Although Pakistan and Italy are poles apart in many ways, the two countries are similar in how they place religion on the top of the state pyramid, to overcome perceived threats to the state’s unity at the cost of progressive dynamic and responsive democratic system. While both the countries opted to employ religion for political ends, Pakistan was a step ahead, using religion as a foreign policy tool too. The crisis both the countries face is proportional to their use of religion as a political tool.
In the Italian case, Catholicism — the religion of a majority of the population – was proposed to provide a cementing force to Italian unity which, according to Professor Alessandro Ferrari, had a fortuitous character that was achieved through the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861 and the capture of Rome in 1870. However, in case of Pakistan, religion could not prevent the dismemberment of the country in 1971.
Italy certainly benefited from the surrounding environment wherein others in the modern Europe struggled, as professor Ferrari argues in his work Civil Religion In Italy: A “Mission Impossible”?, “to invest in a direct relationship between individual and state to privatize the monopoly on the religion and to publicize its many agents. Yet if, the geographical integrity is being attribute to the cementing force of religion then Italy achieved it at the greater cost of institutional and governance cost.”
Like articles 2A of Pakistan’s constitution of 1973, that declares ‘Objectives Resolution’ a substantive part of the constitution, the Italian constitution of 1948 guarantees the prominent position of the Catholic Church. That hampered the growth and development of state institutions, because , in the words of Professor Farrari, ‘the liberal governments were worried about conciliating the Church with the new central power, than they were about enlarging the spaces for political participation that established ‘a protected democracy’, a democracy subordinated to the objectives and non-negotiable values of a single church.”
The state, unlike religion, requires dynamic institutions, and flexible and progressive legislative system to cope with the emerging socio-economic and political challenges. But states having religion as the determining factor in the process of law making and implementation systems render the system incapable of coming up with timely and proper legislation to face the challenges of governance and the increasing demand and expectations of the citizens. As Farrari argues, “The Italian experience in the nineteenth century provides a great example of how a liberal state could face a strong and undemocratic power—that refused to recognize the legitimization of the secular institutions—without renouncing the protection of freedoms for individual citizens or for ecclesiastical organizations themselves.” And thus, in Italy, the state apparatus remain the same as in the former fascist regime.
The Italian unification was geographical, without a politically active middle class and constitutional reforms required for the cultivation of process of nationalization with more secular values, Professor Ferrari further elaborates. The duality of system creates vacuums and disconnects in the state system that consequently erode the state writ and governance capabilities. The voids are often filled by non-sate actors. Nichols Machiavelli, an Italian political philosopher, in his fifteenth century epoch making work, warned that the state and religion have different values, morality, and obligations and fusing both can lead to instability.
The duality of the system struggling to achieve the opposing ends results in confusion, rendering it ineffective and inefficient. The political elites, instead of improving economic conditions and service delivery through responsive and transparent institutional mechanisms, use religion as a pacification tool that not only creates a layback mentality syndrome in elites but also in citizens. The religious elites strive to use the state for ecclesiastical ends to augment sectional interests.
In both Italy and Pakistan, the religion failed to infuse its moral values in the state but the duality and competing interests affected the welfare and civic sense of the citizens. As Dr Giovanna Gioli of Italy, holding a PhD degree in political philosophy, explains: ‘’We have still the unresolved North/South divide. The South is still in many ways a pre-industrial region with a ‘magic’ sense of life and of religion… the Church certainly plays a crucial role in our politics and we can say that both the church and the mafia ruined the prospect of good governance in the country. The predominant role of Church and the weak institutions under its shadow as outcome of polarization failed to check the emergence of criminal organization like the mafia that further sucked in the writ of the state, institutional growth and rule of law.”
Similarly, in Pakistan, the moral values and transparency, at institutional as well as social level, along with the rule of law progressively deteriorated in the face of increasing religious sentiments and ritualism, particularly after the Islamization drive of 1980s.
Moreover, patriotism is not a necessary outcome of such a process. It comes from the nature of state-citizens relationship and how both sides meet each other’s expectations.
Italy has the advantage of being religiously homogenous as a majority of its population belong to the Catholic faith. Such cultural and religious homogeneity produced a social cohesion. But, Farrari laments, that social cohesion could not transform into patriotism founded on the common bond of citizenship based on public institutions.
Relatively, Pakistan presents a gloomier picture in this regard because of the prevailing sectarian divide. Currently, It seems that religious extremism, and on the top of it sectarianism, pose a threat to the writ of the state and its constitutional framework more than any other elements. Unlike Italy, having the Vatican city (center of Catholicism) that commands religious loyalties of the Italian citizens, Pakistan cannot claim the undivided religious loyalties of citizens toward the state as none of the holy places of any sect are situated in Pakistan. The more the state of Pakistan whips up the religious sentiments of its citizens for nationalistic ends, the more it pushes the loyalties toward the states where the holy places of the respective sects are situated.
Religion could be a tool of specification and unifying force at individual and group levels, but not on the state level. Thus, one can conclude that in the state project, religion cannot prove a cementing force in the national integration process. National integration needs dynamic independent institutional framework supported by progressive legislative mechanisms that could remove regional disparities and marginalization through good and responsive governance system. The state cannot absolve itself from, and the citizens cannot condone the state for not delivering worldly amenities in lieu of religious services.
The writer is an Islamabad based researcher is interested in climate change, migration, peace and conflict
Email: talimand.khan@gmail.com
Twitter: @talimandkhan1
In the Italian case, Catholicism — the religion of a majority of the population – was proposed to provide a cementing force to Italian unity which, according to Professor Alessandro Ferrari, had a fortuitous character that was achieved through the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861 and the capture of Rome in 1870. However, in case of Pakistan, religion could not prevent the dismemberment of the country in 1971.
Italy certainly benefited from the surrounding environment wherein others in the modern Europe struggled, as professor Ferrari argues in his work Civil Religion In Italy: A “Mission Impossible”?, “to invest in a direct relationship between individual and state to privatize the monopoly on the religion and to publicize its many agents. Yet if, the geographical integrity is being attribute to the cementing force of religion then Italy achieved it at the greater cost of institutional and governance cost.”
Like articles 2A of Pakistan’s constitution of 1973, that declares ‘Objectives Resolution’ a substantive part of the constitution, the Italian constitution of 1948 guarantees the prominent position of the Catholic Church. That hampered the growth and development of state institutions, because , in the words of Professor Farrari, ‘the liberal governments were worried about conciliating the Church with the new central power, than they were about enlarging the spaces for political participation that established ‘a protected democracy’, a democracy subordinated to the objectives and non-negotiable values of a single church.”
The state, unlike religion, requires dynamic institutions, and flexible and progressive legislative system to cope with the emerging socio-economic and political challenges. But states having religion as the determining factor in the process of law making and implementation systems render the system incapable of coming up with timely and proper legislation to face the challenges of governance and the increasing demand and expectations of the citizens. As Farrari argues, “The Italian experience in the nineteenth century provides a great example of how a liberal state could face a strong and undemocratic power—that refused to recognize the legitimization of the secular institutions—without renouncing the protection of freedoms for individual citizens or for ecclesiastical organizations themselves.” And thus, in Italy, the state apparatus remain the same as in the former fascist regime.
The Italian unification was geographical, without a politically active middle class and constitutional reforms required for the cultivation of process of nationalization with more secular values, Professor Ferrari further elaborates. The duality of system creates vacuums and disconnects in the state system that consequently erode the state writ and governance capabilities. The voids are often filled by non-sate actors. Nichols Machiavelli, an Italian political philosopher, in his fifteenth century epoch making work, warned that the state and religion have different values, morality, and obligations and fusing both can lead to instability.
The duality of the system struggling to achieve the opposing ends results in confusion, rendering it ineffective and inefficient. The political elites, instead of improving economic conditions and service delivery through responsive and transparent institutional mechanisms, use religion as a pacification tool that not only creates a layback mentality syndrome in elites but also in citizens. The religious elites strive to use the state for ecclesiastical ends to augment sectional interests.
In both Italy and Pakistan, the religion failed to infuse its moral values in the state but the duality and competing interests affected the welfare and civic sense of the citizens. As Dr Giovanna Gioli of Italy, holding a PhD degree in political philosophy, explains: ‘’We have still the unresolved North/South divide. The South is still in many ways a pre-industrial region with a ‘magic’ sense of life and of religion… the Church certainly plays a crucial role in our politics and we can say that both the church and the mafia ruined the prospect of good governance in the country. The predominant role of Church and the weak institutions under its shadow as outcome of polarization failed to check the emergence of criminal organization like the mafia that further sucked in the writ of the state, institutional growth and rule of law.”
Similarly, in Pakistan, the moral values and transparency, at institutional as well as social level, along with the rule of law progressively deteriorated in the face of increasing religious sentiments and ritualism, particularly after the Islamization drive of 1980s.
Moreover, patriotism is not a necessary outcome of such a process. It comes from the nature of state-citizens relationship and how both sides meet each other’s expectations.
Italy has the advantage of being religiously homogenous as a majority of its population belong to the Catholic faith. Such cultural and religious homogeneity produced a social cohesion. But, Farrari laments, that social cohesion could not transform into patriotism founded on the common bond of citizenship based on public institutions.
Relatively, Pakistan presents a gloomier picture in this regard because of the prevailing sectarian divide. Currently, It seems that religious extremism, and on the top of it sectarianism, pose a threat to the writ of the state and its constitutional framework more than any other elements. Unlike Italy, having the Vatican city (center of Catholicism) that commands religious loyalties of the Italian citizens, Pakistan cannot claim the undivided religious loyalties of citizens toward the state as none of the holy places of any sect are situated in Pakistan. The more the state of Pakistan whips up the religious sentiments of its citizens for nationalistic ends, the more it pushes the loyalties toward the states where the holy places of the respective sects are situated.
Religion could be a tool of specification and unifying force at individual and group levels, but not on the state level. Thus, one can conclude that in the state project, religion cannot prove a cementing force in the national integration process. National integration needs dynamic independent institutional framework supported by progressive legislative mechanisms that could remove regional disparities and marginalization through good and responsive governance system. The state cannot absolve itself from, and the citizens cannot condone the state for not delivering worldly amenities in lieu of religious services.
The writer is an Islamabad based researcher is interested in climate change, migration, peace and conflict
Email: talimand.khan@gmail.com
Twitter: @talimandkhan1