I write this in the afternoon of Sunday, January 25. The headlines on internet news websites scream that the far left Syriza party has won the national election in Greece, and is possibly only 2 votes short of an absolute majority in the Parliament. The party leader is quoted as saying, “today the Greeks wrote history.” Since the Greeks wrote a good bit of Western history in the first 2,000 years of the West, I think he could have added the word, “again.”
But the real issue is whether this is a “game changer” for Europe. Will Syriza lead Greece out of the Euro Zone? And if so, does that portend the unravelling of the EMU? And if the Euro Zone collapses, or fragments into two or more monetary zones (the North and the South, or the haves and the have nots), where does that leave the European Union in regard to its most pressing threat—a Russian leader who seems to be intent on recreating the 20th century divide between Western and Eastern Europe, and recreating the Soviet Empire that ruled the East? And what do some or all of these possibilities mean for world economic growth, thus the growth of the developing as well as the rest of the developed world? What are the implications of European fragmentation, recession, and re-division along ideological lines for China’s burgeoning growth and geopolitical superpower ambitions? You see, game changers can have implications, which turn into unintended consequences, far beyond our predictive powers.
But I have another so-called “game changer” on my mind. The December 16, 2014 killing of 150 Pakistanis, primarily children, in the Peshawar school has been called a game changer as it elicited public outrage and a universal cry for vengeance. The pressure was so intense that the government acted almost overnight to formulate an agreed strategy to root out and destroy militancy in Pakistan. Enlightened opinion, at least what I see in the English language press, seems quite contradictory; some of my friends are very optimistic that this will be carried out; some are very pessimistic, and some are agnostic. I think I probably fit in the third category, primarily because I am aware only of what the various pundits are writing, and the evidence they cite to back up their opinions. I am not on the spot to try to get a sense of what the political and military leaders are thinking, let alone the intensity with which the political class is viewing the issues involved.
The issue that divides the optimists from the pessimists is whether military and civilian political leaders can construct and carry out a comprehensive strategy to extirpate militancy in Pakistan. From what I have read by optimists and pessimists, the government’s new antiterrorism strategy, which emerged after the popular outcry about the Peshawar tragedy, read literally, and as articulated by both civilian and military leaders, seems to support interpretation that its objective is the complete extirpation of militancy. And that interpretation inspires the pessimists to be pessimistic as to its feasibility as well as to the intentions of both the civilian government and the military, and it inspires the optimists to some (perhaps) wishful thinking.
Such a strategy would entail not just continuing and winning the battle in Pakistan’s Northwest, but carrying the fight to the heart land of Pakistani militancy, Punjab. It seems unlikely that many of the militants in Punjab would go quietly if the Army trained its sights on them. While some would probably be willing to trade in their militancy for a price, my guess is that many would resist efforts to control and disarm them. The implication of this scenario is a long—perhaps decades long—struggle, an insurgency really in Pakistan’s largest and most populous province. Is the political class, let alone the army and the political leadership of either major party, ready for that?
One question is whether the situation is beyond such a solution. Are militants so entrenched, so numerous, so well-armed, have such support among the population, that the human and material costs of such a scenario are beyond comprehension – and beyond even the most virulent of anti-militant proponents to contemplate. What then? A standoff, a truce, a live and let live atmosphere? Isn’t that what there is now in Punjab? How sustainable would that be in the context of having eliminated militancy in the Northwest?
This raises the question is whether the strategy is ceteris paribus, words used by economists to convey the idea that one thing is happening while everything else is standing still. Or, in this context, is there an accompanying package that makes a strategy of extirpating militancy holistic? What would such a package entail? Wouldn’t it have to start with better governance: an economy growing sustainably at maximum rates; a complete and inclusive educational reform (don’t leave out the madrassas) that includes the curriculum, the access to school of all boys and girls; an energy reform policy that eliminates load shedding and thus that drag on industrial growth? How about a program of structural economic reform which would begin by revising the tax code to ensure that all Pakistanis pay their fair share of taxes, and that provides revenues commensurate with Pakistan’s needs and as it implements this part of the anti-militancy strategy. Is the Pakistani elite willing to pay for the enormous increase in resources needed to make the anti-militancy strategy work? Donors might help, but the major portion must come from Pakistanis.
One indication that the implicit long term nature of the of the anti-militancy strategy is not yet fully understood is the two-year life (at least in theory) of the constitutional amendment to allow the military to try terrorists. If the civilians really want to end military tribunals in two years, there must be a plan to reform the judiciary so that it will be trusted to do its job with terrorists when it inherits the responsibility back from the military. (Some of my friends would have written “if” it inherits that responsibility back.) Has such a plan been developed?
And here may lie the deeper dilemma of this anti-militancy strategy. Some of the pessimists argue that this extension of what should be a civilian judicial function to the military is only an outwardly visible sign of a silent encroachment of military governance — a voluntary shrinking of its responsibilities and its functions by a civilian government knocked on its heels by the Peshawar tragedy – giving greater political ground to the Army without a whimper. If this is correct, and the Army’s influence in policy is further expanded, isn’t Pakistan back to square one, and hasn’t the Army has restored its position to status quo ante 2008? Instead of the civil/military relationship that the 2008/2013 elections brought about, and many hoped would develop into civilian dominance and, at least the possibility of real reform, Pakistan may be back, in substance if not in form at least, to the old days when the military completely pretty much ran the show. Given the history of the past 35 years, how confident can we be that a Pakistan with the Army in control of most levers can (or will) carry out, to the full extent of its implied nature, the anti-militancy strategy it is now set upon?
The author is a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC and a former US diplomat who was Ambassador to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Chief of Mission in Liberia
But the real issue is whether this is a “game changer” for Europe. Will Syriza lead Greece out of the Euro Zone? And if so, does that portend the unravelling of the EMU? And if the Euro Zone collapses, or fragments into two or more monetary zones (the North and the South, or the haves and the have nots), where does that leave the European Union in regard to its most pressing threat—a Russian leader who seems to be intent on recreating the 20th century divide between Western and Eastern Europe, and recreating the Soviet Empire that ruled the East? And what do some or all of these possibilities mean for world economic growth, thus the growth of the developing as well as the rest of the developed world? What are the implications of European fragmentation, recession, and re-division along ideological lines for China’s burgeoning growth and geopolitical superpower ambitions? You see, game changers can have implications, which turn into unintended consequences, far beyond our predictive powers.
But I have another so-called “game changer” on my mind. The December 16, 2014 killing of 150 Pakistanis, primarily children, in the Peshawar school has been called a game changer as it elicited public outrage and a universal cry for vengeance. The pressure was so intense that the government acted almost overnight to formulate an agreed strategy to root out and destroy militancy in Pakistan. Enlightened opinion, at least what I see in the English language press, seems quite contradictory; some of my friends are very optimistic that this will be carried out; some are very pessimistic, and some are agnostic. I think I probably fit in the third category, primarily because I am aware only of what the various pundits are writing, and the evidence they cite to back up their opinions. I am not on the spot to try to get a sense of what the political and military leaders are thinking, let alone the intensity with which the political class is viewing the issues involved.
The issue that divides the optimists from the pessimists is whether military and civilian political leaders can construct and carry out a comprehensive strategy to extirpate militancy in Pakistan. From what I have read by optimists and pessimists, the government’s new antiterrorism strategy, which emerged after the popular outcry about the Peshawar tragedy, read literally, and as articulated by both civilian and military leaders, seems to support interpretation that its objective is the complete extirpation of militancy. And that interpretation inspires the pessimists to be pessimistic as to its feasibility as well as to the intentions of both the civilian government and the military, and it inspires the optimists to some (perhaps) wishful thinking.
It seems unlikely that many of the militants in Punjab would go quietly if the Army trained its sights on them
Such a strategy would entail not just continuing and winning the battle in Pakistan’s Northwest, but carrying the fight to the heart land of Pakistani militancy, Punjab. It seems unlikely that many of the militants in Punjab would go quietly if the Army trained its sights on them. While some would probably be willing to trade in their militancy for a price, my guess is that many would resist efforts to control and disarm them. The implication of this scenario is a long—perhaps decades long—struggle, an insurgency really in Pakistan’s largest and most populous province. Is the political class, let alone the army and the political leadership of either major party, ready for that?
One question is whether the situation is beyond such a solution. Are militants so entrenched, so numerous, so well-armed, have such support among the population, that the human and material costs of such a scenario are beyond comprehension – and beyond even the most virulent of anti-militant proponents to contemplate. What then? A standoff, a truce, a live and let live atmosphere? Isn’t that what there is now in Punjab? How sustainable would that be in the context of having eliminated militancy in the Northwest?
This raises the question is whether the strategy is ceteris paribus, words used by economists to convey the idea that one thing is happening while everything else is standing still. Or, in this context, is there an accompanying package that makes a strategy of extirpating militancy holistic? What would such a package entail? Wouldn’t it have to start with better governance: an economy growing sustainably at maximum rates; a complete and inclusive educational reform (don’t leave out the madrassas) that includes the curriculum, the access to school of all boys and girls; an energy reform policy that eliminates load shedding and thus that drag on industrial growth? How about a program of structural economic reform which would begin by revising the tax code to ensure that all Pakistanis pay their fair share of taxes, and that provides revenues commensurate with Pakistan’s needs and as it implements this part of the anti-militancy strategy. Is the Pakistani elite willing to pay for the enormous increase in resources needed to make the anti-militancy strategy work? Donors might help, but the major portion must come from Pakistanis.
One indication that the implicit long term nature of the of the anti-militancy strategy is not yet fully understood is the two-year life (at least in theory) of the constitutional amendment to allow the military to try terrorists. If the civilians really want to end military tribunals in two years, there must be a plan to reform the judiciary so that it will be trusted to do its job with terrorists when it inherits the responsibility back from the military. (Some of my friends would have written “if” it inherits that responsibility back.) Has such a plan been developed?
And here may lie the deeper dilemma of this anti-militancy strategy. Some of the pessimists argue that this extension of what should be a civilian judicial function to the military is only an outwardly visible sign of a silent encroachment of military governance — a voluntary shrinking of its responsibilities and its functions by a civilian government knocked on its heels by the Peshawar tragedy – giving greater political ground to the Army without a whimper. If this is correct, and the Army’s influence in policy is further expanded, isn’t Pakistan back to square one, and hasn’t the Army has restored its position to status quo ante 2008? Instead of the civil/military relationship that the 2008/2013 elections brought about, and many hoped would develop into civilian dominance and, at least the possibility of real reform, Pakistan may be back, in substance if not in form at least, to the old days when the military completely pretty much ran the show. Given the history of the past 35 years, how confident can we be that a Pakistan with the Army in control of most levers can (or will) carry out, to the full extent of its implied nature, the anti-militancy strategy it is now set upon?
The author is a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC and a former US diplomat who was Ambassador to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Chief of Mission in Liberia