T he United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and Jinnah Institute (JI), Pakistan co-convened a project aimed at gathering and articulating informed Pakistani opinion on the evolving situation in Afghanistan. Following are excerpts from their report.

Pakistan's Objectives in Afghanistan:In terms of the end game, Pakistani policy elite see their state as having defined two overriding objectives: The "settlement" in Afghanistan should not lead to a negative spillover such that it contributes to further instability in Pakistan or causes resentment among Pakistani Pashtuns; and The government in Kabul should not be antagonistic to Pakistan and should not allow its territory to be used against Pakistani state interests. Translated into actionable policy, these umbrella objectives lead Pakistan to pursue three outcomes:

A degree of stability in Afghanistan: Project participants felt that Pakistan's interests are best served by a relatively stable government in Kabul that is not hostile towards Pakistan. There was across the board realization among the participants that persistent instability in Afghanistan will have numerous and predictable consequences for Pakistan that it is ill-prepared to tackle.

An inclusive government in Kabul: Pakistan prefers a negotiated configuration with adequate Pashtun representation that is recognized by all ethnic and political stakeholders in Afghanistan. Some of the opinion makers insisted that given the current situation, a sustainable arrangement would necessarily require the main Taliban factions - particularly Mullah Omar's "Quetta Shura" Taliban and the Haqqani network - to be part of the new political arrangement.

Limiting Indian presence to development activities: Pakistani foreign policy elite accept that India has a role to play in Afghanistan's economic progress and prosperity. However, many participants perceived the present Indian engagement to be going beyond strictly development. They wish to see greater transparency on Indian actions and objectives.

Views on US Strategy in Afghanistan: Pakistani policy elite involved in the project perceived America's Afghanistan strategy to date to be inconsistent and counterproductive to Pakistan's interests. The most scathing criticism was targeted at the political component of the strategy, which is largely seen to be subservient to the military surge. Not many among the participants were optimistic about the prospects of the surge. While there was recognition that operations over the past year have degraded the Taliban's capacity, virtually no one was convinced that this would force the main Taliban factions to negotiate on America's terms.

Pakistani policy elite see the prospects for a successful end game in Afghanistan as bleak also because of the belief that the United States would want to retain some long-term security presence in Afghanistan, which will likely create unease among the Afghan Taliban and countries in the region, including Pakistan. In terms of Pakistan's role in the end game, project participants believed that the United States would continue to push the Pakistan military to "do more" to stamp out militant sanctuaries while Washington tries to open up direct channels for talks with the Taliban-with an eye on reducing reliance on Pakistan's security establishment in the political reconciliation process.

Regardless, there was no support for a breakdown of the Pakistan-US relationship. Project participants, however, felt that greater clarity in US and Pakistani policies was crucial in order to avoid failure in Afghanistan, to convince the Taliban of the validity of a power-sharing agreement, and to urge regional actors (including Pakistan) to stop hedging and to play a more constructive role.

Reacting to the United States: Project participants suggested that Pakistani policy faces a dilemma vis-a-vis the US. On the one hand, US military operations in Afghanistan are believed to be causing an internal backlash in terms of militancy and deepening the state-society rift within Pakistan; on the other hand, Pakistani policy elite appreciate that a premature US troop withdrawal would lead to added instability in Afghanistan.

Participants felt that from Islamabad's perspective, the longer US military operations continue without a clear path for political negotiations, the tougher it will become for Pakistan to manage its internal security balancing act. Islamabad therefore favours an immediate, yet patient effort at inclusive reconciliation.

Pakistani policy elite we spoke with tended to believe that a genuine intra-Afghan dialogue will inevitably allow a significant share of power to the Pashtuns and thus produce a dispensation in Kabul that is sensitive to Pakistani interests. Based on their perceptions about the current realities on the ground in Afghanistan, those tied to this narrative see any attempts to alienate Pashtuns in general, and the Taliban in particular, as shortsighted.

Nonetheless, the Taliban's perceived utility for Pakistan does not translate into a desire for a return to Taliban rule in Afghanistan. A bid to regain lost glory by Mullah Omar's Taliban would end up creating conditions in Afghanistan which run counter to Pakistani objectives, most notably stability. The Pakistani state is no longer believed to be interested in a return to complete Taliban rule akin to the 1990s.

Other Impediments to Successful End Game Negotiations: Project participants saw the following aspects as additional hurdles in ensuring successful negotiations and a durable settlement in Afghanistan. Viability of a regional framework: A regional framework which seeks neutrality and non-interference from countries in the neighbourhood received in principle support during the discussions held under the project. However, Pakistani elite are unsure of how a regional agreement will be enforced. Some participants worried that just the entrenched expectation of interference by others will prompt countries not to honour the arrangement in the first place as each seeks 'first mover's advantage' in establishing its influence in Afghanistan.

Taliban's willingness to negotiate: Pakistani policy elite claim a lack of clarity about the Afghan Taliban's willingness to participate in a political reconciliation process, or even to communicate directly with the United States beyond a point. Notwithstanding, they feel that the longer meaningful talks are delayed, the more challenging it will become for the Pakistani security establishment to persuade the main Taliban factions to come to the negotiating table.

Political situation in Afghanistan: Afghan President Hamid Karzai, while acknowledged as a legitimate leader, is also seen as having lost credibility among Afghan citizens. This is believed to be generating additional support for the insurgency and forcing Afghan groups opposed to his government to delay serious negotiations. A major challenge in this political environment lies in identifying representatives who could mediate and speak on behalf of different Afghan stakeholders.

Future of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF): Pakistani policy elite remain wary of the future role of the ANSF. Participants perceived the bloated size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to be unsustainable and a threat to Pakistan's interests. In terms of ANA's ethnic composition, the presence of non-Pashtun officers in key positions was highlighted to suggest that the makeup is more likely to fuel ethnic hostility than to maintain peace in Afghanistan.

The Post-Osama Bin Laden Calculus: Because most of our conversations with Pakistani foreign policy elite predated the May 2, 2011 killing of Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan, the project team subsequently requested participants to reflect on the impact of this development on the Afghan calculus for Pakistan and the United States.

Most respondents believed that bin Laden's death had no bearing on Pakistan's strategy in Afghanistan. As for the United States, there was a sense that bin Laden's departure will make it easier to create a 'narrative of victory' against Al Qaida and perhaps, to negotiate directly with Afghan Taliban leaders. A greater emphasis may be laid on distinguishing Al Qaeda from the Taliban to facilitate the process further.

That said, the growing mutual distrust between Pakistan and the United States, as exposed during the May 2 US unilateral raid that killed bin Laden, has raised doubts about the ability of the two countries to collaborate in attaining a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. The state of the bilateral relationship, it was feared, may end up overshadowing the otherwise considerable overlap on the issue of reconciliation between the American and Pakistani positions. Some of the respondents disagreed with this view, arguing that the Obama administration will continue reaching out to elicit Pakistan's support in nudging the main Afghan Taliban factions to the Negotiating table. ?

Excerpted from Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan's Foreign Policy Elite