Waiting for miracles

very time a Pakistani opposition leader comes to Washington, it is to get access to America’s corridors of power to plead the case for Pakistan’s return to full democracy.

The Bush administration remains unconvinced. It has a nice and beneficial relationship going with the General Pervez Musharraf-led quasi-civilian regime and it does not seem interested in upsetting the applecart. Pakistan is delivering almost on schedule and according to the script and the administration cannot ask for more. This is also clear from the recent Congressional testimonies given by the US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice. Dr Rice on all occasions claimed that Islamabad was cooperating on the nuclear proliferation issue and had been most active on the counter-terrorism front. Washington also feels a military-led government would be more malleable than a purely civilian dispensation. It is easier to deal with the military than a noisy, messy democracy.

Small wonder then that Pakistani opposition leaders are generally cold-shouldered. However, pragmatic reasons are not the only factor for the US to keep Pakistani politicians at bay. There is also a high degree of frustration with the political leaders who, Americans think, are inefficient, corrupt and slothful. The American policymaking circles, including the think-tank community, do not seem interested in key Pakistani opposition leaders. The State and other departments find it pretty off-putting to see these leaders plead for American help to return to power. How can America support these leaders when they have so little to show for their politics? They cannot even mobilise the masses or cause political unrest. Their internal party structures are in disarray, the local leaders have no incentive to motivate the cadres or win more members, and top leaders invariably are authoritarian.

It is essential for the political leadership to realise that the global environment is not favourable for a civilian regime that has no wherewithal to interest the world. Even the think tanks in the US are averse to suggesting an alternative position.

Indeed, the behaviour of the political opposition in Pakistan is intriguing. It shows a high degree of inertia, which prevents the political leadership from reorganising and regrouping. The opposition cannot even come up with ideas and stories to embarrass the regime. This is either owed to lethargy or personal stakes.

While one could explain this behaviour without necessarily understanding it, there is need to study it in terms of its structure. What logic does the opposition employ to justify what it is doing or, more appropriately, not doing? It seems that some parties are waiting and hoping that the ground reality will change at some point. In this case, the leaders are looking at the future.

There are two underlying assumptions. First, it is understood that there is no possibility of reconciliation with the present military regime. For General Musharraf, politics is a personal game. He would certainly not like to accept a modus vivendi with, for instance, the two former premiers. His statement that he would not allow them to take part in politics should be taken seriously. There have been contacts, no doubt. Benazir Bhutto has talked about talks, as has General Musharraf. But there is little likelihood of Musharraf either changing the system or allowing Bhutto or Sharif to return and take part in politics.

There are only two scenarios: engagement with the military and compromise and impending and potential conflict.

Second, the opposition is depending on some heavenly intervention that might change the ground reality. It is in this connection that it is also appealing to the US, hoping that the Americans would facilitate a return to full civilian rule. It doesn’t seem to be working. It is difficult to see how that can happen short of direct US intervention. And if the hope is that fate might remove Musharraf, one is not sure if subsequent events could play out like 1988.

One of the problems with the 1988 scenario is that it assumes that there would be a replay and fair elections will be held. Also, that the PPP would come back to power. There is also a hidden assumption that the army would be sufficiently divided for the political process to kick off without major intervention. This is a good, but risky assertion. Such estimates also appear to be based on different assessments of how far the army is divided as an institution. There are several reports on fissures within the defence establishment. These divisions are both vertical and horizontal. There are ethnic as well as ideological divisions. It is true that the army would come under a lot of pressure and it won’t be easy for it to intervene.

However, none of this indicates a favourable situation for the political stakeholders, especially if those currently out of power want to change the tenor of politics and policymaking in the future. One could argue that the above-mentioned divisions within the armed forces could also help get one of the opposition parties into power, but it is not a dependable formula. A division that brings a dramatic change in the top management does not indicate a pleasant shift that one would look forward to. This would be an unstable change born out of violence.

What is even more important is the fact that the army ahs developed hardened perceptions regarding various political parties. The mistrust of the PPP, for instance, is shared across the board. While one could get into long-drawn explanation of how this negative image has come about, the fact is that the party leadership needs to address this problem.

Compromise and political adjustment is certainly not an alternative. What is required is the ability of the leadership to rebuild the party and infuse political life into its structure. The PPP can certainly not depend on the past laurels of its leadership. It needs to do something politically new and exciting, in other words have a viable strategy. The international players find it disconcerting that the leadership has nothing to say except compare their past achievements with that of the present regime or claiming that they (the political leaders) would do better than the man in uniform. The political opposition is badly in need of reinventing a political endgame. Continued dependence on miracles would result in continued political instability and disaster.