It was amusing to observe the Sindh Chief Minister reporting ‘victory’ to his party boss upon his return from China during December 2016. The ‘success’ was embedded in Chinese assent to include Karachi Circular Railways, development of Keti Bandar and a Special Economic Zone in Dhabeji in the potpourri of projects aligned with China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Many termed it as good news. Irrespective of relevance to the prevailing sectoral and contextual conditions, announcement of a mega project is usually considered as a government’s timely action aimed at drastic improvement. Absence of mega projects is flagged as a sign of neglect from the government. A development programme is normally considered incongruent if it does not entail projects with large expenditures. Motorways, elevated metro bus corridors, canals, power plants, dams, treatment plants, highways and the like, fall under this category. Using this approach to gain popular support, the government never stops short of announcing large-scale projects including those that cause the most severe of controversies. Disappointingly, many such projects in the past have ended in gross failures and loss of precious opportunity and resources.
The planning, design and implementation of Lyari Expressway is an example. Launched in 2002 with an estimated commission benchmark in 2004, the project still awaits completion. Initial estimated cost was worked out as Rs 5 billion, which has now soared to more than Rs. 11 billion. Absence of a proven scientific analysis, dubious feasibility, lack of consensus among the participating actors (whether to have the project or not), an eventual path leading to donors’ involvement, alleged lack of transparency and fair play in the award of work were the common short comings. Though the project is in limbo, it is a reminder of a very strong trend that envisages development only through mega projects. This particular approach is adequately visible in the overall developmental practice in the country in general and Sindh in particular. Both democratic and military governments have focused on mega projects to spend their allocated sum of various public sector development funds.
A mega project could be defined as an enterprise of large scale, magnitude and cost overlays running into billions of rupees. Although this is a simplistic way to describe a mega project, in actual terms this is what they normally turn out to be. In most cases, mega projects appear to be a drag on the development budget especially when one single project would account for one-third or one-fourth of the total kitty! However, the governments have strong political reasons to initiate such projects despite their technical, financial or managerial handicaps.
Mega projects are conceived as high budget affairs. For instance, the cumulative cost of the proposed six lines of Bus Rapid Transit project in Karachi amounts to over Rs. 165 billion. Compare it with the combined budget of Rs 26.68 billion of Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and Karachi Development Authority, both dealing with a spread out task list in the metropolis. It appears as a gross mismatch. Obviously large capital overlays enhance the financial control of the ruling cadres who also derive the flexibility of diverting this money to other avenues of expenditure. Besides the controlling authority, department or project management unit acquires several prerogatives. Awarding sub-contracts of enormous sums, laying down procurement lines of articles of all kinds, awarding petty construction contracts, employing staff, technocrats and labourers, choosing locations and sub locations to benefit (or not to benefit) any particular community or their heads are some of the direct measures of control that evolve from a mega development scheme. In the absence of effective monitoring mechanisms, the wrongdoings of the project management remain unnoticed causing harm to the affected people without any redress. Many affected people from projects such as Lyari Expressway are running from pillar to post for compensation of their losses, without any relief.
High visibility mega projects are considered as symbols of efficient performance of the government in power. Regardless of their immediate usefulness or long-term sustainability, everyone notices such physical structures. In the urban context, high-grade motorways, transit corridors, bridges, pylons etc. constitute images of development. In the sub-urban and rural sectors, power plants, waterways, canal ways and highways are such image boosting entities. Usually infrastructural components, which are largely concealed in the earth surface, are not considered as the right form of development. Medium and small-scale projects are avoided for their lack of visibility. For instance, Pakistan has plenty of abandoned school buildings, which were constructed as per normal prescription but never utilized due to lack of feasibility. For many villagers these are bad examples of development.
Large and medium scale consultants push for mega projects, obviously for their own motives. It helps them well in many ways. Firstly, the rate of consultancy and supervision rises sizably to the benefit of consultants. Secondly, it satisfies the professional ego of consultants who have been associated with such projects. Thirdly, it creates the viability of obtaining more projects of similar nature in the future. And fourthly, since the consultants are only concerned about their fees, they seldom care to look into the future about the worth and sustainability of such project. This syndrome has given rise to many isolated stand-alone type projects not necessarily beneficial for the people.
The Judicial Commission of Inquiry, formed under the Supreme Court orders to probe the dismal water supply and sanitation conditions in Sindh, was informed by officials that none of the three sewage treatment plants in Karachi were functional despite investment of billions of rupees and the support of Asian Development Bank and the World Bank at earlier occasions. The reason is simple. It is an open secret that storm water drains in the metropolis are almost entirely converted into regular sewerage outlets. They siphon the large portion of raw sewage directly into the sea. However, instead of noting this fact, plants are constructed which are neither geographically congruent nor technically appropriate to collect the sewage for treatment. Another factor for failure is that the conceptualization, design and decisions for implementation remain a black box operation without participation of even the direct affectees.
To achieve balanced development, projects of multiple scales need to be initiated. Technically, mega projects should possess a corresponding link with the small and medium scale projects/realities of the sector. This can create a sense of initiative amongst individuals, small groups and even local bodies to address their respective developmental issues. If sewerage treatment plant is to be built, it should be rationally connected to the disposal channels at tertiary, secondary and primary scales to that the function of treatment is efficiently performed. Socially, the design of such projects should be based on the needs of the target population. For instance, if in an urban centre, improved roads with an up to date fleet of buses can perform the task of urban transportation satisfactorily, the need for elevated mass transit does not arise. Furthermore, exaggerated costs and unrealistic estimates should not be made the basis of any loan parleys to finance a large-scale project. Finally, for effective project implementation, it must be ensured that the cross-section of the society for whom the project is targeted should be made to participate in each and every stage of the execution and post construction management of the project.
The writer heads Architecture & Planning at NED University, Karachi, is an expert in urban planning and governance. He recently co-authored Karachi Through the Prism of Urban Design (2015)
The planning, design and implementation of Lyari Expressway is an example. Launched in 2002 with an estimated commission benchmark in 2004, the project still awaits completion. Initial estimated cost was worked out as Rs 5 billion, which has now soared to more than Rs. 11 billion. Absence of a proven scientific analysis, dubious feasibility, lack of consensus among the participating actors (whether to have the project or not), an eventual path leading to donors’ involvement, alleged lack of transparency and fair play in the award of work were the common short comings. Though the project is in limbo, it is a reminder of a very strong trend that envisages development only through mega projects. This particular approach is adequately visible in the overall developmental practice in the country in general and Sindh in particular. Both democratic and military governments have focused on mega projects to spend their allocated sum of various public sector development funds.
A mega project could be defined as an enterprise of large scale, magnitude and cost overlays running into billions of rupees. Although this is a simplistic way to describe a mega project, in actual terms this is what they normally turn out to be. In most cases, mega projects appear to be a drag on the development budget especially when one single project would account for one-third or one-fourth of the total kitty! However, the governments have strong political reasons to initiate such projects despite their technical, financial or managerial handicaps.
Launched in 2002, Lyari Expressway project still awaits completion. Initial cost of Rs 5 billion has now soared to more than Rs. 11 billion
Mega projects are conceived as high budget affairs. For instance, the cumulative cost of the proposed six lines of Bus Rapid Transit project in Karachi amounts to over Rs. 165 billion. Compare it with the combined budget of Rs 26.68 billion of Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and Karachi Development Authority, both dealing with a spread out task list in the metropolis. It appears as a gross mismatch. Obviously large capital overlays enhance the financial control of the ruling cadres who also derive the flexibility of diverting this money to other avenues of expenditure. Besides the controlling authority, department or project management unit acquires several prerogatives. Awarding sub-contracts of enormous sums, laying down procurement lines of articles of all kinds, awarding petty construction contracts, employing staff, technocrats and labourers, choosing locations and sub locations to benefit (or not to benefit) any particular community or their heads are some of the direct measures of control that evolve from a mega development scheme. In the absence of effective monitoring mechanisms, the wrongdoings of the project management remain unnoticed causing harm to the affected people without any redress. Many affected people from projects such as Lyari Expressway are running from pillar to post for compensation of their losses, without any relief.
High visibility mega projects are considered as symbols of efficient performance of the government in power. Regardless of their immediate usefulness or long-term sustainability, everyone notices such physical structures. In the urban context, high-grade motorways, transit corridors, bridges, pylons etc. constitute images of development. In the sub-urban and rural sectors, power plants, waterways, canal ways and highways are such image boosting entities. Usually infrastructural components, which are largely concealed in the earth surface, are not considered as the right form of development. Medium and small-scale projects are avoided for their lack of visibility. For instance, Pakistan has plenty of abandoned school buildings, which were constructed as per normal prescription but never utilized due to lack of feasibility. For many villagers these are bad examples of development.
None of the three sewage treatment plants in Karachi are functional despite investment of billions of rupees
Large and medium scale consultants push for mega projects, obviously for their own motives. It helps them well in many ways. Firstly, the rate of consultancy and supervision rises sizably to the benefit of consultants. Secondly, it satisfies the professional ego of consultants who have been associated with such projects. Thirdly, it creates the viability of obtaining more projects of similar nature in the future. And fourthly, since the consultants are only concerned about their fees, they seldom care to look into the future about the worth and sustainability of such project. This syndrome has given rise to many isolated stand-alone type projects not necessarily beneficial for the people.
The Judicial Commission of Inquiry, formed under the Supreme Court orders to probe the dismal water supply and sanitation conditions in Sindh, was informed by officials that none of the three sewage treatment plants in Karachi were functional despite investment of billions of rupees and the support of Asian Development Bank and the World Bank at earlier occasions. The reason is simple. It is an open secret that storm water drains in the metropolis are almost entirely converted into regular sewerage outlets. They siphon the large portion of raw sewage directly into the sea. However, instead of noting this fact, plants are constructed which are neither geographically congruent nor technically appropriate to collect the sewage for treatment. Another factor for failure is that the conceptualization, design and decisions for implementation remain a black box operation without participation of even the direct affectees.
To achieve balanced development, projects of multiple scales need to be initiated. Technically, mega projects should possess a corresponding link with the small and medium scale projects/realities of the sector. This can create a sense of initiative amongst individuals, small groups and even local bodies to address their respective developmental issues. If sewerage treatment plant is to be built, it should be rationally connected to the disposal channels at tertiary, secondary and primary scales to that the function of treatment is efficiently performed. Socially, the design of such projects should be based on the needs of the target population. For instance, if in an urban centre, improved roads with an up to date fleet of buses can perform the task of urban transportation satisfactorily, the need for elevated mass transit does not arise. Furthermore, exaggerated costs and unrealistic estimates should not be made the basis of any loan parleys to finance a large-scale project. Finally, for effective project implementation, it must be ensured that the cross-section of the society for whom the project is targeted should be made to participate in each and every stage of the execution and post construction management of the project.
The writer heads Architecture & Planning at NED University, Karachi, is an expert in urban planning and governance. He recently co-authored Karachi Through the Prism of Urban Design (2015)