Not war, not peace?

A book titled, Not War, Not Peace? Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism written by two of America’s acclaimed scholars on India-Pakistan matters, has been generating heat in both countries even though it hasn’t been launched.

It is widely believed that if there were to ever be another Mumbai-type terrorist attack that is traced back to actors in Pakistan, a nuclear war between the two countries would be inevitable. This fear is based on India’s growing frustration over what it says is Pakistan’s support for anti-India militant organizations that are accused of fomenting terrorism in India. Indian thinkers and strategists continue to articulate strategies to prevent “cross-border terrorism” and prepare response options to punish the perpetrators in the wake of a terrorist attack. The Indian discourse developed over the past fifteen years presents a variety of response options, including proactive operations, air strikes, covert operations and Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation by non-violent means.

Tom Dalton and George Perkovich take stock of the Indian policy discourse and evaluate the feasibility of India’s options against its material and non-material capabilities. They analyze the utility of each option by asking a set of questions; What are the short- and long-term strategic objectives that India could fulfill by exercising a given policy option? Will the policy choices under consideration help satisfy domestic political demand for retribution? More importantly, to what extent will India be in a position to influence the behavior of Pakistani decision-makers and persuade them to take action against anti-India militant groups in Pakistan? Recognizing the limitations of the decision-makers in Pakistan the authors argue that it may not be operationally feasible for Pakistan to move against Jamaat-ud-Dawa or Lashkar-e-Taiba given Pakistan’s ongoing military operations against the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan. They contend that a realistic expectation on the part of India would be to persuade Pakistan to demobilize the LeT and the JuD. The authors caution against the danger of pushing Pakistan too hard to turn it into a pariah state. Conversely, such cognizance hinders the possibility of challenging the status quo.

Given what the book sets out to achieve, it merits careful reading and attention. It opens with an incisive chapter on ‘The Decision-Making Setting’ in India. It identifies lack of civilian expertise in defense and security matters as well as the military’s limited input in the decision-making process as key challenges for informed decision-making in India.

Dalton and Perkovich ask, what are the short- and long-term strategic objectives that India could fulfill by exercising certain policy options they discuss? Will the policy choices help satisfy domestic political demand for retribution? More importantly, to what extent will India be in a position to influence the behavior of Pakistani decision-makers and persuade them to take action against anti-India militant groups in Pakistan?

The chapters on Proactive strategy, Air Power, Covert Operations and Nuclear Capabilities evaluate India’s capabilities in the respective domains and assess the feasibility of each of these options against India’s key objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan. After a thorough analysis, the authors conclude that India’s existing capabilities are not commensurate with strategic goals that India seeks to achieve against Pakistan. More importantly, they highlight the risks of escalation associated with the pursuit of strategies that the adversary may find disproportionate to India’s strategic objectives.

The chapters on Covert Operations and Non-violent Compellence are the most fascinating given the almost non-existent academic inquiry in these areas. The authors provide an overview of the history of covert operations between India and Pakistan. Acknowledging India’s covert operations in Balochistan and Karachi they write, “…it is safe to say that India has not been purely abstemious in the use of covert agents and actions against Pakistan… But Indian authorities have been very careful to preserve their reputational advantage over Pakistan in this domain of statecraft.” They wisely state, “It is intuitively ‘fair’ to take an eye for an eye (though it can lead to mutual blindness).”

The authors consider “non-violent compellence” as a preferable option mainly because it would help India achieve its objectives without fighting. This approach would bring India reputational advantages without any serious risks. While, the authors provide a comprehensive list of non-violent compellence options, they also put forward one troublesome proposition, writing, “India’s political leaders, diplomats, and globally-renowned civil society figures—including authors, musicians, economists, Bollywood stars, cricket players, etc.—have untapped potential to mobilize their counterparts and audiences in other countries to ostracize Pakistan for failures to combat terrorism emanating from its territory.”

Seeking an active role for civil society and Bollywood stars “to ostracize Pakistan” would entail many risks. Such an approach would reinforce narrow national identities on an issue that demands transcendence to a universally shared humane perspective. Also, the role of civil society perceived as a B-team of the Indian government would further shrink the space for liberal voices in Pakistan. The secular and progressive voices in Pakistan will face tremendous pressure to perform a similar role on behest of their own government.

India can only muster support among Pakistanis by presenting itself as a democratic and progressive actor in the region—a role model worth emulating—as opposed to an India that projects its identity in oppositional-nationalist terms. Phantom an Indian film about Mumbai attacks meant to uncover the LeT/JuD, generated hostile reactions in Pakistan. On the other hand critical films such as Parzania (on the Gujrat carnage), Haider (about the plight of Kashmiri people), and My Name is Khan (about Islamophobia) to name only a few, had a positive impact because they conveyed the strong message that India is a democracy tolerant enough to allow dissent. That is the India that a Pakistan military would dread to see.

Also, a judicious reading of this book helps identify areas that require research. For instance, the authors support the case for India’s military growth and deeper interaction between Indian civilian and military leaders. This, however, warrants careful deliberation. The authors acknowledge, “In some respects, India has done better than most major powers in avoiding international security debacles and unaffordable defence spending, despite or perhaps because of the lack of military participation in policymaking.” The question is, given India’s improved status and performance over the last two decades, what additional objectives might have been served, had India put more emphasis on military policies, doctrines and capabilities? Why should India abandon what has worked for what may or may not deliver?

The authors repeatedly refer to the pressures faced by the political government in India to satisfy popular demand for reprisals in the wake of a terrorist attack. Given the fact that Manmohan Singh was re-elected India’s prime minister only a few months after the Mumbai crisis, the political cost of inaction needs to be investigated more thoroughly.

Lastly, Dalton and Perkovich argue that India’s long-term strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan should be democratization of the country and “normalization of relations.” It remains to be seen if India, particularly under Modi’s tainted democracy, possesses the capacity and moral legitimacy to “encourage democratization of Pakistan”. Future research could explore what kind of capabilities and policies India needs to pursue to achieve these goals.

Not War, Not Peace is engaging, thought-provoking and compelling. This book can play an instrumental role in expanding and understanding policy analysis. Beyond the casual and academic readers, this book must be read by policymakers in India, Pakistan and the United States.

The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. She can be reached at sadia.tasleem@gmail.com