The Muttahida Qaumi Movement’s resilience against internal and external pressures has baffled observers and detractors for over three decades. Excluding the short five-year period under Musharraf, the party has remained in constant conflict since its inception as the shape of the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organisation in 1978 and has braved continuous state offensive, internal fractionalization and Altaf Hussain’s self-destructive speeches and antics with little impact on its popularity or power. The question then is, what makes the MQM so resilient as a political force in Karachi and urban Sindh?
There is no doubt in the fact that the MQM extracts its power mainly from its infallible support in the masses, who vote for the party ticket regardless of the person contesting the constituency. In most cases, the voters don’t even know the names of the candidates, which is in contradiction with the prevalent political culture elsewhere in the country that revolves primarily around local patronage with some support from the party structure. As the famous saying goes, even a pole (khamba) would win in those areas with an MQM ticket.
The prevalent explanation for the source of this mass popularity is Altaf Hussain’s oratory, the attraction of ‘Mohajir’ identity, or the fear tactics the party employs against the people who dare to oppose it. While these might be important factors that contribute to the party’s success, its real tenacity lies in something hidden and more basic: the party’s formidable institutional structure that fills the void left by the state.
Indeed, institutions are resilient entities that are not only self-preserving, but also silently work behind the scenes toward the success of the organization they work for. According to the great Francis Fukuyama, the most effective institutions are the ones that allow upward social mobility, merit-based advancement, and a clear rule structure. In their book Why Nations Fail? Acemoglu and Robinson explain that the presence or absence of these qualities in a country’s institutional structure determine whether it would continue to progress or regress. It is, thus, not surprising to see a thriving MQM as it neatly applies these attributes to its organizational structure.
Unlike any other political party in the country, the MQM provides an avenue for individuals from the most marginalized classes to gain political, social, and material power. A young adult from the poorest background can enter the party as a worker and make his or her way to the top echelons of party leadership or federal/provincial ministerial positions. This in turn creates a deep sense of ownership and affiliation within the party cadres and fosters an unprecedented access of the poor masses to political office bearers, as these officials are likely to belong to their communities, neighborhoods, families, and acquaintance circles. Most importantly, the progress within the party structure is rooted in meritocracy, so that the workers with the highest level of motivation, organizational qualities, and loyalty to the party and its leader are rewarded with a clear path of ascension from a worker to unit in-charge, to sector in-charge, to Rabita Committee and assembly member, and so on. The MQM also provides an unparalleled inclusion to women in the political sphere, and they in turn pay the party back by fervently supporting it in periods of crisis.
Another strikingly successful policy adopted by Altaf Hussain (knowingly or unknowingly) is the constant destruction of mid-tier leadership by the top leadership to engage in a mutually beneficial relationship with the lowest cadres. Examples of such a power arrangement are abundant in history. Roman Emperor Augustus defeated the powerful nobility by gaining support from the peasant/soldier class. The Danish and other Scandinavian kings of the 18th and 19th centuries also followed this example, whereas Mao Zedong consistently used to belittle and remove the mid-tier leadership of the Communist Party of China to gain direct support and loyalty from the masses during the Cultural Revolution. Through this strategy, the masses gain relief from the oppression of the mid-tier leadership, while the top leadership enjoys unbridled power through mass support. Altaf Hussain’s frequent derision of the Rabita Committee members, elected representatives, and ministers on the complaints of lower-tier workers ensures that the workers are loyal to his personality and office. The workers, subsequently, gain access to the government resources controlled by the mid-tier elected leadership.
Finally, all these internal institutional strengths are translated into mass support when the MQM fills the service gaps left by the state institutions. The lower tier MQM workers provide the marginalized masses with security where the police agencies fail, speedy justice where the legal system fails, jobs where the economy fails, and access to basic amenities such as water and electricity in a crumbling state, local, provincial, and federal infrastructure. The masses, thus, see the MQM and Altaf Hussain as a messianic figure who ensures their access to public services, especially when they do not have the education, money, or personal contacts that are necessary to attain them in Pakistan. The elite and educated middle and upper-middle classes of Pakistan with ready access to such services can never fathom how important this intervention is for many people. This allows the masses to support, ignore, or overlook MQM’s alleged illegal activities such as extortion, target killings, or land grabbing that mostly impacts the moneyed class. When the government does not fulfill its responsibility of providing low-cost housing, for example, illegal land grabbers seize the opportunity for mutual benefit of their impoverished clients and their own political and financial interests.
In sum, the resilience of the MQM lies in the strong institutional structure of the party, direct connection of the masses with the top leadership, and an exploitation of state failure. Past and current operations against the party will only result in temporary wins for the state apparatus as old workers and elected officials will be easily replaced by a steady stream of workers moving up the ranks. The mid-tier leadership, including Farooq Sattar or Amir Khan, does not have the clout within the masses to attract votes or gain support from the party workers. This very strength of the MQM, however, is also its worst weakness since the party is all set to disintegrate into chaos if Altaf Husain is removed from the scene as there is no one else to hold the party together or keep it organized. Until that happens, there is only one way for the state to defeat the MQM in Karachi: Provide effective and equitable public services to the marginalized people of Karachi, and improve their access to justice and economic progress.
Obed Pasha is lecturer of Public Policy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He can be reached at obedpasha@gmail.com or @ramblingsufi
There is no doubt in the fact that the MQM extracts its power mainly from its infallible support in the masses, who vote for the party ticket regardless of the person contesting the constituency. In most cases, the voters don’t even know the names of the candidates, which is in contradiction with the prevalent political culture elsewhere in the country that revolves primarily around local patronage with some support from the party structure. As the famous saying goes, even a pole (khamba) would win in those areas with an MQM ticket.
The prevalent explanation for the source of this mass popularity is Altaf Hussain’s oratory, the attraction of ‘Mohajir’ identity, or the fear tactics the party employs against the people who dare to oppose it. While these might be important factors that contribute to the party’s success, its real tenacity lies in something hidden and more basic: the party’s formidable institutional structure that fills the void left by the state.
Indeed, institutions are resilient entities that are not only self-preserving, but also silently work behind the scenes toward the success of the organization they work for. According to the great Francis Fukuyama, the most effective institutions are the ones that allow upward social mobility, merit-based advancement, and a clear rule structure. In their book Why Nations Fail? Acemoglu and Robinson explain that the presence or absence of these qualities in a country’s institutional structure determine whether it would continue to progress or regress. It is, thus, not surprising to see a thriving MQM as it neatly applies these attributes to its organizational structure.
Unlike any other political party in the country, the MQM provides an avenue for individuals from the most marginalized classes to gain political, social, and material power. A young adult from the poorest background can enter the party as a worker and make his or her way to the top echelons of party leadership or federal/provincial ministerial positions. This in turn creates a deep sense of ownership and affiliation within the party cadres and fosters an unprecedented access of the poor masses to political office bearers, as these officials are likely to belong to their communities, neighborhoods, families, and acquaintance circles. Most importantly, the progress within the party structure is rooted in meritocracy, so that the workers with the highest level of motivation, organizational qualities, and loyalty to the party and its leader are rewarded with a clear path of ascension from a worker to unit in-charge, to sector in-charge, to Rabita Committee and assembly member, and so on. The MQM also provides an unparalleled inclusion to women in the political sphere, and they in turn pay the party back by fervently supporting it in periods of crisis.
Another strikingly successful policy adopted by Altaf Hussain (knowingly or unknowingly) is the constant destruction of mid-tier leadership by the top leadership to engage in a mutually beneficial relationship with the lowest cadres. Examples of such a power arrangement are abundant in history. Roman Emperor Augustus defeated the powerful nobility by gaining support from the peasant/soldier class. The Danish and other Scandinavian kings of the 18th and 19th centuries also followed this example, whereas Mao Zedong consistently used to belittle and remove the mid-tier leadership of the Communist Party of China to gain direct support and loyalty from the masses during the Cultural Revolution. Through this strategy, the masses gain relief from the oppression of the mid-tier leadership, while the top leadership enjoys unbridled power through mass support. Altaf Hussain’s frequent derision of the Rabita Committee members, elected representatives, and ministers on the complaints of lower-tier workers ensures that the workers are loyal to his personality and office. The workers, subsequently, gain access to the government resources controlled by the mid-tier elected leadership.
Finally, all these internal institutional strengths are translated into mass support when the MQM fills the service gaps left by the state institutions. The lower tier MQM workers provide the marginalized masses with security where the police agencies fail, speedy justice where the legal system fails, jobs where the economy fails, and access to basic amenities such as water and electricity in a crumbling state, local, provincial, and federal infrastructure. The masses, thus, see the MQM and Altaf Hussain as a messianic figure who ensures their access to public services, especially when they do not have the education, money, or personal contacts that are necessary to attain them in Pakistan. The elite and educated middle and upper-middle classes of Pakistan with ready access to such services can never fathom how important this intervention is for many people. This allows the masses to support, ignore, or overlook MQM’s alleged illegal activities such as extortion, target killings, or land grabbing that mostly impacts the moneyed class. When the government does not fulfill its responsibility of providing low-cost housing, for example, illegal land grabbers seize the opportunity for mutual benefit of their impoverished clients and their own political and financial interests.
In sum, the resilience of the MQM lies in the strong institutional structure of the party, direct connection of the masses with the top leadership, and an exploitation of state failure. Past and current operations against the party will only result in temporary wins for the state apparatus as old workers and elected officials will be easily replaced by a steady stream of workers moving up the ranks. The mid-tier leadership, including Farooq Sattar or Amir Khan, does not have the clout within the masses to attract votes or gain support from the party workers. This very strength of the MQM, however, is also its worst weakness since the party is all set to disintegrate into chaos if Altaf Husain is removed from the scene as there is no one else to hold the party together or keep it organized. Until that happens, there is only one way for the state to defeat the MQM in Karachi: Provide effective and equitable public services to the marginalized people of Karachi, and improve their access to justice and economic progress.
Obed Pasha is lecturer of Public Policy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He can be reached at obedpasha@gmail.com or @ramblingsufi