In an extraordinary interview to the BBC, ex-DG-ISPR, Maj-Gen (r) Athar Abbas has shed light on an issue that has long perplexed many analysts. Why, when friends and foes at home and abroad were all expecting the army to launch a military operation in North Waziristan in 2010-11 to stop it from becoming a base area for all manner of terrorists, did the then army chief, General Kayani, not take the plunge?
The question is critical especially because, according to Gen Abbas, the army’s formation commanders were generally agreed upon the necessity of such a course of urgent action in order to control the spread of militancy and terrorism, an assessment that has turned out to be correct because of the terrible loss of army and civilian lives at the hands of the terrorists based in NWA since then.
Gen Abbas has also explained the factors that led General Kayani to stay his hand. First, the army chief believed that in the face of such an operation the militant groups and tribes allied to the military in one way or another would turn against the army and join the militant groups. Second, he worried about how to expel the foreign militant-assets belonging to the Haqqani network and how to deal with the flood of IDPs that would inevitably follow a military operation. Third, he was concerned about the inability of the government’s other intelligence and law enforcement agencies to cope with the expected terrorist backlash in the settled urban areas. Fourth, in the absence of a national consensus, he was afraid about a militant reaction from the religious right wing. Fifth, he could not shrug away the probability that he would personally become a target for the terrorists like General Pervez Musharaf before him.
There is absolutely no doubt that General Abbas is speaking the truth. Two other facts support his statement. First, in March 2011, Maj-Gen Ghayur Mehmood of the army’s Seventh Division in North Waziristan told a group of specially assembled reporters that the “myths and rumours about U.S. Predator strikes and the casualty figures are many, but it’s a reality that many of those being killed in these strikes are hardcore elements, a sizable number of them foreigners.” This statement blatantly conflicted with the popular perception that the drones were the root cause of terrorism because of the collateral damage they inflicted. It led perceptive analysts to argue that Gen Ghayur‘s statement was deliberately given in order to pave the way for a military operation in NWA in cooperation with the Americans. Instead, it ended up sowing confusion when no such thing happened and Gen Ghayur conveniently “disappeared” from the scene without any censure, suggesting a change of mind at the last minute. Second, statements emanating from Washington DC, in particular from Admiral Mike Mullen, the US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, who boasted of his friendship with Gen Kayani, confirmed that an operation was on the cards. Later, on the eve of his retirement, Admiral Mullen spoke bitterly of being misled by General Kayani and breaching his “trust” by going back on his word to launch the operation.
Gen Abbas’s statement is an indictment of General Kayani’s misplaced tactical concreteness. Three years later, with the death toll from terrorism exacting an existential price, the problem has become bigger because the state’s vulnerabilities have become more pronounced after the terrorists have used the time and space to become more organised and efficient. A more apt epitaph could not have been uttered: “For six years General Kayani kept vacillating over the issue and in six months, this leader (General Raheel Sharif) decided this is the crux of the problem. It’s a matter of how decisive you are, how much you have the ability to sift essentials from non-essentials”.
Why has General Abbas thought fit to shed light on this issue at this time and that too in an interview to the BBC? His answer – “the issue came up in the interview and I had to face the truth squarely” – doesn’t wash.
A productive line of reasoning would suggest that, like General Ghayur in 2011, Gen Abbas has obtained “clearance” for his interview from the “top”. General Raheel Sharif is saddled with General Kayani’s legacy in more ways than one, not least in a section of corps commanders and intelligence chiefs that might be a drag on the new army chief’s political, strategic and tactical vision. So it helps in exposing the failings of the past not just in order to achieve unity and success in the current mission but also to establish his own authority amongst his predecessor’s appointees. It is also important to send a strong signal abroad to the international community that this time the army leadership is not playing a “double game” and can be trusted to keep its word. What better forum to send this message at this time than the BBC.
The question is critical especially because, according to Gen Abbas, the army’s formation commanders were generally agreed upon the necessity of such a course of urgent action in order to control the spread of militancy and terrorism, an assessment that has turned out to be correct because of the terrible loss of army and civilian lives at the hands of the terrorists based in NWA since then.
Gen Abbas has also explained the factors that led General Kayani to stay his hand. First, the army chief believed that in the face of such an operation the militant groups and tribes allied to the military in one way or another would turn against the army and join the militant groups. Second, he worried about how to expel the foreign militant-assets belonging to the Haqqani network and how to deal with the flood of IDPs that would inevitably follow a military operation. Third, he was concerned about the inability of the government’s other intelligence and law enforcement agencies to cope with the expected terrorist backlash in the settled urban areas. Fourth, in the absence of a national consensus, he was afraid about a militant reaction from the religious right wing. Fifth, he could not shrug away the probability that he would personally become a target for the terrorists like General Pervez Musharaf before him.
There is absolutely no doubt that General Abbas is speaking the truth. Two other facts support his statement. First, in March 2011, Maj-Gen Ghayur Mehmood of the army’s Seventh Division in North Waziristan told a group of specially assembled reporters that the “myths and rumours about U.S. Predator strikes and the casualty figures are many, but it’s a reality that many of those being killed in these strikes are hardcore elements, a sizable number of them foreigners.” This statement blatantly conflicted with the popular perception that the drones were the root cause of terrorism because of the collateral damage they inflicted. It led perceptive analysts to argue that Gen Ghayur‘s statement was deliberately given in order to pave the way for a military operation in NWA in cooperation with the Americans. Instead, it ended up sowing confusion when no such thing happened and Gen Ghayur conveniently “disappeared” from the scene without any censure, suggesting a change of mind at the last minute. Second, statements emanating from Washington DC, in particular from Admiral Mike Mullen, the US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, who boasted of his friendship with Gen Kayani, confirmed that an operation was on the cards. Later, on the eve of his retirement, Admiral Mullen spoke bitterly of being misled by General Kayani and breaching his “trust” by going back on his word to launch the operation.
Gen Abbas’s statement is an indictment of General Kayani’s misplaced tactical concreteness. Three years later, with the death toll from terrorism exacting an existential price, the problem has become bigger because the state’s vulnerabilities have become more pronounced after the terrorists have used the time and space to become more organised and efficient. A more apt epitaph could not have been uttered: “For six years General Kayani kept vacillating over the issue and in six months, this leader (General Raheel Sharif) decided this is the crux of the problem. It’s a matter of how decisive you are, how much you have the ability to sift essentials from non-essentials”.
Why has General Abbas thought fit to shed light on this issue at this time and that too in an interview to the BBC? His answer – “the issue came up in the interview and I had to face the truth squarely” – doesn’t wash.
A productive line of reasoning would suggest that, like General Ghayur in 2011, Gen Abbas has obtained “clearance” for his interview from the “top”. General Raheel Sharif is saddled with General Kayani’s legacy in more ways than one, not least in a section of corps commanders and intelligence chiefs that might be a drag on the new army chief’s political, strategic and tactical vision. So it helps in exposing the failings of the past not just in order to achieve unity and success in the current mission but also to establish his own authority amongst his predecessor’s appointees. It is also important to send a strong signal abroad to the international community that this time the army leadership is not playing a “double game” and can be trusted to keep its word. What better forum to send this message at this time than the BBC.