Things are unbearably heating up on both sides of the Durand Line. The danger is palpable that this time round things will get far worse than expected with probably no thaw in between. Two terrible suicide bombings in Kabul have utterly dissipated any confidence the Afghan authorities held in the ability of their security forces. The surprise visit of a high-powered delegation to Islamabad exposes both the anger and helplessness felt in official circles in Kabul.
The recent outrage in Kabul resulted in the deaths of nearly 200 people. An attack on the Intercontinental Hotel was aimed at frightening the presence of foreigners but the most unnerving assault was on Marshal Fahim Military Training Academy (known as ‘Sandhurst in the Sand’ due to its British affiliation) that appears to have spurred Afghan leadership to make a dash for Islamabad.
The visit by Afghan Interior Minister Wais Ahmad Barmak and chief of the National Directorate of Security intelligence agency, Masoom Stanekzai, who was injured in a suicide attack that killed former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, came just after Pakistan handed over 27 insurgents to the Afghan authorities in November 2017, including members of the dreaded Haqqani network.
The Afghan delegation pointed at what they say is the Pakistani connection in the renewed terrorist spree. This much was also claimed by Afghanistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN Mahmoud Saikal. He tweeted that the father of one of the insurgents involved in the assault on Intercontinental Hotel, Abdul Qahar, who is in the custody of the Afghan authorities, “conceded his son was trained in Chaman in Balochistan...” The delegation brought with it documentary evidence and phone tap information linking Afghan groups considered to be involved in the Kabul attacks.
The accusatory brief of the Afghan delegation is in actual fact an attempt to sidetrack many unpalatable facts it faces. It is commonly known that around 70% of Afghan territory is under the armed influence of Islamist forces. Following the strategy of the 1990s, Islamist forces are trying to zero in on Kabul as was done by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Masood. They are desperate to capture Kabul and the only way to do this is to use indirect tactics to avoid US forces. Moreover, it is quite understandable that by attacking Kabul Afghan resistance forces are hedging against indiscriminate US aerial strikes, particularly the ‘mother of all bombs’, an 11 ton device dropped on eastern Afghanistan on April 13, 2017.
To add to the woes of a bickering Afghan national government are the US force commanders who consistently shun direct engagement to avoid sending body bags back home. This exposes seven corps (6 field and 1 commando corps) of the Western-trained, inexperienced and brittle Afghan national army, forcing it to perform beyond its capacity. As a result, it has failed to overcome the ever-increasing insurgency despite the Afghan army’s countrywide spread with 201 corps garrisoning Kabul, 203 Gardez, 205 Kandahar, 207 Heart, 209 Mazar-e-Sharif and 215 Lashkargah.
Furthermore, the deeply entrenched warlord system is flouting the writ of the national government as Atta Mohammad Noor, the governor of the strategically important northern province of Balkh, refused to step down despite President Ashraf Ghani’s orders. The prominent warlord Rashid Dostum, a former defence minister, has sought asylum in Turkey. It may very well be inferred that such internal fissures do not require foreign intervention to create instability.
Pakistan has not much to gain by abetting terrorist activity in Afghanistan for the simple reason that it can ill afford imminent retaliation as it is already grappling with indigenous fissiparous forces.
The Afghans accused dissident Afghan groups operating from Pakistan for outrages, an uncontrollable activity perpetrated by anti-Pakistan forces from inside Afghanistan that Pakistan is also the victim of. Pakistan’s reaction to build a border fence is an anathema to Afghanistan as it champions the cause of uninterrupted movement of divided Pashtun families living on both sides of the border.
The content of the Afghan delegation on an urgent visit once again highlights the fact that even though both countries are reeling from violence they cannot dispel the clouds of mutual suspicion hovering over their intentions.
Pakistan, being far ahead of Afghanistan in terms of institutional development and national consolidation, has every reason to be wary of Indian designs in Afghanistan that fuel strong anti-Pakistan bias there. But Afghan apprehensions about a violence-weary Pakistan seeking to neutralize the source of strife emanating from its porous border with Afghanistan are indeed incomprehensible.
It appears that Pakistan has learned the hard way but Afghanistan, badly entangled in unyielding notions of its past, is not willing to. It is Afghanistan that is complicating relations in the region by gladly welcoming Indian influence, a policy that speaks of inbred animosity it harbours for Pakistan. That it is encouraged to follow such a policy as a cardinal US requirement exacerbates an already fragile regional matrix.
It is quite apparent that Afghanistan faces a similar set of problems with Pakistan—irredentist, ethnic and commercial—as Pakistan has with India, and India, in turn, has with China. But it cannot be denied that Pakistan is ringed by a hostile India to the east and untrustworthy Afghanistan to the west. To make matters worse, Pakistan’s rivalry with India warps every other consideration while conducting foreign relations. Both relationships are nerve-wracking as they have negatively impacted Pakistan since its very inception.
In the wake of the current developments Afghanistan is more of a threat than an opportunity. It has decisively tilted towards India as is evident from the fanfare opening of Chabahar Port aimed at bypassing Karachi and providing direct access to Afghanistan through its port in Gujrat that is a full 600-kilometer shorter route. Afghan Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah gleefully termed this development getting rid of ‘shackles’ imposed by Pakistan.
Pakistan’s countermove is to send a toned-down delegation headed by Foreign Secretary Tehmina Janjua to Kabul aimed at assuaging Afghanistan’s heightened paranoia. Keeping in view the desperate situation the Afghan government is in, portents for the return visit do not appear bright. The worrying aspect for Pakistan pertains to a renewed US-Afghan-India push to endanger and isolate Pakistan further.
The recent outrage in Kabul resulted in the deaths of nearly 200 people. An attack on the Intercontinental Hotel was aimed at frightening the presence of foreigners but the most unnerving assault was on Marshal Fahim Military Training Academy (known as ‘Sandhurst in the Sand’ due to its British affiliation) that appears to have spurred Afghan leadership to make a dash for Islamabad.
The visit by Afghan Interior Minister Wais Ahmad Barmak and chief of the National Directorate of Security intelligence agency, Masoom Stanekzai, who was injured in a suicide attack that killed former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, came just after Pakistan handed over 27 insurgents to the Afghan authorities in November 2017, including members of the dreaded Haqqani network.
Islamist forces are trying to zero in on Kabul as was done by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Masood
The Afghan delegation pointed at what they say is the Pakistani connection in the renewed terrorist spree. This much was also claimed by Afghanistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN Mahmoud Saikal. He tweeted that the father of one of the insurgents involved in the assault on Intercontinental Hotel, Abdul Qahar, who is in the custody of the Afghan authorities, “conceded his son was trained in Chaman in Balochistan...” The delegation brought with it documentary evidence and phone tap information linking Afghan groups considered to be involved in the Kabul attacks.
The accusatory brief of the Afghan delegation is in actual fact an attempt to sidetrack many unpalatable facts it faces. It is commonly known that around 70% of Afghan territory is under the armed influence of Islamist forces. Following the strategy of the 1990s, Islamist forces are trying to zero in on Kabul as was done by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Masood. They are desperate to capture Kabul and the only way to do this is to use indirect tactics to avoid US forces. Moreover, it is quite understandable that by attacking Kabul Afghan resistance forces are hedging against indiscriminate US aerial strikes, particularly the ‘mother of all bombs’, an 11 ton device dropped on eastern Afghanistan on April 13, 2017.
To add to the woes of a bickering Afghan national government are the US force commanders who consistently shun direct engagement to avoid sending body bags back home. This exposes seven corps (6 field and 1 commando corps) of the Western-trained, inexperienced and brittle Afghan national army, forcing it to perform beyond its capacity. As a result, it has failed to overcome the ever-increasing insurgency despite the Afghan army’s countrywide spread with 201 corps garrisoning Kabul, 203 Gardez, 205 Kandahar, 207 Heart, 209 Mazar-e-Sharif and 215 Lashkargah.
The accusatory brief of the Afghan delegation is in actual fact an attempt to sidetrack many unpalatable facts it faces. It is commonly known that around 70% of Afghan territory is under the armed influence of Islamist forces
Furthermore, the deeply entrenched warlord system is flouting the writ of the national government as Atta Mohammad Noor, the governor of the strategically important northern province of Balkh, refused to step down despite President Ashraf Ghani’s orders. The prominent warlord Rashid Dostum, a former defence minister, has sought asylum in Turkey. It may very well be inferred that such internal fissures do not require foreign intervention to create instability.
Pakistan has not much to gain by abetting terrorist activity in Afghanistan for the simple reason that it can ill afford imminent retaliation as it is already grappling with indigenous fissiparous forces.
The Afghans accused dissident Afghan groups operating from Pakistan for outrages, an uncontrollable activity perpetrated by anti-Pakistan forces from inside Afghanistan that Pakistan is also the victim of. Pakistan’s reaction to build a border fence is an anathema to Afghanistan as it champions the cause of uninterrupted movement of divided Pashtun families living on both sides of the border.
The content of the Afghan delegation on an urgent visit once again highlights the fact that even though both countries are reeling from violence they cannot dispel the clouds of mutual suspicion hovering over their intentions.
Pakistan, being far ahead of Afghanistan in terms of institutional development and national consolidation, has every reason to be wary of Indian designs in Afghanistan that fuel strong anti-Pakistan bias there. But Afghan apprehensions about a violence-weary Pakistan seeking to neutralize the source of strife emanating from its porous border with Afghanistan are indeed incomprehensible.
It appears that Pakistan has learned the hard way but Afghanistan, badly entangled in unyielding notions of its past, is not willing to. It is Afghanistan that is complicating relations in the region by gladly welcoming Indian influence, a policy that speaks of inbred animosity it harbours for Pakistan. That it is encouraged to follow such a policy as a cardinal US requirement exacerbates an already fragile regional matrix.
It is quite apparent that Afghanistan faces a similar set of problems with Pakistan—irredentist, ethnic and commercial—as Pakistan has with India, and India, in turn, has with China. But it cannot be denied that Pakistan is ringed by a hostile India to the east and untrustworthy Afghanistan to the west. To make matters worse, Pakistan’s rivalry with India warps every other consideration while conducting foreign relations. Both relationships are nerve-wracking as they have negatively impacted Pakistan since its very inception.
In the wake of the current developments Afghanistan is more of a threat than an opportunity. It has decisively tilted towards India as is evident from the fanfare opening of Chabahar Port aimed at bypassing Karachi and providing direct access to Afghanistan through its port in Gujrat that is a full 600-kilometer shorter route. Afghan Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah gleefully termed this development getting rid of ‘shackles’ imposed by Pakistan.
Pakistan’s countermove is to send a toned-down delegation headed by Foreign Secretary Tehmina Janjua to Kabul aimed at assuaging Afghanistan’s heightened paranoia. Keeping in view the desperate situation the Afghan government is in, portents for the return visit do not appear bright. The worrying aspect for Pakistan pertains to a renewed US-Afghan-India push to endanger and isolate Pakistan further.