Back in the late nineteen-eighties, a Karachi businessman of this commentator’s acquaintance was heard to say, “Whenever I return home from an overseas trip, I’m depressed for a month at seeing the dynamic progress being made in most other places compared to the squalid backwardness here. But now I even find myself in a state of depression after returning to Karachi from a trip to Lahore.”
This statement grew from the observation that the regions of Central and Northern Punjab, in general, and the city of Lahore, in particular, had been the unabashed beneficiaries of General Ziaul Haq’s largesse and the notably effective administration of General Ghulam Jilani and his political protégé Mian Nawaz Sharif. In 1981, General Jilani had picked the latter as a member of the Punjab Advisory Council. Sharif was appointed as the provincial Finance Minister, in which role he presented development-oriented budgets and gained prominence in Punjab province. With financial policies drafted and approved by Sharif, and backed by General Zia, Punjab province benefited and the purchasing power of the Punjabi business and trading classes greatly and exponentially swelled. The success story of Punjab, in contrast with the deliberately nurtured decrepitude in Sindh, gave Sharif a reputation for being action-oriented and possessing executive competence.
In 1985, General Jilani nominated Sharif as Chief Minister of Punjab, against the wishes of Prime Minister Junejo. Sharif went on to serve for two consecutive terms there, during the second of which (1988-1990), his insolence and obduracy made life miserable for Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. In the elections of 1990, the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), of which Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League was the largest component, gained a comfortable majority. In power, the IJI was disbanded and the PML, under Sharif, now came to dominate the political scene. Sharif’s first stint as PM (abruptly cut short by President Ishaq Khan and General Wahid Kakar) was noteworthy for liberalisation of foreign exchange transactions and the taxation system, and emergence of business-friendly national policies.
[quote]The crisis is now far beyond containing[/quote]
It is worth pointing out that this was the first time in the history of independent Pakistan that a party carrying the Muslim League label had been able to score this well in a more or less free and fair election. The pre-Partition Muslim League had been a broad national movement, standard bearer of the Pakistan project, and not a conventional political party. After Independence, it had quickly begun to disintegrate. Nawab Iftikhar Mamdot broke away to form his Awami Party. Shaheed Suhrawardy created the Awami Muslim League. Mian Iftikharuddin resigned his Cabinet position and formed the Azad Pakistan Party along with Shaukat Hyat. GM Syed formed the Sindh Awami Mahaz, Iskander Mirza promoted the formation of the Republican Party, with the help of Mushtaq Gurmani and Sardar Rashid Khan, who also roped in Dr Khan Sahib and Firoz Khan Noon. The League plumbed its depths when, in the East Bengal provincial elections of 1954, it was all but annihilated by a United Front, led by Fazlul Haq, Shaheed Suhrawardy and Hamid Khan Bhashani.
Thereafter, we hear about this party when Ayub Khan usurps of the name for his particular King’s Party, an action later repeated by Zia and Musharraf. In 1970, in the first free and fair general elections in Pakistan, the PML — in its ‘Conventionist’, ‘Council’, ‘Qayyum’, ‘Pagaro’ and other variants — was virtually wiped out by the twin political waves of Mujib’s Awami League and Bhutto’s PPP in the then two wings of the country.
Within Ziaul Haq’s ‘partyless’ Parliament of 1985, was conceived yet another PML, which I believe we should call the ‘PML Junejo’. By the time of the next real elections, those of 1988, this had re-emerged under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif. In 1990, Sharif’s IJI was to win the elections and form the government, the PML component of the IJI dominating overall and particularly in the Punjab. In the elections of 1996, the PML swept the polls, securing more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats and what Sharif referred to as his ‘massive mandate’. With Sharif in power again, his trademark neo-liberal, pro-business strategies were further enlarged and better relations with India, notably trade relations, were sought. This time, his tenure was disrupted by General Pervez Musharraf.
Thus, we see that the signature qualities of Sharif’s governmental style included, in addition to flashy infrastructure projects and ‘Yellow’ vote-catchers, a measure of executive effectiveness, action orientation and robust electoral campaign management. Rejecting both the traditional bureaucratic version of capitalism and left-wing populism, Sharif successfully cultivated and established a business-friendly conservative political positioning, based on free trade and a liberal economic environment. On the negative side were observed blatant cronyism, Punjab-centrism, lack of intellectual finesse, his notorious two-minute span of attention, and alleged massive corruption.
More important, we see a politician, mid-wifed and nurtured by the military Establishment, who falls afoul of that very Establishment, leading the latter to cut short his stints in national government after only thirty months in April 1990, three months (following reinstatement by the Supreme Court) in July 1990, and thirty-two months in October 1999. His current tenure had run a mere fourteen months before it was severely challenged by serious, if localised, agitations stimulated by (according to Imran Khan himself) an unnamed “third umpire”.
Sharif’s present stint in power at the Federal level has seriously dented his former reputation for executive effectiveness. One does not need to be a deranged PIT/PAT follower to agree that there has been negligible governmental or legislative action on any development-related issue since Mian Sahib took the reins of power this time around. Worse, his government waffled fatuously over the issue of the Taliban, even indulging in senseless ‘negotiations’ with mass-murderers and anti-state terrorists, until the military decided, seemingly on its own steam, to move into action. There are clearly major problems in Pakistan’s relations with our ‘all-weather friend’ China, for which Mr Imran Khan can scarcely be held responsible, and the outreach to India has clearly, disastrously failed. But we, of course, do not even have a Foreign Minister.
Finally, one must point in despair to the appalling mishandling by Sharif of the crisis stirred up by the two Dharna-wallahs and their ‘third umpire’. Before the crisis had actually broken, when it was time to defuse it, the government turned crude and violent. When it was time to exhibit no-nonsense firmness, prior to the invasion of the Red Zone, the government simply melted away. The crisis now is far beyond containing. But the Prime Minister still sees no need to take along the citizens of the country and talks only to the high and mighty.
Is Nawaz Sharif going? The answer is: Not very far.
This statement grew from the observation that the regions of Central and Northern Punjab, in general, and the city of Lahore, in particular, had been the unabashed beneficiaries of General Ziaul Haq’s largesse and the notably effective administration of General Ghulam Jilani and his political protégé Mian Nawaz Sharif. In 1981, General Jilani had picked the latter as a member of the Punjab Advisory Council. Sharif was appointed as the provincial Finance Minister, in which role he presented development-oriented budgets and gained prominence in Punjab province. With financial policies drafted and approved by Sharif, and backed by General Zia, Punjab province benefited and the purchasing power of the Punjabi business and trading classes greatly and exponentially swelled. The success story of Punjab, in contrast with the deliberately nurtured decrepitude in Sindh, gave Sharif a reputation for being action-oriented and possessing executive competence.
In 1985, General Jilani nominated Sharif as Chief Minister of Punjab, against the wishes of Prime Minister Junejo. Sharif went on to serve for two consecutive terms there, during the second of which (1988-1990), his insolence and obduracy made life miserable for Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. In the elections of 1990, the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), of which Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League was the largest component, gained a comfortable majority. In power, the IJI was disbanded and the PML, under Sharif, now came to dominate the political scene. Sharif’s first stint as PM (abruptly cut short by President Ishaq Khan and General Wahid Kakar) was noteworthy for liberalisation of foreign exchange transactions and the taxation system, and emergence of business-friendly national policies.
[quote]The crisis is now far beyond containing[/quote]
It is worth pointing out that this was the first time in the history of independent Pakistan that a party carrying the Muslim League label had been able to score this well in a more or less free and fair election. The pre-Partition Muslim League had been a broad national movement, standard bearer of the Pakistan project, and not a conventional political party. After Independence, it had quickly begun to disintegrate. Nawab Iftikhar Mamdot broke away to form his Awami Party. Shaheed Suhrawardy created the Awami Muslim League. Mian Iftikharuddin resigned his Cabinet position and formed the Azad Pakistan Party along with Shaukat Hyat. GM Syed formed the Sindh Awami Mahaz, Iskander Mirza promoted the formation of the Republican Party, with the help of Mushtaq Gurmani and Sardar Rashid Khan, who also roped in Dr Khan Sahib and Firoz Khan Noon. The League plumbed its depths when, in the East Bengal provincial elections of 1954, it was all but annihilated by a United Front, led by Fazlul Haq, Shaheed Suhrawardy and Hamid Khan Bhashani.
Thereafter, we hear about this party when Ayub Khan usurps of the name for his particular King’s Party, an action later repeated by Zia and Musharraf. In 1970, in the first free and fair general elections in Pakistan, the PML — in its ‘Conventionist’, ‘Council’, ‘Qayyum’, ‘Pagaro’ and other variants — was virtually wiped out by the twin political waves of Mujib’s Awami League and Bhutto’s PPP in the then two wings of the country.
Within Ziaul Haq’s ‘partyless’ Parliament of 1985, was conceived yet another PML, which I believe we should call the ‘PML Junejo’. By the time of the next real elections, those of 1988, this had re-emerged under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif. In 1990, Sharif’s IJI was to win the elections and form the government, the PML component of the IJI dominating overall and particularly in the Punjab. In the elections of 1996, the PML swept the polls, securing more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats and what Sharif referred to as his ‘massive mandate’. With Sharif in power again, his trademark neo-liberal, pro-business strategies were further enlarged and better relations with India, notably trade relations, were sought. This time, his tenure was disrupted by General Pervez Musharraf.
Thus, we see that the signature qualities of Sharif’s governmental style included, in addition to flashy infrastructure projects and ‘Yellow’ vote-catchers, a measure of executive effectiveness, action orientation and robust electoral campaign management. Rejecting both the traditional bureaucratic version of capitalism and left-wing populism, Sharif successfully cultivated and established a business-friendly conservative political positioning, based on free trade and a liberal economic environment. On the negative side were observed blatant cronyism, Punjab-centrism, lack of intellectual finesse, his notorious two-minute span of attention, and alleged massive corruption.
More important, we see a politician, mid-wifed and nurtured by the military Establishment, who falls afoul of that very Establishment, leading the latter to cut short his stints in national government after only thirty months in April 1990, three months (following reinstatement by the Supreme Court) in July 1990, and thirty-two months in October 1999. His current tenure had run a mere fourteen months before it was severely challenged by serious, if localised, agitations stimulated by (according to Imran Khan himself) an unnamed “third umpire”.
Sharif’s present stint in power at the Federal level has seriously dented his former reputation for executive effectiveness. One does not need to be a deranged PIT/PAT follower to agree that there has been negligible governmental or legislative action on any development-related issue since Mian Sahib took the reins of power this time around. Worse, his government waffled fatuously over the issue of the Taliban, even indulging in senseless ‘negotiations’ with mass-murderers and anti-state terrorists, until the military decided, seemingly on its own steam, to move into action. There are clearly major problems in Pakistan’s relations with our ‘all-weather friend’ China, for which Mr Imran Khan can scarcely be held responsible, and the outreach to India has clearly, disastrously failed. But we, of course, do not even have a Foreign Minister.
Finally, one must point in despair to the appalling mishandling by Sharif of the crisis stirred up by the two Dharna-wallahs and their ‘third umpire’. Before the crisis had actually broken, when it was time to defuse it, the government turned crude and violent. When it was time to exhibit no-nonsense firmness, prior to the invasion of the Red Zone, the government simply melted away. The crisis now is far beyond containing. But the Prime Minister still sees no need to take along the citizens of the country and talks only to the high and mighty.
Is Nawaz Sharif going? The answer is: Not very far.