Another trap?

Another trap?
For months, as the government, political parties and media all dithered over the pros and cons of a military operation against the murderous Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan flatly rejected the idea of a ceasefire prior to negotiations, instead setting up impossible preconditions for talks. Indeed, the more Pakistani politicians like Maulana Fazal ur Rahman and Imran Khan, demanded All Parties Conferences to cement a consensus about talking instead of fighting, the more the TTP was liable to launch attacks on military and civilians alike across the country. Since last September, when prime minister Nawaz Sharif called an APC to offer an olive branch to the TTP, to date, TTP suicide bombers and remote control IEDs have killed over 500 people and maimed thousands. In fact, since the PMLN government set up a committee on Jan 28 to talk to the TTP, terrorist strikes, for which one or another TTP franchise has boasted responsibility, have led to over 150 dead and injured. The straw that broke the military’s back was the savage beheading recently of 19 FC soldiers who’d been in the TTP’s captivity for several years. This provoked the military to carry out retaliatory air strikes on TTP strongholds and hideouts in North Waziristan. A second series of deadly air strikes last month have finally wrung out a call for ceasefire from the TTP, proving the wisdom of what some of us have been saying for months: if you want the TTP to listen to you, then you will first have to use the iron fist instead of proffering the velvet glove.

There is no doubt about it. The TTP’s offer of one month’s ceasefire is a trap that is tactically calibrated to sow confusion in our ranks and forestall fresh air strikes while waiting for winter to pass so that guerilla fluidity is restored and the TTP can melt away and regroup in the face of targeted operations.

Unfortunately, however, the logic of the TTP’s ideology and strategy, in association with that of Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban – creation of a base-area state in northern Pakistan that is reflected in their demand for the Pakistan army to withdraw from Waziristan – is lost on the likes of Imran Khan, on religious parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Ulema and on sections of the Pakistani media. Consider.

The Afghan Taliban have long baited the Americans and the Karzai government with prospects of talks but never held them or conceded anything because they know that when America exits Afghanistan the Karzai regime will collapse sooner than later, so it is better to dig in and fight later than sooner. Similarly, the Pakistani Taliban know that when the Afghan Taliban have a freer hand in Afghanistan after the Americans leave, they too will have greater maneuverability against the Pakistan army when their Afghan allies help them erase the Durand Line. Thousands of Afghan Taliban have already made Waziristan a second permanent home away from home and they are not likely to let go without a fight.

There is another more relevant point that is largely missing from the Pakistani debate about whether to talk or fight the TTP. The Afghan Taliban have a locus standi and raison d’etre. They are fighting to reclaim a lost state at the hands of a foreign invader. So it makes sense for the departing Americans and the tottering puppet Karzai regime they leave behind to try and negotiate some sort of power-sharing formula with the Taliban just as it makes sense for their adversaries to hold out and settle for nothing less than Kabul. But what is the Pakistani state going to negotiate with the TTP? A chunk of Pakistani territory for a new Islamic Taliban state? A new Islamic constitution? Power-sharing in Islamabad?

The PMLN government has responded to the ceasefire offer by “institutionalizing” the negotiation process. This means that it has effectively tasked the interior minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan to enable the military to take ownership of war or peace even though the Chief Minister and Governor of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa are supposed to be part of the decision making process. It is a cunning move that compels those who want to fight (the military under General Raheel Sharif) and those who want to talk or appease (the KPK government under the PTI-JI) to sit together and decide. This is exactly what President Asif Zardari did two years ago when he got the interior minister Rehman Malik to enable the military under General Ashfaq Kayani that didn’t want to fight and the KPK government under ANP that wanted to fight to sit and decide. In the event, the military had its way and the ANP paid the price for it. Much the same is likely to happen now, except the other way round and with greater confusion and disquiet.

This sort of politics has exacted a heavy price of state and society in the last three decades.  It is time to stop playing politics and act forcefully to defend Pakistan.

Najam Aziz Sethi is a Pakistani journalist, businessman who is also the founder of The Friday Times and Vanguard Books. Previously, as an administrator, he served as Chairman of Pakistan Cricket Board, caretaker Federal Minister of Pakistan and Chief Minister of Punjab, Pakistan.