The recent terrorist attack on a court in Islamabad cleared several misplaced notions, brought attention to several ignored facts, and reiterated some lessons that we so stubbornly refuse to learn.
The first false notion it shattered was a belief that the Taliban would abide by their promise of a one-month ceasefire. The authorities had taken the bait and unwittingly lowered their guards. The residents of Islamabad entering the city from the motorway would have noticed that days before the incident, most barricades at the entrances of the capital had been removed. The militants availed the opportunity and struck hard at the heart of Pakistan.
Despite this grave violation, it was considered wise to keep the ceasefire intact as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had denied its involvement in the attack. Another little known group claimed responsibility. But analysts are certain of the involvement of TTP in the attack through its proxies.
Those who advocated talks with the TTP ignored that fact they were not simple, honest people, and the assurances of the militants and their guarantors should have been taken with a pinch of salt. It is quite clear that the government had seriously committed itself to give negotiations a try, and sincerely believed that talks would work – a grave imprudence. Consequently, despite the killing of 1,357 innocent people in 1,380 terrorist attacks during 272 days of the new government, it continued to cling to the option of talks.
Patience and restraint are admirable traits, but letting the murderers carry on with their unabated killing spree cannot be termed patience. Has anyone tried to find out whether the parents and families of the 23 FC men who were slaughtered by the militants support negotiations with the murderers or whether they demand justice? Is somebody bothered about sensibilities of nears and dears of the victims of Islamabad court terrorist attack?
The government has formulated a draft of an internal security policy, but the point to understand is that policy is a larger concept. It gives an overall view and idea of handling a subject. It tells us what to do. But we are at a stage where we need to know how to do it. That is called strategy. After ten years of war with terrorists and insurgents, we don’t have to worry about the what. Policy will take care of itself, as the constitution of Pakistan is clear about it. The government needs to issue formally articulated official counterterrorism strategy in black and white. It should clearly state the objectives and assign responsibilities to all concerned agencies and departments. Talks can be one option among many.
But we have to move fast in this regard. We cannot sit back and show undue magnanimity while the terrorists slit throats of soldiers, dumping their headless bodies and uploading their video clips on social media. If this inactivity is due to fear that has gripped the hearts and minds of the government and the people, then the terrorists have already won.
There have been 13 peace deals and agreements with the Taliban, some tacit and unwritten, others announced in public. Many of them were negotiated by the military. Others, such as the Swat peace agreement for the implementation of Nizam-e-Adl, were made by the civilian government. All of these deals fell apart, resulting in more violence. The problem with those agreements was that they were all signed to pacify the adversary from a position of weakness. Aren’t we about to commit that same folly again? What is holding us from learning lessons from the past?
It can be argued that the government has the knowledge and resources to take a holistic view of the issue, and therefore it is probably in a better position to decide whether to talk to the terrorists or not. But, at the same time, it is morally bound to consider people’s sentiments. The people of Pakistan, especially the relatives and friends of the victims, will surely like the perpetrators to be hanged to death instead of being bestowed respect and recognition in negotiations. They would demand in unison that the culprits be pursued and punished. Their faith in the capability and intention of the state security apparatus to protect them from brutalities and fear is declining. And it is therefore time to raise the battle cry.
The writer is Honorary Director of the Centre for Peace and Security Studies, University of the Punjab, and holds Master’s degree in Intelligence and International Security from the War Studies Department at King’s College London
The first false notion it shattered was a belief that the Taliban would abide by their promise of a one-month ceasefire. The authorities had taken the bait and unwittingly lowered their guards. The residents of Islamabad entering the city from the motorway would have noticed that days before the incident, most barricades at the entrances of the capital had been removed. The militants availed the opportunity and struck hard at the heart of Pakistan.
Despite this grave violation, it was considered wise to keep the ceasefire intact as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had denied its involvement in the attack. Another little known group claimed responsibility. But analysts are certain of the involvement of TTP in the attack through its proxies.
Those who advocated talks with the TTP ignored that fact they were not simple, honest people, and the assurances of the militants and their guarantors should have been taken with a pinch of salt. It is quite clear that the government had seriously committed itself to give negotiations a try, and sincerely believed that talks would work – a grave imprudence. Consequently, despite the killing of 1,357 innocent people in 1,380 terrorist attacks during 272 days of the new government, it continued to cling to the option of talks.
Patience and restraint are admirable traits, but letting the murderers carry on with their unabated killing spree cannot be termed patience. Has anyone tried to find out whether the parents and families of the 23 FC men who were slaughtered by the militants support negotiations with the murderers or whether they demand justice? Is somebody bothered about sensibilities of nears and dears of the victims of Islamabad court terrorist attack?
The government has formulated a draft of an internal security policy, but the point to understand is that policy is a larger concept. It gives an overall view and idea of handling a subject. It tells us what to do. But we are at a stage where we need to know how to do it. That is called strategy. After ten years of war with terrorists and insurgents, we don’t have to worry about the what. Policy will take care of itself, as the constitution of Pakistan is clear about it. The government needs to issue formally articulated official counterterrorism strategy in black and white. It should clearly state the objectives and assign responsibilities to all concerned agencies and departments. Talks can be one option among many.
But we have to move fast in this regard. We cannot sit back and show undue magnanimity while the terrorists slit throats of soldiers, dumping their headless bodies and uploading their video clips on social media. If this inactivity is due to fear that has gripped the hearts and minds of the government and the people, then the terrorists have already won.
There have been 13 peace deals and agreements with the Taliban, some tacit and unwritten, others announced in public. Many of them were negotiated by the military. Others, such as the Swat peace agreement for the implementation of Nizam-e-Adl, were made by the civilian government. All of these deals fell apart, resulting in more violence. The problem with those agreements was that they were all signed to pacify the adversary from a position of weakness. Aren’t we about to commit that same folly again? What is holding us from learning lessons from the past?
It can be argued that the government has the knowledge and resources to take a holistic view of the issue, and therefore it is probably in a better position to decide whether to talk to the terrorists or not. But, at the same time, it is morally bound to consider people’s sentiments. The people of Pakistan, especially the relatives and friends of the victims, will surely like the perpetrators to be hanged to death instead of being bestowed respect and recognition in negotiations. They would demand in unison that the culprits be pursued and punished. Their faith in the capability and intention of the state security apparatus to protect them from brutalities and fear is declining. And it is therefore time to raise the battle cry.
The writer is Honorary Director of the Centre for Peace and Security Studies, University of the Punjab, and holds Master’s degree in Intelligence and International Security from the War Studies Department at King’s College London