serves as a chapeau, lofty promises from Trump of security guarantees for North Korea and expressions from Kim of unwavering commitment to complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. No specifics are offered. Both affirm four points that appear to be an effort at some specificity, but are mostly just as vague as the chapeau: 1) promising a new era in US-DPRK relations; 2) joint efforts at a lasting peace in the region: North Korea commits to working toward complete denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula (a repeat of the chapeau): and 4) both countries commit to the recovery of the remains of American military personnel still left in North Korea from the 1950-53 war. This latter point is the only tangible gain the US achieved according in the declaration. Over 30,000 Americans were killed in the war and around 8000 bodies were never recovered.
Trump seems to have made a concession that is not in the declaration as he announced after the meeting that he was suspending the annual joint military exercises that the US has conducted with South Korea; they are provocative, he said. One analyst, the odd man out I think, suggested this was the price of North Korea’s suspension of testing nuclear devices and ballistic missiles. But that suspension was announced in mid-April, almost two months before the summit, and if anything was the price North Korea paid to obtain US agreement to a summit. Trump was asked directly at his press conference what he got in return for conceding on the joint exercises, and his answer was vague but seemed to imply that it was the suspension of testing. If that is the case, he paid twice for that suspension, which makes his self-image as a great deal maker somewhat suspect.
Listening to Trump, as he ruminates about five hours of talks with Kim, it seems much of the progress he perceives somehow never got into the declaration. Clearly, in negotiating, as in the rest of his Presidential activities, Trump eschews analysis and ignores fact, and goes on gut instinct. His first two minutes with Kim must have had positive vibes as his reading of the results far outruns the evidence of the declaration. But it was a beginning, and one hopes we have settled in for a long drawn out period of negotiation, which will last far beyond the Trump years. Whether they lead to any serious success on the nuclear issue, talking will obviate the issue of war. The scary possibility is that the lack of any immediate progress on that core issue will frustrate the volatile Trump to the point that he loses patience and we are again at daggers drawn with North Korea.
The author is a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC, and a former US diplomat who was ambassador to Pakistan and Bangladesh