An intractable situation

alochistan constitutes roughly 40 to 43 percent of the land mass with only a 5 to 7 percent share in the population. It has the richest mineral and natural resources in the country, yet, is the most impoverished area of Pakistan with the lowest literacy, health and infrastructure. The province also happens to house one of the longest popular insurgent moments in history dating back more than, five decades.

From 1973 to 1978 roughly 60,000 Baloch tribesmen and militia faced-off against the Pakistani army. Iran, eager to quell any similar uprising in its bordering area, contributed its air-force and personnel to the Pakistani efforts and bombarded Baloch villages into submission. Bhutto’s ouster, via Zia’s military coup, forced a calm onto the situation as Zia launched into his One-Pakistan-through-Islam program. The Afghanistan war, the Iranian revolution and Zia’s policies made Balochistan an island of outsider activity. US and UN aid for Afghani refugees poured into the metropolitan areas. During the 1990s, the Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif governments did little for Balochistan and Baloch nationalist parties floundered in exile.

After General Musharraf landed into power, he tried to foster new a relationship with

Balochistan. Over the last decade, the Kachhi Canal, Mirani Dam, Gwadar Port, Makran

Coastal Highway, Saindak Copper Project and Quetta Water Supply Scheme were announced by Islamabad. More than a 300 percent increase was made in the national budget for development programmes in Balochistan. Yet, all these things have failed to materialize and with the killing of Nawab Akbar Bhugtti and later of Marri, all hope for reconciliation is lost.

The present government in Balochistan lacks legitimacy as all Baloch nationalist parties’ boycotted 2008 elections in protest against an unannounced operation in Balochistan. According to author of bestselling The Way of the World, Ron Suskind, the current chief minister Nawab Aslam Raisani has links with intelligence agencies. The Baloch see him as an agent of the Pakistani establishment.

The Baloch Nationalist Movement (BNM) and the Baloch National Party (BNP) were once considered ‘moderates’ with leaders like Dr Abdul Hayee Baloch and Hasil Bizenjo. In recent years, Baloch nationalism in what is described as the “Balochistan belt” has silently but inevitably changed its direction from political activism to militant movement or active insurgency. The middle class that once denounced militancy has recently taken a very tough stance against the state of Pakistan and had turned hawkish. Now anyone who speaks of reconciliation with Islamabad or even provincial autonomy is seen as an “agent” of the intelligence bureaus.

Historically, the Pakistani establishment via its various intelligence agencies had played various Baloch tribes against each other. The intelligence officials stationed in Balochistan continue this policy of dividing the Baloch; however, its effectiveness has diminished. Across the province the younger generation has become completely radicalized and to them Balochistan is already an independent state. A visit to Balochistan University, Quetta, and Balochistan Engineering University, Khuzdar, confirms that the demand of “full autonomy” is widespread. Even the middle class Baloch will not settle on anything less than, “complete independence”.

Due to the highhanded techniques employed by Frontier Corps, which run a shadow government in Balochistan, strong militant nationalism has gained ground. The locus of militancy is in ‘Baloch’ districts such as Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Wadh (areas controlled by Mengals, Bugtis and Marris). However, anti-state sentiments are no longer confined to a specific area of Balochistan anymore.

Several analysts claim that the Pakistan military is in control, is ‘hyper active’, micro managing, and super sensitive about Balochistan. It regularly detains young Balochis from Lyari, Karachi, and allegedly indulges in human rights’ abuses and terror tactics. My research indicates that at least since 2009 for every non-Baloch killed in Balochistan, a Baloch is killed the next day. This pattern seems to indicate that the security establishment has decided to apply the ‘Swat Model’ to Balochistan by grossly misjudging the two insurgencies. Another terror device has been to throw Balochi activists from helicopters. Only recently two more mutilated bodies have been found in Mustang and Turbat.

Demographic changes manufactured by Islamabad by encouraging Pashtuns to settle in Balochistan have created tensions between the Baloch and Pashtun communities within the province. The Frontier Corps has become a colonial force viewed by locals as responsible for killing Balochis. Incidentally, FC is largely composed of Pashtuns (and some Punjabis). It is creating additional friction within Balochistan where the Baloch for the first time feels a sense of animosity against the Pashtuns who had been living in Balochistan for generations. An intelligence insider who had previously been in-charge of Balochistan confirms the fact that Mahmood Khan Achakzai, a veteran Pashtun leader in Balochistan, holds a key to the future of Balochistan, but for the Baloch he has decided to ‘look the other way’.

Actions by the tribals and the military response in Balochistan can be understood within the context of the acrimonious center-province relationship in Pakistan. The rights of provinces, minorities, and individuals are negotiated in a deeply contested manner where the military power brokers have the final word. Given the lack of political space, aggrieved parties are finding no alternative except violent struggle. Foreign intervention has also been reported but the evidence for that is sketchy and unclear. However, Balochistan is a largely a domestic issue and requires a political solution. Pakistani state has created similar situations in urban Sindh, Waziristan in the past. It is time that the civil and military leadership took this issue seriously and devise a political agreement with the people of Balochistan to save the federation.

December 31-January 6, 2010 - Vol. XXII, No. 46