The State of Pakistan may have finally emerged from being in denial about the presence of Daish on its territory to at least acknowledging that it is an enemy at the gates: This week, the military started its largest known operation, Khyber-IV, against Daish in Rajgal Valley of Khyber Agency. Daish is the Arabic acronym for Islamic State group or ISIS.
The operation, which involves up to 3,000 troops backed by the artillery, army aviation helicopters and Pakistan Air Force, would seek to cleanse an area covering roughly 17kms by 15kms of terrorists who have established hideouts there because of its extremely difficult terrain and thick forest cover. Though there have already been three operations in Khyber Agency, and one in this particular valley, as ISPR Director-General Maj Gen Asif Ghafoor said, “the pocket” was a leftover task.
The fear this time is that a motley crew of terrorist groups with sanctuaries in Rajgal, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Jamaatul Ahrar, and Mangal Bagh’s Lashkar-e-Islami, could team up with Daish that has established its stronghold in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar across the border (as the Khorasan chapter of the Middle Eastern terrorist group). The military believes that Khyber-IV would prevent “Daish influence” from coming over to this side.
At the same time, Maj. Gen. Ghafoor acknowledged, however, that they had found linkages between the Parachinar bomb blasts in June to the group based on the Afghan side of the border. Three earlier attacks in Parachinar too, it is believed, were executed on its orders. This implies that a connection already exists between Daish in Afghanistan and terrorist groups operating here. It is worth recalling that US top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John Nicholson, had mentioned that Daish’s core in Afghanistan is made up of Pakistani terrorists, in a Congressional testimony earlier in February this year.
Therefore, the problem is much more complicated than just pre-empting Daish’s entry to Pakistan. Furthermore, difficult terrain and forests in the area would make an actual battle in Rajgal tough.
Rewind to the first week of June this year. The Army conducted an operation against the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami, one of Daish’s local affiliates, in the Isplinji caves near Mastung for days. In an announcement then, the ISPR had said that the operation had denied the “establishment of any direct/indirect ISIS-organized infrastructure in Balochistan/Pakistan”. The operation, which was originally meant to rescue Chinese hostages, was officially said to have targeted the group that attacked the convoy of Senate Deputy Chairman Abdul Ghafoor Hyderi. Daish claimed responsibility for this May 12 attack on the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-F legislator.
The argument here is that no matter how much we sugarcoat the problem by denying its existence, it is a reality that Daish has some sort of existence here, whether direct or through affiliates or in the shape of unconnected supporters of its extremist ideology. A conservative estimate by a London-based think tank, the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, estimates that there could be at least 2,000 to 3,000 Daish members in Pakistan. Leaked official Pakistani documents give a higher number, but the government and military’s mantra has been that Daish has no organized presence here.
It is generally believed that the group’s support network is much bigger than indicated by the usually quoted figures. Its sectarian agenda and resourcefulness have inspired individual extremists and organizations to associate with it ever since it first set foot in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region in late 2014.
Daish and its affiliates have over the past two years claimed about a dozen attacks, ranging from assassinations to bombings. This year it has claimed Sehwan, Mastung and Parachinar, indicating that they are becoming more lethal. The uptick in terrorist activity of the group which has suffered major setbacks in Iraq and Syria, its birthplace, is meant to strengthen its jihadist credentials by attacking Shia minorities, Christians, security men, government functionaries and Chinese interests. Intelligence sources suggest that it is also under pressure from Middle Eastern donors to increase its visibility here after losing ground in Iraq and Syria. Much as it was in Afghanistan, although not on the same scale, Daish elements here have been taking on the Afghan Taliban as proven by the assassination of some Taliban commanders.
The various actions taken against Daish in Pakistan have fallen mostly in the military domain. However, in view of their significant support base in our society, particularly in urban areas, a civilian-led national effort is needed to counter its propaganda, which has been helping it recruit, and to prevent it from exploiting sectarian faultlines. This element is noticeably missing from the strategy to fight the group.
The writer is a freelance journalist based in Islamabad and tweets at @bokhari_mr
The operation, which involves up to 3,000 troops backed by the artillery, army aviation helicopters and Pakistan Air Force, would seek to cleanse an area covering roughly 17kms by 15kms of terrorists who have established hideouts there because of its extremely difficult terrain and thick forest cover. Though there have already been three operations in Khyber Agency, and one in this particular valley, as ISPR Director-General Maj Gen Asif Ghafoor said, “the pocket” was a leftover task.
The fear this time is that a motley crew of terrorist groups with sanctuaries in Rajgal, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Jamaatul Ahrar, and Mangal Bagh’s Lashkar-e-Islami, could team up with Daish that has established its stronghold in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar across the border (as the Khorasan chapter of the Middle Eastern terrorist group). The military believes that Khyber-IV would prevent “Daish influence” from coming over to this side.
At the same time, Maj. Gen. Ghafoor acknowledged, however, that they had found linkages between the Parachinar bomb blasts in June to the group based on the Afghan side of the border. Three earlier attacks in Parachinar too, it is believed, were executed on its orders. This implies that a connection already exists between Daish in Afghanistan and terrorist groups operating here. It is worth recalling that US top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John Nicholson, had mentioned that Daish’s core in Afghanistan is made up of Pakistani terrorists, in a Congressional testimony earlier in February this year.
Therefore, the problem is much more complicated than just pre-empting Daish’s entry to Pakistan. Furthermore, difficult terrain and forests in the area would make an actual battle in Rajgal tough.
Rewind to the first week of June this year. The Army conducted an operation against the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami, one of Daish’s local affiliates, in the Isplinji caves near Mastung for days. In an announcement then, the ISPR had said that the operation had denied the “establishment of any direct/indirect ISIS-organized infrastructure in Balochistan/Pakistan”. The operation, which was originally meant to rescue Chinese hostages, was officially said to have targeted the group that attacked the convoy of Senate Deputy Chairman Abdul Ghafoor Hyderi. Daish claimed responsibility for this May 12 attack on the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-F legislator.
The argument here is that no matter how much we sugarcoat the problem by denying its existence, it is a reality that Daish has some sort of existence here, whether direct or through affiliates or in the shape of unconnected supporters of its extremist ideology. A conservative estimate by a London-based think tank, the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, estimates that there could be at least 2,000 to 3,000 Daish members in Pakistan. Leaked official Pakistani documents give a higher number, but the government and military’s mantra has been that Daish has no organized presence here.
It is generally believed that the group’s support network is much bigger than indicated by the usually quoted figures. Its sectarian agenda and resourcefulness have inspired individual extremists and organizations to associate with it ever since it first set foot in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region in late 2014.
Daish and its affiliates have over the past two years claimed about a dozen attacks, ranging from assassinations to bombings. This year it has claimed Sehwan, Mastung and Parachinar, indicating that they are becoming more lethal. The uptick in terrorist activity of the group which has suffered major setbacks in Iraq and Syria, its birthplace, is meant to strengthen its jihadist credentials by attacking Shia minorities, Christians, security men, government functionaries and Chinese interests. Intelligence sources suggest that it is also under pressure from Middle Eastern donors to increase its visibility here after losing ground in Iraq and Syria. Much as it was in Afghanistan, although not on the same scale, Daish elements here have been taking on the Afghan Taliban as proven by the assassination of some Taliban commanders.
The various actions taken against Daish in Pakistan have fallen mostly in the military domain. However, in view of their significant support base in our society, particularly in urban areas, a civilian-led national effort is needed to counter its propaganda, which has been helping it recruit, and to prevent it from exploiting sectarian faultlines. This element is noticeably missing from the strategy to fight the group.
The writer is a freelance journalist based in Islamabad and tweets at @bokhari_mr