Watch that tail

Malik Siraj
Akbar reviews a frightening new book about Pakistan’s role in the war on terror

Ten years after the launching of the war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the menace of terrorism continues to pose a threat to global peace as vehemently as it did on September 11, 2011. For the United States of America, the war is far from over in spite of the death of 2318 international (including 1472 American) soldiers. Inside Afghanistan, the Taliban control over 80% of the war-ravaged country. For Pakistan, the war has literally shifted inside its territory in such a draconian form that it now jeopardizes the very foundations of the nuclear-armed Islamic republic.

Zahid Hussain, one of Pakistan’s highly credible journalists, has critically documented and analyzed the war on terror. A correspondent for the Wall Street Journal and Newsweek, Hussain first questioned the commitment of certain sections within Pakistan’s security establishment in his 2007 book ‘Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam’. While liberal forces in Pakistan lauded former president General Pervez Musharraf’s decision to join the U.N-backed invasion of Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime, hardliners inside the Pakistani army loathed the decision. On their part, the religious parties rallied against Musharraf’s support of the war and called it a “sellout” of Pakistan’s sovereignty to “anti-Islam” America.

Hussain’s latest book is ‘The Scorpion’s Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan and How It Threatens America’. It is a candid account of the repeated blunders Islamabad has made over these last ten years while halfheartedly fighting the war against terrorists. Concessions, deals and amnesty offers to the Taliban and their supporters have brought the war from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Today a new generation of Al-Qaeda operatives is flourishing inside Pakistan.

Ostensibly engaging an American audience, the book provides a detailed historical review of the gradual Islamization of Pakistan. Though the right wing opposed the very idea of Pakistan in 1947 by seeing it as a “British conspiracy” to divide the Muslims of South Asia, the country fell into the hands of Islamic orthodoxy soon after the death of its “secular” founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Subsequently, every ruler exploited the “Islamic card” for advancing political agendas and prolonging his rule.

Unlike in the Cold War period, the Pakistani army did not enthusiastically welcome the Americans to the region in the aftermath of 9/11. With a new generation of military leaders who were inducted and indoctrinated during General Zia-ul-Haq’s age of Islamization, the task of defeating the Taliban was destined to become tough. Conservatives in the army and the media saw the anti-Taliban drive as America’s rather than Pakistan’s war.

According to Hussain, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were two totally different entities prior to 9/11. The Taliban’s spiritual leader Mullah Omar disliked Bin Laden so much that he once called him a “donkey”. The Saudi billionaire moved to Pakistan’s mountainous terrain in Waziristan after the beginning of the war. He hired fighters, trained them and offered $250 to each fighter. Bin Laden’s money and urgent need for a safe haven and the Taliban’s quest for substantial financial support brought the Taliban and Al-Qaeda close to each other.

After the invasion of Afghanistan, foreign fighters arrived in Waziristan where their strongest supporter was Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a demagogue who prepared a militia of four thousand fighters against the coalition forces.

Another important player, the Haqqani Network, which has enormous influence on both sides of the Af-Pak border, is believed to have contacts with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which views the network as an “asset” that will prevent any kind of Afghan government from getting too close to India. Headed by Sirajuddin Haqqani, a son of legendary fighter Jalaluddin Haqqani, the Haqqani Network has influence over the militant groups based in Waziristan. The organization, which accepted responsibility for an assassination attempt on President Hamid Karzai, even facilitated a deal between the Pakistani army and Hafiz Gul Bahadur.

“Dozens of officers and soldiers quit the armed forces and joined the anti-American resistance in Afghanistan, providing the militants with professional training and logistics,” discloses Hussain alarmingly.

Signs of Al-Qaida’s collaboration with local militants and penetration into Pakistan’s armed forces became evident in December 2003, when there were two assassination attempts on President Musharraf. These were masterminded by senior Libyan Al-Qaeda leader Abu Faraj al-Libbi, and with the help of personnel from the Pakistan Air Force.

While the U.S forces battled inside Afghanistan, in South Waziristan Al-Qaeda maintained fifteen training camps, making it the world’s largest Al-Qaeda command-and-control system and training facility.

Musharraf’s plea in February 2004 to the tribal notables of Waziristan to oust foreigners from their territory was spurned, which resulted in a fresh military “operation” in South Waziristan in March. A young charismatic Waziri called Nek Mohammad, who had previously participated in anti-US battle at the end of 2001, now led the militants in South Waziristan.

The operation ended in a complete fiasco, forcing the Pakistani military to ink the Shakai Agreement at Nek Mohammad’s residence on April 24th, 2004. Under this agreement, Nek Mohammad was granted amnesty and allowed to retain his weapons. Dozens of his fighters were released. Foreign fighters were once again offered amnesty, provided that they agreed to leave the tribal area and stop cross-border terrorism. The truce was violated by militants who launched more attacks until the army launched a fresh offensive. Nek Mohammad was killed in June 2004 in a missile attack and became for his followers a martyr and a legend.

On February 7, 2005, the army signed another peace deal with Baithullah Mehsud, Nek Mohammad’s successor, in Sararogha, area under which the army agreed to withdraw troops and gave millions of dollars for the development of the tribal areas. But Baithullah’s forces still continued to kill tribal elders.

The appointment of Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzai, an anti-operation military officer, as the Governor of the North Western Frontier Province in May 2006, was a setback to the war against terrorism. He emboldened the militants by signing the infamous Waziristan Accord on September 5 with Gul Bahadur and another militant leader Abdul Khaliq. The Accord ended the military operation in the tribal region, withdrew forces, and released all militants captured by the military during the operation. In addition, compensation was also provided to the families of the killed militants, “effectively legitimize their activities.”

By 2007, a distinctive Pakistani Taliban movement emerged. They had established an Islamic Emirate of Waziristan, which comprised the breakaway factions of militant groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. Once restricted to Waziristan, now the Pakistani Taliban spread to other tribal regions such as Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai and Khyber.

Zahid Hussain says: “The Pakistani Taliban was even more brutal than their Afghan comrades. Beheadings and public executions of opponents and government officials became common practice, and videos of those killings were distributed widely to spread fear.”

Islamic militants formally began to confront Islamabad after the launching of Operation Silence in July 10, 2007 in Islamabad, which was the most violent operation in the history of the federal capital. The operation was launched against the agitating extremists of Lal Masjid who were demanding the imposition of Islamic law and had taken to abducting policemen as well as ordinary citizens.

“More than eighty-eight bombings killed 1,188 people and wounded 3, 209 in the first year following the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) siege, an average of three people dying and more than seven people wounded every day from July 2007 to July 2008,” Zahid recalls.

Baithullah Mehsud unilaterally pulled out of the February 2005 agreement with the government of Pakistan by accusing it of re-deploying troops in his area.

On August 30th, Mehsud captured 260 soldiers, seventeen trucks and a cache of weapons belonging to the Pakistani army near Laddah military fort, only twenty-five miles from the regional headquarters at Wana. Many of the soldiers surrendered without firing a bullet. Baithullah emerged as a very powerful terrorist who overpowered the entire Pakistani state and the UN said in September 2007 that he accounted for 80% of the suicide bombings inside Pakistan. The detained troopers were released on November 4 after the government conceded to all demands of Mehsud. This was followed in December by Operation Earthquake in South Waziristan. 200, 000 people fled their homes because of the conflict.

The US and Pakistan began to suspect each other as the former launched drone strikes inside Pakistani territory to target the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, while the latter said drone attacks were proving counterproductive because of heavy civilian causalities. According to the writer, “From 2007 to 2009 at least twelve of the top twenty high value al-Qaeda operatives, along with dozens of lesser figures, are believed to have been killed by drones, and many bases and safe houses were also destroyed... More than seventy strikes between 2006 and 2009 killed more than seven hundred civilians and only fourteen Al Qaeda leaders... Ten civilians died in the drone attacks for every militant killed.”

In this way ‘The Scorpion’s Tail’ clearly exposes the roots of Pakistan’s frustrating failure to grapple with Islamist militancy. Nonetheless, the writer misleads his readers by opining that the Taliban movement is largely a Pashtun war. As a matter of fact neither the Taliban neither flaunted their Pashtun identity nor demanded special rights and opportunities for the Pashtuns living in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Additionally, this oft-repeated claim (Zahid Hussain is not the only one to make it) exempts from serious scrutiny the Punjabi Taliban, as well as all those foreign fighters and their supporters inside the Pakistani military. Are these nefarious forces also to be appeased by the granting of Pashtun rights?

The language in ‘The Scorpion’s Tail’ is not as bold or clear as in ‘Frontline Pakistan’, but the book is worth reading for the startling revelations it makes about Pakistan’s “deep state”, which has succeeded not only in terrorizing the world but also in poisoning itself.

Malik Siraj Akbar is a Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow at Arizona State University’s Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication

February 11-17, 2011 - Vol. XXII, No. 52