For the last few weeks, and particularly since the disclosure on a TV talk show by our defense minister that the government has agreed in principle to allow Gen. Raheel Sharif to accept the leadership of the Saudi-sponsored Islamic Army, there has been an outpouring of concern by virtually every columnist and TV commentator. The eloquent denunciations rest on the fact that this army is being created to bolster Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners as they seek to reduce the advance of Iranian influence, perceived as dangerously pervasive in Syria, Iraq Yemen, Bahrain Lebanon etc.
Pakistan, as a neighbour of Iran and as the home of a substantial Shia minority, has always valued its relationship with Iran. Equally importantly, it has always, in its 70 years of existence, stayed away from taking sides in any intra-Arab or intra-Muslim quarrel, offering in every such case, to act as a neutral mediator. Much emphasis was laid on the fact that this was the position reiterated by our Parliament when the question of Saudi Arabia and the UAE seeking our assistance in the war in Yemen came up. And no one spoke of changing this position even when there was public criticism of Pakistan’s decision from UAE leaders and implicit threats of the UAE downgrading its relations with Pakistan.
The criticism and warnings are all based on the premise that there is no chance of Iran and the GCC or Iran and the larger Arab world working out a modus vivendi or effecting some sort of a reconciliation. This may well turn out to be true but in accepting this premise, our commentators have failed to take note of some significant developments on the ground.
Let me list them.
First, after the break in diplomatic relations prompted by the attack on Saudi diplomatic offices—only the UAE and Qatar among the GCC countries followed the Saudi lead—the strain in relations was exacerbated by the failure of Saudi and Iranian negotiators to agree on the terms for Iranian participation in the annual Haj, thus depriving Iranians of the right to fulfill one of the basic requirements of our faith. This year an agreement has been reached that 80,000 pilgrims will come from Iran to perform Hajj. It can be assumed that as is normal the negotiations, while primarily for Hajj, also covered other elements of the relationship. Results are not known but one can assume that a certain degree of understanding of each other’s positions may have resulted. Iran’s foreign minister Jawad Zarif also paid a visit to Qatar and statements issued thereafter suggested that enhanced ties were agreed upon.
Second, two GCC members Kuwait and Oman retained their ties with Iran. They, I believe, were responsible for proposing a strategic dialogue to Iran on behalf of the GCC. The Kuwaiti deputy foreign minister said, while briefing the press on March 27, that President Rouhani had responded to the GCC proposal and that the response would be discussed at the GCC ministerial meeting on March 30. Obviously, no such announcement would have been made had the Rouhani response not contained positive elements. It is true that after the March 30 meeting no announcement has been made of how the GCC ministers reacted but it is evident that they are mulling over the response and have not rejected it.
Third, there were reports that during his March visit to Iran, Sartaj Aziz had raised the question of the Saudi request for the deputation of Gen. Raheel Sharif. We do not know if this is true but it is unfortunate that none of our worthy commentators took the trouble of asking this question at the Foreign Office spokesman’s press conference in late March. The spokesman dismissed the subject of Raheel Sharif by maintaining that the defense minister had said all that needed to be said. There is, to my mind, a possibility that given Iran’s own fractured polity—accentuated by the preparation for the next election and the uncertainties of the US-Iran relationship—he got an equivocal response but not a rejection.
Fourth, after a long period of diplomatic estrangement, Saudi Arabia sent its foreign minister to Iraq and he then promised that an ambassador would be sent shortly. The editor-in-chief of the Saudi newspaper Al-Hayat said, “the visit of a senior Saudi politician such as Jubeir to Iraq holds great meaning. [Saudi Arabia] is reaching out to bring Iraq back to its Arab milieu, after Iran has sought to set a wall between it and its Arab brothers.” The visit was an acknowledgement that Iraq was an Arab country with whom relations had to be maintained even if the reins of power had shifted from the Sunni minority to the Shia majority. The Saudis appreciate that for Iraq’s Shias being Arab is as important in the Arab-Ajam context as the faith that they share with Iranian co-religionists. They are also aware of the factions within Shia Iraq’s fractious polity who chafe at the perceived inordinate influence Iran’s military commanders and political commissars have secured in Iraq.
On the other hand, in Lebanon a Saudi favourite Hariri has been elected prime minister but in securing this office Hariri has had to accept Hezbollah as a coalition partner to whom cabinet portfolios will have to be allocated. The GCC ministers decided to name Hezbollah a terrorist organisation but at the same time they may want to strengthen Hariri’s hand in Lebanese politics and Saudi Arabia may decide in this context to invite Hariri and discuss with him the resumption of the $4 billion package of assistance for the Lebanese army that it had decided to suspend. Would this really reduce the influence of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics and by extension its ability to reinforce Bashar in Syria? It is difficult to say.
Sixth, there is resumed talk of creating an Arab army probably being propelled by the Trump Administration. For Trump, who is to meet President Sisi shortly, the ideal would be an Arab army allied with Israel to combat the “Iranian Threat”. The Arab countries have just repeated to Israel their earlier offer of recognition and normal relations if Israel were to agree to a Palestinian State based on the 1967 borders. Of course, Israel will not agree and therefore the question will be whether Arab leaders will risk the ire of their people and arrive at any sort of alliance with Israel.
These are the moves that have been made on the Middle East chessboard that I believe are relevant to the question of whether the GCC is willing to move towards a modus vivendi with Iran. It is not certain but it is not something that can be ruled out on the basis of publicly available information. Perhaps the discussions our leaders and diplomats have had with regional leaders may point in a different direction but for those who do not have access to classified material it would be reasonable to think that neither side is entirely averse to reconciliation.
Does Pakistan then have the possibility of playing a mediatory role and if so, would this be facilitated by the leadership of the anti-terrorist—specifically Daesh and Al-Qaeda—role envisaged for the so-called Islamic army?
The Saudi-proposed Islamic army has been dubbed a “phantom army”. This is entirely accurate if we are thinking of the army as being an army with its own barracks and cantonments. But that is not what such alliances are about even when they are purely military. The two examples one can look at are NATO and the defunct Warsaw Pact. In both there was first a decision in principle and then through a relatively slow process each member country earmarked certain units (army, navy and air force) that could be called upon by the Pact leaders. In the case of NATO this was SACEUR-Supreme Allied Commander in Europe who had a multi-national staff in his headquarters but who had no troops at his immediate disposal at his headquarters.
The Islamic Army is similarly going to have only a headquarter in Saudi Arabia or wherever is finally decided upon but it will have no troops attached to it. If troops are sent to Saudi Arabia by any country this will be on the basis of bilateral agreements such as those concluded by the US with Germany after it ceased to be an occupation army sharing occupation responsibilities with the Russians, the British and the French.
But here the similarity with NATO will or should end if the leadership is clear that the purpose of the alliance is anti-terror and the terrorist groups to be targeted are Daesh and Al-Qaeda. For this limited purpose it will be visualised that each of the alliance members will have to tackle the problem of extremists in their country and the connections they have or seek to establish with the central organs of these two bodies. They will have to share intelligence on such elements as they have identified and the means they employ to spread their extremist and communal message (social media, meeting places such as mosques or in some countries shrines) and separately and jointly devise methods to thwart these efforts. Above all, they will have to involve religious leaders to help put together “deradicalisation” programmes. For countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia sermons and “fatwas” from Middle Eastern religious leaders whose writings have earned them a following would perhaps be effective.
It would be extremely foolish to imagine that this alliance would mean joint deployment in countries where Daesh still holds territory: Iraq and Syria. This task is being undertaken, as it should be by the Iraqis and the Syrians (where you have a civil war situation with a Daesh overlay) with the deep involvement of outside forces which no Islamic alliance can hope to match. The physical involvement of Pakistani forces in Yemen or in any other intra-Arab quarrel has been settled by the Pakistan Parliament. This will also be the position of countries like Malaysia and Indonesia. What can and should happen is that as the alliance leaders devise a programme for “winning hearts and minds” they shared them with both these countries. And as internal problems in these countries are resolved, or even earlier, they too can become members to fight the common enemy.
Let me conclude this part by emphasizing that as the alliance takes shape Pakistan’s and therefore Raheel Sharif’s participation must be made conditional on the acceptance of the premise that the alliance is against Daesh and Al-Qaeda, that Iran too is an Islamic country that views these organisations as the “common enemy” and that the ultimate objective of the alliance is not to oppose Iran but to develop common cause with Iran to oppose the “common enemy”. If this premise cannot be agreed upon, then Pakistan must not participate.
Postscript: Iran’s ambassador to Iran in an interview to an Iranian news agency confirmed that Iran had been informed of the Raheel Sharif proposal but that Iran had reservations about the alliance which it had not been asked to join. This Iranian statement came many days after the Sartaj Aziz visit to Iran and reflects, in my view, the differences which exist in Iran’s polity and does not therefore affect the basic thrust of my assessment of the Iranian position.
[Next week, in part II of this article, the history and present state of relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and between Pakistan and Iran.]
The writer is a former foreign secretary and has served as ambassador to the US and Iran, among other key appointments. He lectures at NDU and has written extensively on Pakistan and international relations
Pakistan, as a neighbour of Iran and as the home of a substantial Shia minority, has always valued its relationship with Iran. Equally importantly, it has always, in its 70 years of existence, stayed away from taking sides in any intra-Arab or intra-Muslim quarrel, offering in every such case, to act as a neutral mediator. Much emphasis was laid on the fact that this was the position reiterated by our Parliament when the question of Saudi Arabia and the UAE seeking our assistance in the war in Yemen came up. And no one spoke of changing this position even when there was public criticism of Pakistan’s decision from UAE leaders and implicit threats of the UAE downgrading its relations with Pakistan.
The Saudi-proposed Islamic army has been dubbed a "phantom army". This is entirely accurate if we are thinking of the army as being an army with its own barracks and cantonments. But that is not what such alliances are about even when they are purely military. The two examples one can look at are NATO and the defunct Warsaw Pact
The criticism and warnings are all based on the premise that there is no chance of Iran and the GCC or Iran and the larger Arab world working out a modus vivendi or effecting some sort of a reconciliation. This may well turn out to be true but in accepting this premise, our commentators have failed to take note of some significant developments on the ground.
Let me list them.
First, after the break in diplomatic relations prompted by the attack on Saudi diplomatic offices—only the UAE and Qatar among the GCC countries followed the Saudi lead—the strain in relations was exacerbated by the failure of Saudi and Iranian negotiators to agree on the terms for Iranian participation in the annual Haj, thus depriving Iranians of the right to fulfill one of the basic requirements of our faith. This year an agreement has been reached that 80,000 pilgrims will come from Iran to perform Hajj. It can be assumed that as is normal the negotiations, while primarily for Hajj, also covered other elements of the relationship. Results are not known but one can assume that a certain degree of understanding of each other’s positions may have resulted. Iran’s foreign minister Jawad Zarif also paid a visit to Qatar and statements issued thereafter suggested that enhanced ties were agreed upon.
Second, two GCC members Kuwait and Oman retained their ties with Iran. They, I believe, were responsible for proposing a strategic dialogue to Iran on behalf of the GCC. The Kuwaiti deputy foreign minister said, while briefing the press on March 27, that President Rouhani had responded to the GCC proposal and that the response would be discussed at the GCC ministerial meeting on March 30. Obviously, no such announcement would have been made had the Rouhani response not contained positive elements. It is true that after the March 30 meeting no announcement has been made of how the GCC ministers reacted but it is evident that they are mulling over the response and have not rejected it.
Third, there were reports that during his March visit to Iran, Sartaj Aziz had raised the question of the Saudi request for the deputation of Gen. Raheel Sharif. We do not know if this is true but it is unfortunate that none of our worthy commentators took the trouble of asking this question at the Foreign Office spokesman’s press conference in late March. The spokesman dismissed the subject of Raheel Sharif by maintaining that the defense minister had said all that needed to be said. There is, to my mind, a possibility that given Iran’s own fractured polity—accentuated by the preparation for the next election and the uncertainties of the US-Iran relationship—he got an equivocal response but not a rejection.
Fourth, after a long period of diplomatic estrangement, Saudi Arabia sent its foreign minister to Iraq and he then promised that an ambassador would be sent shortly. The editor-in-chief of the Saudi newspaper Al-Hayat said, “the visit of a senior Saudi politician such as Jubeir to Iraq holds great meaning. [Saudi Arabia] is reaching out to bring Iraq back to its Arab milieu, after Iran has sought to set a wall between it and its Arab brothers.” The visit was an acknowledgement that Iraq was an Arab country with whom relations had to be maintained even if the reins of power had shifted from the Sunni minority to the Shia majority. The Saudis appreciate that for Iraq’s Shias being Arab is as important in the Arab-Ajam context as the faith that they share with Iranian co-religionists. They are also aware of the factions within Shia Iraq’s fractious polity who chafe at the perceived inordinate influence Iran’s military commanders and political commissars have secured in Iraq.
On the other hand, in Lebanon a Saudi favourite Hariri has been elected prime minister but in securing this office Hariri has had to accept Hezbollah as a coalition partner to whom cabinet portfolios will have to be allocated. The GCC ministers decided to name Hezbollah a terrorist organisation but at the same time they may want to strengthen Hariri’s hand in Lebanese politics and Saudi Arabia may decide in this context to invite Hariri and discuss with him the resumption of the $4 billion package of assistance for the Lebanese army that it had decided to suspend. Would this really reduce the influence of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics and by extension its ability to reinforce Bashar in Syria? It is difficult to say.
Sixth, there is resumed talk of creating an Arab army probably being propelled by the Trump Administration. For Trump, who is to meet President Sisi shortly, the ideal would be an Arab army allied with Israel to combat the “Iranian Threat”. The Arab countries have just repeated to Israel their earlier offer of recognition and normal relations if Israel were to agree to a Palestinian State based on the 1967 borders. Of course, Israel will not agree and therefore the question will be whether Arab leaders will risk the ire of their people and arrive at any sort of alliance with Israel.
Note these developments: after an agreement this year, 80,000 pilgrims will come from Iran to perform Hajj; Kuwait and Oman retained ties with Iran and may have suggested strategic dialogue with it to the GCC; after a long period of diplomatic estrangement, Saudi Arabia sent its foreign minister to Iraq and promised an ambassador shortly
These are the moves that have been made on the Middle East chessboard that I believe are relevant to the question of whether the GCC is willing to move towards a modus vivendi with Iran. It is not certain but it is not something that can be ruled out on the basis of publicly available information. Perhaps the discussions our leaders and diplomats have had with regional leaders may point in a different direction but for those who do not have access to classified material it would be reasonable to think that neither side is entirely averse to reconciliation.
Does Pakistan then have the possibility of playing a mediatory role and if so, would this be facilitated by the leadership of the anti-terrorist—specifically Daesh and Al-Qaeda—role envisaged for the so-called Islamic army?
The Saudi-proposed Islamic army has been dubbed a “phantom army”. This is entirely accurate if we are thinking of the army as being an army with its own barracks and cantonments. But that is not what such alliances are about even when they are purely military. The two examples one can look at are NATO and the defunct Warsaw Pact. In both there was first a decision in principle and then through a relatively slow process each member country earmarked certain units (army, navy and air force) that could be called upon by the Pact leaders. In the case of NATO this was SACEUR-Supreme Allied Commander in Europe who had a multi-national staff in his headquarters but who had no troops at his immediate disposal at his headquarters.
The Islamic Army is similarly going to have only a headquarter in Saudi Arabia or wherever is finally decided upon but it will have no troops attached to it. If troops are sent to Saudi Arabia by any country this will be on the basis of bilateral agreements such as those concluded by the US with Germany after it ceased to be an occupation army sharing occupation responsibilities with the Russians, the British and the French.
But here the similarity with NATO will or should end if the leadership is clear that the purpose of the alliance is anti-terror and the terrorist groups to be targeted are Daesh and Al-Qaeda. For this limited purpose it will be visualised that each of the alliance members will have to tackle the problem of extremists in their country and the connections they have or seek to establish with the central organs of these two bodies. They will have to share intelligence on such elements as they have identified and the means they employ to spread their extremist and communal message (social media, meeting places such as mosques or in some countries shrines) and separately and jointly devise methods to thwart these efforts. Above all, they will have to involve religious leaders to help put together “deradicalisation” programmes. For countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia sermons and “fatwas” from Middle Eastern religious leaders whose writings have earned them a following would perhaps be effective.
It would be extremely foolish to imagine that this alliance would mean joint deployment in countries where Daesh still holds territory: Iraq and Syria. This task is being undertaken, as it should be by the Iraqis and the Syrians (where you have a civil war situation with a Daesh overlay) with the deep involvement of outside forces which no Islamic alliance can hope to match. The physical involvement of Pakistani forces in Yemen or in any other intra-Arab quarrel has been settled by the Pakistan Parliament. This will also be the position of countries like Malaysia and Indonesia. What can and should happen is that as the alliance leaders devise a programme for “winning hearts and minds” they shared them with both these countries. And as internal problems in these countries are resolved, or even earlier, they too can become members to fight the common enemy.
Does Pakistan then have the possibility of playing a mediatory role and if so, would this be facilitated by the leadership of the anti-terrorist-specifically Daesh and Al-Qaeda-role envisaged for the so-called Islamic army?
Let me conclude this part by emphasizing that as the alliance takes shape Pakistan’s and therefore Raheel Sharif’s participation must be made conditional on the acceptance of the premise that the alliance is against Daesh and Al-Qaeda, that Iran too is an Islamic country that views these organisations as the “common enemy” and that the ultimate objective of the alliance is not to oppose Iran but to develop common cause with Iran to oppose the “common enemy”. If this premise cannot be agreed upon, then Pakistan must not participate.
Postscript: Iran’s ambassador to Iran in an interview to an Iranian news agency confirmed that Iran had been informed of the Raheel Sharif proposal but that Iran had reservations about the alliance which it had not been asked to join. This Iranian statement came many days after the Sartaj Aziz visit to Iran and reflects, in my view, the differences which exist in Iran’s polity and does not therefore affect the basic thrust of my assessment of the Iranian position.
[Next week, in part II of this article, the history and present state of relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and between Pakistan and Iran.]
The writer is a former foreign secretary and has served as ambassador to the US and Iran, among other key appointments. He lectures at NDU and has written extensively on Pakistan and international relations