India has progressively ratcheted up military tensions along the Line of Control and International Border with Pakistan. Considering that a fairly effective ceasefire held the ground from 2003 until the Modi regime came to power in India, what are the consequences of the new regional dynamics?
When Narendra Modi became prime minister, it was clear that the BJP under him would not deal with Pakistan in the same mode as Atal Behari Vajpayee and L K Advani. The latter had staked the fag end of their political careers on trying to build a historic peace with Pakistan, albeit largely on their own terms. Advani’s yatra to Karachi and Vajpayee’s to Lahore were the cornerstones of that policy. Modi, on the other hand, has been intent on building his political career on anti-Muslim communalism and pro-West economic free marketeering. This has led to an overly hard posture towards Pakistan and a swooning attitude towards the US.
Ajit Doval, PM Modi's National Security Advisor, spelt out the new posture when he unfurled his "Doval doctrine" of “offensive defense” in five manifest areas. First, aggressive electioneering and coalition building in Kashmir, followed by a brutal crackdown. Second, heating up the LoC to stop cross border incursions. Third, proxy-warring in Balochistan and Karachi. Fourth, staking Kabul by exploiting Pakistan's diminishing leverage. Fifth, isolating Pakistan internationally as a “state sponsor of terrorism”. All dimensions are clearly in evidence today. The victory of Donald Trump in Washington is an added bonus – he equates support for India with support for Hindus.
Nawaz Sharif’s error lay in equating Modi with Vajpayee and misreading the new dialectic at work in Modi’s India. PM Sharif thought he could simply pick up the thread with India where he had left it in 1999 and stitch up a peace deal in 2014. So, just before the Indian elections, he decided to postpone the signing of a significant MFN trade deal with India under Dr Manmohan Singh – a long time Indian demand -- because he wanted to start out on the right foot by signing it with Modi who was forecast to be the next prime minister of India. Accordingly, he went to the Delhi Durbar at the Emperor’s inauguration and wasn’t dissuaded by the Indian foreign secretary’s snub when he held out the hand of reconciliation. Indeed, Modi hasn’t missed any photo-op to embrace Nawaz Sharif – in Raiwind too -- even as he has continued to wield the knife behind his back like a modern day Shivaji.
The Pakistani military establishment disapproves of Nawaz’s naïve diplomacy. Therefore it has reinstated Kashmir as the sole “core” issue with India, a position long abandoned since the Musharraf era, and opened the jihadi tap just a little to stress its centrality in the face of a highly repressive situation in Kashmir. So, in a sense, Nawaz has been outplayed by Modi and also outwitted by his own military establishment. If Modi has internationalized Balochistan’s “liberation” from the ramparts of Delhi on Independence Day and exhorted the UN to declare Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism, the Pakistani military has hit back directly in Pathankot and indirectly in Uri, paraded the Indian spy Kulbhushan Yadev as proof of Indian proxy warring in Balochistan and distributed evidences of the RAW connection with Altaf Hussain in Karachi. Both countries have recently expelled each other’s diplomat-spys in equal measure.
India has not even been interested in talking about talks. The back channel has been wound up. The NSAs haven’t met in ages. India provoked a cancellation of the SAARC Summit in Islamabad by pulling out. Recently it conjured up a series of “strategic military strikes” against alleged jihadi outposts along the border inside Pakistan and whipped up an orgy of media glee at its invincibility. Now Pakistan is having second thoughts about attending the Heart of Asia Conference scheduled in Amritsar.
Meanwhile, India has successfully wooed Afghan President Ashraf Ghani away from Pakistan and is betting on tilting President Trump in its favour too.
Some people think that India is veering towards outright war with Pakistan. That is not correct. The last thing Modi wants is a war with nuclear Pakistan to raise the hackles of the world. Indeed, any real sign of war would trigger capital flight out of India and scare potential foreign investors eyeing India as an emerging market par excellence. It would shatter Modi’s showcase of shining India, sow political discord at home and lose him the next state and general elections.
How Indo-Pak relations pan out depends on three factors. First, Narendra Modi’s domestic compulsions to whip up anti-Pakistan sentiment on the eve of state elections in several big states early next year. Second, Donald Trump’s foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Third, Nawaz Sharif’s political longevity and civil-military balance in Pakistan. At worst, the current calibrated hostility will persist. At best, India and Pakistan will start talking about talks again sometime next year. Neither war nor peace is forecast.
When Narendra Modi became prime minister, it was clear that the BJP under him would not deal with Pakistan in the same mode as Atal Behari Vajpayee and L K Advani. The latter had staked the fag end of their political careers on trying to build a historic peace with Pakistan, albeit largely on their own terms. Advani’s yatra to Karachi and Vajpayee’s to Lahore were the cornerstones of that policy. Modi, on the other hand, has been intent on building his political career on anti-Muslim communalism and pro-West economic free marketeering. This has led to an overly hard posture towards Pakistan and a swooning attitude towards the US.
Ajit Doval, PM Modi's National Security Advisor, spelt out the new posture when he unfurled his "Doval doctrine" of “offensive defense” in five manifest areas. First, aggressive electioneering and coalition building in Kashmir, followed by a brutal crackdown. Second, heating up the LoC to stop cross border incursions. Third, proxy-warring in Balochistan and Karachi. Fourth, staking Kabul by exploiting Pakistan's diminishing leverage. Fifth, isolating Pakistan internationally as a “state sponsor of terrorism”. All dimensions are clearly in evidence today. The victory of Donald Trump in Washington is an added bonus – he equates support for India with support for Hindus.
Nawaz Sharif’s error lay in equating Modi with Vajpayee and misreading the new dialectic at work in Modi’s India. PM Sharif thought he could simply pick up the thread with India where he had left it in 1999 and stitch up a peace deal in 2014. So, just before the Indian elections, he decided to postpone the signing of a significant MFN trade deal with India under Dr Manmohan Singh – a long time Indian demand -- because he wanted to start out on the right foot by signing it with Modi who was forecast to be the next prime minister of India. Accordingly, he went to the Delhi Durbar at the Emperor’s inauguration and wasn’t dissuaded by the Indian foreign secretary’s snub when he held out the hand of reconciliation. Indeed, Modi hasn’t missed any photo-op to embrace Nawaz Sharif – in Raiwind too -- even as he has continued to wield the knife behind his back like a modern day Shivaji.
The Pakistani military establishment disapproves of Nawaz’s naïve diplomacy. Therefore it has reinstated Kashmir as the sole “core” issue with India, a position long abandoned since the Musharraf era, and opened the jihadi tap just a little to stress its centrality in the face of a highly repressive situation in Kashmir. So, in a sense, Nawaz has been outplayed by Modi and also outwitted by his own military establishment. If Modi has internationalized Balochistan’s “liberation” from the ramparts of Delhi on Independence Day and exhorted the UN to declare Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism, the Pakistani military has hit back directly in Pathankot and indirectly in Uri, paraded the Indian spy Kulbhushan Yadev as proof of Indian proxy warring in Balochistan and distributed evidences of the RAW connection with Altaf Hussain in Karachi. Both countries have recently expelled each other’s diplomat-spys in equal measure.
India has not even been interested in talking about talks. The back channel has been wound up. The NSAs haven’t met in ages. India provoked a cancellation of the SAARC Summit in Islamabad by pulling out. Recently it conjured up a series of “strategic military strikes” against alleged jihadi outposts along the border inside Pakistan and whipped up an orgy of media glee at its invincibility. Now Pakistan is having second thoughts about attending the Heart of Asia Conference scheduled in Amritsar.
Meanwhile, India has successfully wooed Afghan President Ashraf Ghani away from Pakistan and is betting on tilting President Trump in its favour too.
Some people think that India is veering towards outright war with Pakistan. That is not correct. The last thing Modi wants is a war with nuclear Pakistan to raise the hackles of the world. Indeed, any real sign of war would trigger capital flight out of India and scare potential foreign investors eyeing India as an emerging market par excellence. It would shatter Modi’s showcase of shining India, sow political discord at home and lose him the next state and general elections.
How Indo-Pak relations pan out depends on three factors. First, Narendra Modi’s domestic compulsions to whip up anti-Pakistan sentiment on the eve of state elections in several big states early next year. Second, Donald Trump’s foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Third, Nawaz Sharif’s political longevity and civil-military balance in Pakistan. At worst, the current calibrated hostility will persist. At best, India and Pakistan will start talking about talks again sometime next year. Neither war nor peace is forecast.